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Map 1. Singapore, Johor and Riau Islands 
 
 



















Southeast Asia in the post-war1 period has been considered a place with changing 
dynamics, such as strengthened foreign relations, reduced intra-regional tensions and 
enhanced domestic security. Although there still remain local insurgencies, political 
disagreements and ideological divergences, much progress in regional economic 
cooperation and integration has been made by the Southeast Asian nations.2 The 
achievement was further encouraged and formalized during the Bali Summit in 1976, 
when official cooperation within ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 
countries was declared. Within this context, then deputy prime minister of Singapore, 
Goh Chok Tong, announced the establishment of the SIJORI (Singapore-Johor-Riau 
Islands) Growth Triangle in 1989 with the purpose of economic cooperation between 
the respective regions. This arrangement also attracted great interest from other 
regions; thus, when more Malaysian and Indonesian states joined the partnership, a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed on 17 December 1994 by the 
representatives of the participating countries to expand SIJORI into a new grouping, 
the IMS-GT (Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle). 
                                                          
1 In this study, ‘post-war’ refers to post-Pacific War. 
2 Leung, Improving Southeast Asian Security within the ASEAN Framework: Insurgencies and 
Counterinsurgencies. 
2  Genesis of a Growth Triangle 
The constituent parts of the SIJORI Growth Triangle included three individual 
states: a city-state (Singapore), a state within a federal system (Johor) and a province 
under a unitary system (the Riau Islands). Singapore was represented by its national 
leaders while Johor was represented by its state leaders and Riau was by its 
government leaders from Jakarta. Attributed to the effort made by the three states, 
the SIJORI Growth Triangle has played a crucial role in stimulating regional 
economic development since its establishment. It opened up new economic 
opportunities and allowed a considerable transfer of commodities, capital, 
technology, human resources and knowledge beyond and across national 
boundaries. 3 In Johor, the economy benefited greatly from the close ties with 
Singapore. In the late 1990s, more than 40 per cent of Singapore’s trade with Malaysia 
was done through Singapore each year. Up to 1998, Singapore became the largest 
source of foreign investment in Johor and in the same year about 50,000 Johoreans 
crossed into Singapore daily to work there. The Riau Islands also picked up economic 
momentum with imminent bilateral links with Singapore. In Batam, Singapore was 
the largest foreign investor. The US$200 million Batam Industrial Park was jointly 
developed by Singapore and Indonesian public and private sectors. 4 The Riau 
Islands hence rapidly became a regional industrial centre and tourist destination.  
 Although this regional cooperation scheme was materialized very recently, as a 
matter of fact, the formation of regional connections and cooperation is historically 
rooted. As early as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there was a unified 
kingdom in this region – the Johor-Riau Sultanate, the territory of which 
approximately covered the entire area of the triangle.5 The Malay authority of the 
kingdom was destroyed by the Europeans in the late eighteenth century, resulting in 
the formation of three different polities in the nineteenth century under colonial 
influence: Singapore, Johor State and the Riau Residency. This division still remains 
today’s border between Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia well into the 
post-colonial period, except during the Japanese occupation when the three regions 
were placed under a unified Japanese military administration. Such a political 
separation, however, could not cut off the socio-economic ties within the triangle. 
Carl Trocki describes a Chinese network covering the three regions, which to a large 
extent was created by Chinese activities in the form of kongsi6, opium farming, and 
                                                          
3 Chou, 'Multiple Realities of the Growth Triangle: Mapping Knowledge and the Politics of 
Mapping'. 
4 Thambipillaia, 'The ASEAN Growth Areas: Sustaining the Dynamism'. Thambipillaia, 'The 
ASEAN Growth Triangle: The Convergence of National and Sub-National Interests'. 
5 Andaya, The Kingdom of Johor, 1641-1728: A Study of Economic and Political Developments in 
the Straits of Malacca. 
6 Or clan society, an organization found among oversea Chinese communities to overcome 
economic difficulty, social ostracism, etc.  
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gambir7 and pepper plantations particularly in the nineteenth-century, prior to the 
influx of Western capital.8 This network as an early type of regional growth triangle 
was further identified and underlined by Freek Colombijn. He attributes the 
formation of this nineteenth century network crossing the Strait of Singapore, to the 
cooperation of Chinese planters and their plantation of gambir and pepper in the 
Riau Islands and the financial capital and processing industry in Singapore.9 Aside 
from these visible, legal and formal connections, there are also scholars focusing on 
the invisible, illegal, illicit and informal aspects – piracy and smuggling. Ota Atsushi 
depicts how pirates in these areas established and operated their military and 
commercial networks, and how the Europeans and locals dealt with piracy.10 Such a 
type of regional network, mainly created by illegal goods, such as salvage, opium, 
weapons, raw silk and linen, suggested intensive interaction across the Strait of 
Singapore from another perspective.11 
All three regions used to be incorporated in a unified sultanate, but the conflicts 
between the Westerners and indigenous Malay rulers in obtaining both political and 
economic interest resulted in its break-up. On the one hand, it was political 
relationships, social structures and economic connections helping the construction of 
modern political borders. On the other hand, informal connections also influenced 
the colonial state building. The illicit activities of people, objects and ideas crossing 
the border represented a challenge to the authority of the state and the modernist 
project of state formation.12 As E. Tagliacozzo has argued, during the colonial period 
the border was ‘quickly hardening, with dire consequences for politics, trade, and 
movement for a wide range of local actors, but resistance to state formation in the 
periphery and the laying of hard and fast boundaries was determined and swift’. The 
establishment of modern borders has involved a protracted struggle between 
demarcating states and recalcitrant local communities.13 
                                                          
7 A plant originally used as the ingredient of betel drug, later also used in tanning. 
8 Trocki, Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore, 1800-1910. Turnbull, A 
History of Modern Singapore, 1819-2005. 
9 Colombijn, 'Of Money and Trees: A 19th-century Growth Triangle'. 
10 Ota, 'The Business of Violence: Piracy around Riau, Lingga, and Singapore , 1820-1840'. 
11 Rosenberg, 'Book Review: Elusive Pirates, Pervasive Smugglers: Violence and Clandestine 
Trade in the Greater China Seas'. 
12 Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders : Smuggling and States along a Southeast Asian 
Frontier, 1865-1915. Tagliacozzo and Chang, Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities, and 
Networks in Southeast Asia. Gainsborough, On the Borders of State Power: Frontiers in the 
Greater Mekong Sub-region, 105. 
13 Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, 366. 
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Singapore was separated from the sultanate and set up as a trading post by 
Raffles in 1819. Later on in 1826, it was established as a part of the British Straits 
Settlements and became the government centre for the Straits Settlements.14 In the 
years following its establishment, Singapore rapidly achieved paramountcy in the 
maritime commerce of Southeast Asia, a position earned partly by its strategic 
location and partly by its jealously protected free-port status.15 It survived as a 
British base, living not by taxation upon trade but on the trading activity itself. Its 
free status turned the island within a few decades into the most flourishing port 
Southeast Asia had ever seen, a centre of a vigorous and politically demanding 
mercantile community.16 As an important entrepôt, Singapore has established broad 
external linkages with the world, supported by the prosperity of international trade 
with frequent communications between Singapore and other regions.17 It was the 
rise of Singapore that created a gateway to the world economy, which was essentially 
important for the economic development of Johor and the Riau Islands. 
The final Johor-Riau separation took place in the mid-nineteenth century, when 
the Johor-Riau Sultanate was split into present-day Johor and the state of 
Riau-Lingga. Johor eventually came under British control, officially becoming a 
protectorate in 1914 with a British advisor present in the court.18 For the rest of the 
territory, a new Riau-Lingga kingdom was built on the ashes of the Johor-Riau 
Sultanate. Sultan Sulaiman Badrul Shah signed an agreement with the Dutch, 
surrendering sovereignty over his part of the territory to the Dutch in the early 1860s. 
Sulaiman was the first sultan to be appointed by a Dutch Governor-General and he 
worked successfully to improve the economy of the sultanate.19 His successors were 
not as obedient as him and the Dutch finally subjugated and dissolved the rebellious 
sultanate in 1911. Different from Singapore’s position as a world trade centre, the 
economic development in Johor and the Riau Islands relied much on regional 
production in which both large European plantations and local smallholders exerted 
their influence. 
 
1. Research period and historiography 
Regional socio-political conditions experienced drastic changes, especially since the 
start of building colonial states in eighteenth century. However, this matter is still less 
studied. This study focuses on the regional economic connections for the period 
1870s-1970s, when Europeans replaced Chinese in terms of economic significance in 
                                                          
14 Chandler and Steinberg, In Search, 137. 
15 Ibid., 137. But Huff emphasizes the importance of geographical location. 
16 Ibid., 136. 
17 Wong, The Trade of Singapore, 1819-69. 
18 Butlin, Geographies of Empire: European Empires and Colonies, c. 1880-1960, 70. 
19 Matheson, 'Strategies of Survival: The Malay Royal Line of Lingga-Riau'. 
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the late colonial period and when the status of Malays began rising after achieving 
independence.  
The choice for the 1870s is for several other reasons. First, in contrast to limited 
colonial activities before the 1870s,20 the period that came after marked a new era for 
the history of Southeast Asia, represented by new shapes of European empires and 
considerable colonial expansion.21 In a political sense, it witnessed an intensification 
of European influence in existing imperial territories and the rapid acquisition of new 
territories, facilitated by the Anglo-Dutch Sumatra Treaty of 1871, which resolved 
territorial disputes between the two main colonial powers involved.22 On the British 
side, the Straits Settlements’ transformation to a Crown Colony in 1867 further 
strengthened its direct official governance in the Malay world. Meanwhile, in Johor 
and the Riau Archipelago, colonial administration showed a pattern of indirect rule. 
Second, the 1870s saw the final break-up of the old Johor-Riau Sultanate. Abu Bakar, 
temenggong of Johor, declared himself as a maharaja (sultan), assumed control over 
Muar and declared himself an independent ruler in 1868. In the Riau Archipelago, a 
Resident was appointed to represent the reality of Dutch political dominance, 
whereas the Malay sultan was only regarded as an honorific title. Third, external 
factors, such as the wide use of steamers and telegraph, and the opening of the Suez 
Canal, brought regional economic development, especially in trade. It accelerated 
regional integration into the world market. 
 This study brings the analysis up to the 1970s, when Western colonialism 
disappeared from this region and local powers intensively stimulated regional 
economic cooperation and political development by the establishment of ASEAN in 
1967. Political pacification created new stimuli for possible economic recovery by the 
signing of multilateral agreements and resulted, ultimately, in the formation of the 
SIJORI Growth Triangle. Regional economic development thus stepped into a new 
era with the process of industrialisation, impressively referred to as the 'Asian 
Miracle' from the 1980s onwards. 
This period is not only largely neglected in historiography but also crucial for 
understanding current potentials and bottlenecks in the SIJORI. Only several years 
after the establishment of SIJORI, many scholars have focused on this topic. Most of 
them have sought the rationales behind and predicted the process, such as Myo 
Thant, Lee Tsao Yuan, David Wadley and Hayu Parasati, Pushpa Thambipillai, etc.23 
                                                          
20 Butlin, Geographies, 76-7. 
21 Wesseling, The European Colonial Empires: 1815-1919, 75. 
22 Butlin, Geographies, 32-3. 
23 Thant et al., Growth Triangles in Asia: A New Approach to Regional Economic Cooperation. 
Lee, Growth Triangle: The Johor-Singapore-Riau Experience. Wadley and Parasati, 'Inside South 
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However, the historical aspects are neglected by them. Nevertheless, it has been 
widely accepted that political separation of this region in the colonial period did not 
lead to an economic and social break-up. The economic development of Southeast 
Asia as a whole since the 1870s has attracted a vast amount of scholarship. 
In general, as argued by D. P. Chandler and D. J. Steinberg, Southeast Asia in 
the colonial period has been considered as an exporter of raw materials of tropical 
agricultural commodities and mining products and an importer of Western 
manufactured goods determined by colonial policies and other impersonal forces of 
the world market. By means of these commodities, Southeast Asia entered the 
emerging world economy, establishing various links with other regions. 24 This 
trade-directed economic development was thus characterized by export industries, 
involving millions of people and vast planting and trading areas, as a consequence of 
scientific and industrial revolution. 25  On the Malay Peninsula, the once great 
importance of trade as the economic base of policies was retarded from the late 
seventeenth century, not to be restored until the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the 
pattern of trade – tropical agricultural raw materials and some mining products for 
imported manufactured goods – continued through the export boom of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The same situation held true in the 
Netherlands Indies, where export of plantation commodities boomed under the 
influence of liberal economic policies from 1870. Economically important products – 
coffee, sugar, tobacco and tin – were, or came to be, concentrated in the three centres 
of Java, the northern Philippines, and the Straits Settlements (SS). The rest of island 
Southeast Asia was both economically marginal and politically marginal.26 Such a 
picture of discrepancy between the core and the marginal could also be applied to 
describe the different economic patterns of Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands: 
Singapore’s predominance in trading and shipping, which relied directly or indirectly 
on Johor and the Riau Islands. 
With regard to the economic development of Singapore, first Wong Lin Ken, 
followed by W. G. Huff, has described a continuous trade expansion and port 
development from 1819 till the modern period. Their global perspective puts 
Singapore to a world context. Guided by economic development theory, W. G. Huff 
describes the development process of Singapore’s port economy in detail. Before the 
Pacific War, it performed as a staple port, without agricultural and industrial 
foundation, relying heavily on the commercial products from Malaya and Indonesia, 
which were also fundamental to its post-war development.27 By the 1970s, when 
                                                                                                                                         
East Asia’s Growth Triangles'. Thambipillai, 'The ASEAN Growth Areas'. 
24 Chandler and Steinberg, In Search, 167. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 141. 
27 Huff, The Economic Growth of Singapore: Trade and Development in the Twentieth Century, 
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manufacturing became the economy’s leading sector, Singapore could no longer be 
defined as a staple port, but rather as a centre of protected import substitution 
industrialization.28  
 By contrast, the study of economy in Johor, as a district region, is relatively 
lacking. It is usually combined with the economic history of the Straits Settlements, 
and later on with Malaysia.29 Even so, Johor does not receive much attention in this 
general picture, despite some work done by Trocki30, Patrick Guinness31 and C. M. 
Turnbull.32 Their research shows that the economic embryo of Johor was nourished 
by the introduction of Chinese gambir and pepper plantations in the 1840s; the 
plants had been cultivated in the Riau Islands and Singapore before they reached 
Johor. 33 When these traditional agricultural plantations declined at the end of 
nineteenth century, rubber plantation took their place, facilitating the formation of 
the modern economic sector. However, as argued by Colin Barlow and John Drabble, 
rubber cultivation in Malaya was concentrated on the western side of the peninsula, 
namely the Federated Malay States (FMS).34 After 1970, Johor came under the 
guidelines of the New Economic Policy (NEP), with increasing economic 
opportunities for Malays. Johor was integrated gradually into the national economy 
of Malaysia. 
Nevertheless, the significance of Johor in this general picture needs more 
examination. In its long course of economic development, several sub-phases can be 
identified according to the shift of capital or economic pattern: Chinese domination 
in traditional plantations before the twentieth century; the expansion of European 
capital in the first half of twentieth century; and the formation of a state economy 
after independence with focus on the Malays. The changing power of these different 
ethnic groups in Johor’s economic development resulted in a controversy about the 
                                                                                                                                         
28. 
28 Ibid., 34. 
29 Important works include Cho, The Malaysian Economy: Spatial Perspectives. Rahman et al., 
The Maritime Economy of Malaysia. 
30 Trocki, Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy: A Study of the Asian Opium Trade. 
Trocki, Prince of Pirates: The Temenggongs and the Development of Johor and Singapore, 
1784-1885. 
31 Guinness, On the Margin of Capitalism: People and Development in Mukim Plentong, Johor, 
Malaysia. 
32 Turnbull, A History of Singapore, 1819-1975. Turnbull, The Straits Settlements 1826-67: 
Indian Presidency to Crown colony. 
33 Guinness, On the Margin, 2-3. 
34 Barlow and Drabble, 'Government and the Emerging Rubber Industries in Indonesia and 
Malaya, 1900-1940'.  
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reasons for the decline of Chinese plantations (gambir, pepper and coffee), the rise of 
Western rubber plantations from the end of the nineteenth century, and favourable 
policies towards the Malaysia from the 1950s. Trocki attributes the decline to plant 
disease, lower world market prices and labour shortages.35 The same factors are also 
applied to the Riau Islands and are partly indicated by the trade structures of 
Singapore. It helps explain the mutual relationships of the three in the context of 
British and Dutch expansion. 36  The rise of national consciousness with the 
enhancement of Malays brings about another controversy. During the colonial 
period, kampong residents (also called kampong Malays 37 ) had already been 
increasingly involved in plantation work, but they were marginalized in the 
expansion of Johor economy due to their low economic status.38 Although post-war 
government policy deliberately raised their political status, their economic 
incapability resulted that the ethnic Chinese still played a dominant role in the 
economic field. Therefore, the post-war ethnic relationship became an uncertain 
factor in economic development in Johor. 
 Different from both Singapore and Johor, economic development in the Riau 
Islands represented a combination of plantations and trade as shown by historians. 
Commodities exported from the Riau Islands from the 1870s onwards included the 
traditional agricultural products of gambir, pepper, gutta-percha and palm fruits, and 
mining products, such as tin.39 From the 1920s, rubber and petroleum (in the Lingga 
Islands) dominated the trade. The importance of these two products in the regional 
economy has been maintained up to present times. However, except the traditional 
agricultural products which were locally produced in a large amount, only a small 
quantity of tin was produced in Bintan, Singkep and the Lingga Islands. Moreover, 
the majority of rubber exported from the Riau Islands was planted in the plantations 
on the mainland Sumatra, whereas all petroleum products came from the oil fields in 
Sumatra and Borneo. This situation indicates that the transhipments in the Riau 
Islands performed a key role in the entrepôt trade between the Outer Islands of the 
Netherlands Indies and Singapore. Attributed to its strategic position, more than 65 
per cent of the commodities from the Riau Residency were exported to Singapore, 
and only 28 per cent to Java. As a result, early as the nineteenth century, a number of 
coastal towns in the Netherlands Indies, such as Tanjung Pinang (1829), Bandar 
Lampung (1839) and Sabang (1899) were selected as free ports. In the Riau Islands, 
both Europeans and Chinese dominated the regional export business, although the 
                                                          
35 Trocki, Prince of Pirates, 195. 
36 Ibid., 6. 
37 In Malay: ummah. It refers to Malays living in the villages, in contrast to urban Malays 
(rakyat). 
38 Trocki, Prince of Pirates, 12. 
39 SHS (1879, 1910), MCKS (1938). 
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role of indigenous Malays could not be ignored.40 Economic development in the 
Riau Islands has been depicted as a plural economy in which both large European 
plantations and local smallholders exerted their influence. 
 In short, current historiography describes the regional economies individually 
and points out some factors accounting for the regional development. However, with 
regard to economic development of the three regions as a whole and the internal 
relationships between these factors, the study is insufficient. From a macro 
perspective, we see a general picture of economic networks in Southeast Asia: 
world-shipping centre at Singapore, the origin of primary commodities in the Malay 
Peninsula and the Netherlands Indies. But from a micro perspective, the attention 
has been unbalanced. The central position of Singapore has already been established 
in academic works, whereas the individual economic development of Johor and the 
Riau Islands has often been linked to the economic performance of British Malaya 
and the Netherlands Indies. A biased perspective erases the memory of the glories of 
the old Johor-Riau Sultanate. Rather than see it from either a Eurocentric perspective 
or a local ideology, in this study we have tried to stand outside and bridge the gap, 
searching for unity between them.  
 
2. Research question, methodology, sources and structure 
Although we should be cautious to identify the effect of these historical events, 
undoubtedly, colonial legacies have strong impact on present decision-making. 
Departing from this point, this study tries to reveal the economic connections within 
the SIJORI Growth Triangle covering Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands, to 
answer the central research question: how did the regional economic system integrate 
into the world market in the context of globalization? 
 The research question is addressed in a twofold manner: internal integration to 
strengthen the existing regional economic system and external integration vis-à-vis 
the world market. The formation of a regional economy is indicated by three aspects 
in this study: trade, shipping and capital, which should be analysed within a 
socio-political background. The economic development with mutual connections 
between the three states has been attributed to individual comparative advantage of 
resource endowment, strategic position and favourable policies. In this study, we try 
to seek more factors beyond the range of comparative advantage and to adopt 
Porter’s Diamond Model of competitive advantage to reveal the factors for the 
different paths of economic development in Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands. In 
                                                          
40 Touwen, Extremes in the Archipelago: Trade and Economic Development in the Outer Islands 
of Indonesia, 1900-1942. 
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addition, their individual performance was not an isolated process, but deeply 
interwoven with the world economy. We apply David Held, Anthony McGrew and 
other co-authors’ concept of ‘global transformations’ to measure the integration of 
the SIJORI region as a whole with the outside world in the process of globalization to 
demonstrate the relationship between globalization and regionalization. 
 The study is based on the consultation of trade and shipping statistics, annual 
reports, bank reports and other official and unofficial publications covering a wide 
range of languages. Although these sources provide sufficient data for this study, the 
information remains unbalanced. First, these sources are sufficient for the analysis of 
official trade and shipping connections. On the other hand, hardly any sources exist 
that give information on illicit trade, piracy and other financial dealings. Therefore, 
this study can only marginally touch on illegal, invisible or secret connections. 
Second, primary sources are not available for the whole period, especially concerning 
the period of Japanese occupation. The discussion hence relies on the secondary 
literature. Third, many statistics concerning the post-war situation relate to the 
national level. An examination of the relationship between the national economy and 
the regional economy is required. 
Based on these concepts, the rest of this dissertation is designed as follows: 
Chapter 1 outlines an analytical framework presenting the theoretical models. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the socio-political background of Singapore, Johor 
and the Riau Islands, with specific attention given to political transformations and 
ethnic relationships. Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 focus on the three networks 
individually in three spheres – trade, shipping and capital – in the period under study. 
Each of the three chapters describes both individual performance and mutual 
connections. The points discussed in these four chapters are synthesized using the 
Porter’s Diamond Model to show the process of regional internal integration. 
Chapter 6 analyses the external link of the growth triangle by using the globalization 
model. If without specification, all the values in this study are in current prices. When 
describing long-term trends, we consult a regional price index or deflator to reveal 
















This study aims at describing both internal and external integration of SIJORI from a 
historical perspective. These two patterns of integration are analysed in a twofold 
analytical framework, which is outlined in this chapter. 
 
1. Connections in the growth triangle 
‘Growth triangles’ are considered as a unique Asian solution to the operational 
problems of regional cooperation among countries at different stages of economy 
development with different social and economic systems.1 Thus immediately after 
the establishment of SIJORI, many other regional cooperation schemes were created, 
such as Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT), the Greater 
Mekong Subregion (GMS), the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN 
Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA), Northeast Asia Economic Cooperation. Nevertheless, 
SIJORI by far was the most successful. Therefore, understanding the experience of 
SIJORI can help deepen our knowledge about other regional cooperation. 
                                                          
1 Arnold, 'Growth Triangles in Asia: A New Approach to Regional Economic Cooperation 
Edited by Myo Thant, Min Tang, and Hiroshi Kakazu (Book Review)'. 
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Within the SIJORI Growth Triangle, theoretical rationales for this regional 
cooperation have been investigated by both officials and scholars. At its heart lies an 
improved redistribution and exchange of regional comparative advantage, such as 
massive flows of foreign investment, geographical proximity, labour, capital, 
technology, etc.2 On the one hand, Singapore, as the largest trade and financial 
centre in Southeast Asia, is endowed with considerable capital, skilled labour, high 
technology, an easy access to world markets, and an advanced infrastructure. By 
contrast, the lack of these advantages has been a check on economic development in 
Johor and the Riau Islands. On the other hand, Singapore is a very tiny island without 
natural resources, sufficient land and unskilled labour, which, however, are abundant 
and rarely utilized in adjacent Johor and the Riau Islands. Such complementary 
differences create a wide scope for their cooperation. 
Such cooperation is materialized by various connections between the three 
states, perceived in four dimensions in this study: socio-political aspect, trade, 
shipping and capital.  
 
Socio-political change 
According to Chandler and Steinberg, colonial powers did not simply seize control of 
pre-existing states. Cutting across established lines of political association or 
amalgamating previously separate societies, they created new political frameworks 
and imposed on the Southeast Asian states a new order, which altered economic life.3 
The political evolution was further complicated by the participation of multi-ethnic 
groups in this region, e.g. Europeans, Chinese, Malays, Indians and Bugis. 4 
Therefore, the relationships between the British and Dutch, between Malay chieftains 
situated in the three regions, between Europeans and Malays, and between other 
ethnic groups was reflected in issues such as the succession to a throne, the 
management of labour, the acceptance of an advisor, the organization of the Chinese 
population and similar matters. As a result, various links and networks covering the 
whole region were created: the genealogical links between Malay royal families, 
regional Chinese networks and Western international networks.5 
                                                          
2 Thant et al., Growth Triangles. Lee, Growth Triangle. 
3 Chandler and Steinberg, In Search, 167. 
4 The study of Bugis in this study remains a difficult point. Very little information is available. 
Chandler and Steinberg have written that the Dutch in 1784 expelled the Bugis from both 
Selangor and Riau. At Riau, they extracted from the Malay Sultan Mahmud a treaty permitting 
the establishment of a Dutch garrison and Resident on Pulau Penyengat, but this arrangement 
had scarcely become effective when Ilanun sea raiders from Borneo, summoned by Sultan 
Mahmud, expelled the Dutch in turn – though Mahmud and the Malay also left, fearing Dutch 
revenge. The Bugis remained for the moment in Selangor and in their possessions in Borneo. 
See ibid., 135. 
5 Ibid. 
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 It is therefore necessary to first pay attention to regional socio-political aspects, 
surveying the evolution of political changes and the social structure. The intricate 
political relationships and the individual economic attitudes of various ethnic groups 
resulted in both competition and cooperation in regional economic development. 
This point is explained by following specific aspects in this study: political 
transformations, political relationship between governments, population growth, 
demographic composition and ethnic relationships. 
 
Trade connection 
A trade network is created by trade flows between a port and its hinterland, and 
between port and its foreland. Singapore was an international trading port with 
almost the entire Johor and part of the Riau Islands as its hinterland. The vast 
foreland for imported goods included the destinations all over the world. Ports in 
Johor and the Riau Islands, such as Johor Bahru, Tanjung Puteri, Muar, Batu Pahat, 
Tanjung Pinang, Pulau Sambu, played a role as feeder ports, collecting commodities 
from the production areas, and then transporting them to Singapore for international 
transhipment. However, such a pattern was influenced by political intentions. In the 
colonial period, the Dutch intended to prohibit ports in the Riau Islands inclining to 
Singapore, although following natural economics, it was easier for Singapore than 
Batavia to attract shipments from the Riau Islands. The same policy of avoiding 
Singapore was also pursued in post-war Indonesia and Malaysia for the development 
of their national economies. The rivalrous relationship between Singapore and ports 
in Johor and the Riau Islands were directly reflected by the trade conducted both at 
the international level and the regional level through business firms. The rise and fall 
of these companies during the research period determined the range and intensity of 
regional mutual connections and indicate how they connected to the outside world, 




A shipping network is created by vessels, acting as the carriers of trade. Here 
attention is paid to the freighter rather than the passenger ship. Singapore, in this 
study, is fed by commodities coming from a hinterland which can be described as 
organized and developed land space connected to a port by means of transport 
routes.6 Two types of shipping networks are identified: an international shipping 
network comprising ocean vessels transporting cargoes to and from the world 
                                                          
6 Weigend, 'Some Elements in the Study of Port Geography', 192-3. 
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market, 7 and an internal shipping network with vessels navigating within the 
Singapore, Johor and Riau Islands waters. The extent and intensity of both networks 
can be measured by both the volume of outbound and inbound shipping, the number 
of shipping routes, or net tonnage moving in a certain direction, or in terms of origin 
and destination of cargo.8 It is also an indicator assessing the strength of this region 
connecting to the outside world and measuring the degree to which the region is 
involved in world trade and economy. These two patterns of connections are 
reflected by the shipping companies: European shipping companies carried more 
international shipping, whereas Chinese and indigenous shipping companies 
performed a more important role in regional navigation. 
 
Capital connection 
The third network is created by capital investment in different sectors: agriculture, 
manufacturing and services (especially financial services). The relationship between 
the different sectors can be illustrated by the creation of ‘linkages’:9 
1. When a leading-sector industry makes use of input from other local industries, it 
generates ‘backward linkages’ (transportation and seaports, a shortage of social 
overhead capital). 
2. When the output of the leading industry is used by other industries, we speak of 
a ‘forward linkage’ (residentiary industry). 
3. Consumption linkage effects. 
4. Fiscal linkage. 
 Many scholars, notably Thant Myint and Thee Kian Wee have discussed 
regional trade pattern of vent-for-surplus and argued for a limited creation of 
linkages in this region. Limited regional industrial and financial activities have also 
been discussed by some paralleled studies, such as Wu Xiaoan, who described 
Chinese capital circulation in Kedah and Penang, Malaysia10, and Sikko Visscher, 
who analysed Chinese business and other economic activities in Singapore within the 
society of Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Singapore.11 Many of 
their results are based on regional cases rather than cross-boundary networks. As a 
matter of fact, many linkages were created in Singapore based on the production of 
raw materials from Johor and the Riau Islands, financed by both international 
commercial banks and small regional banking institutions. 
                                                          
7 Ibid., 195. 
8 Ibid., 196. 
9 Touwen, Extremes, 32-3. 
10 Wu, Chinese Business in the Making of the Malay State, 1882-1941: Kedah and Penang. 
11 Visscher, The Business of Politics and Ethnicity: A History of the Singapore Chinese Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry. 
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 These different kinds of connections existed not only within the triangle area 
but also between the triangle and the outside world. This thus resulted in two 
patterns of integration. Internal integration is determined by the mutual connections 
between Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands, while external integration is 
considered as the outward connection of this region with the world.  
 
2. Internal integration 
The theory of comparative advantage is preferred by scholars to explain the 
formation of the SIJORI. However, regional conditions were much more dynamic 
than comparative advantage could explain. Factors such as changeable political 
relations, dynamic social structure, government policies, etc., also played an 
important part in the creation of internal connections between Singapore, Johor and 
the Riau Islands and they are considered as competitive advantage. The theory of 
competitive advantage is well illustrated by the Diamond Model designed by Michael 
E. Porter. According to him, the success of a nation lies in four attributes that shape 
the environment in which local firms compete, promote or impede competitive 
advantage: (1) factor conditions, (2) demand conditions, (3) related and supporting 
industries, (4) firm strategy, structure and rivalry.12  
 In order to reveal the internal relations between the three states, we modify the 
model by introducing the elements of comparative advantage to apply it at the level 
of regions. To fulfil the specific spatio-temporal conditions, the modified Diamond 
Model not only incorporates the core concept of ‘innovative competitiveness’ in 
Porter’s framework, but also traditional factors emphasized in the theory of 
comparative advantage. We attribute the competitive economic performance of a 
(sub)region to four categories of factors borrowed from Porter. 
1. Factor conditions. Porter gives emphasis to the role of skilled labour, 
infrastructure and knowledge, while we think the traditional comparative factors still 
play an essential part, especially in the early stages of economic development. In this 
study, we choose following variables in this category: geography, natural resources 
and the accessibility, available land, skilled and unskilled labour, infrastructure and 
the region’s stock of knowledge and technology. 
2. Demand conditions in the model, different from Porter’s focus on home 
demand for the industry’s product, refers to demand for local products and services. 
It is reflected by the chosen variables referring to trade, shipping and their actors – 
trade agents and shipping companies. Trade and shipping represent the service 
demanded from the regional and world markets. International trade and shipping 
                                                          
12 Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, 71. 
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indicated the outward connections of the triangle to the global world, whereas 
regional trade and shipping created a regional network. The tricky point is the 
classification of interinsular trade and shipping of the Riau Islands within Indonesia, 
which on the one hand, was conducted outside the triangle, and on the other hand, 
was confined to the Indonesian domestic market. Regarding influence from outside 
the triangle region as an external factor, we prefer to consider this as external trade 
and shipping. Actors are indicated by trade agents and shipping companies. As the 
most important actors of trade and shipping, the rise and fall of business firms and 
shipping companies operated by various ethnic groups reflected the changing value 
of these variables. 
3. Related and supporting industries. As argued by Porter, the presence or 
absence of supplier industries is related to industries that are internationally 
competitive. According to regional conditions, chosen variables in this category 
include agriculture, agroprocessing industry, mining, forest production, other 
supporting industries and financial services.. 
4. Firm strategy, structure and rivalry. These elements are stressed in Porter’s 
original model as determinants of how companies are created, organized and 
managed. In our perspective of a region, we introduce the ‘social structure’ of a 
region as an alternative to the firm organization. Two aspects are distinguished: the 
composition of different ethnic groups in the society, and relationships between 
different ethnic communities: cooperation or rivalry.  
The determinants listed above define the context in which the regional economy 
performs. Following the mechanism of the original Diamond Model, these four 
categories of factors, do not apply individually but interact on one system. The 
system shows a pattern of mutual influencing and reinforcing. This argument is 
particularly important in the Singapore-Johor-Riau Islands region as the cumulative 
effect of these factors over such a long period is so influential that they determined 
the continuity or discontinuity of regional economic development. 
The function of another two determinants argued by Porter, chance and 
government policy, are also taken into consideration. Chance here refers to external 
events outside the control of a region, such as natural disaster, significant shifts in 
world economy, political decisions by foreign governments, wars. They bring in 
discontinuities that can unfreeze or reshape economic structure and provide the 
opportunity for a region. The function of government is indicated by political 
stability, government policies and the initiation of projects. Because of the different 
hierarchies and status of the three regions in their own governments, the variable of 
effectiveness of the government in influencing the region is adopted here to the 
complete theory. These two additional determinants do not have direct influence on 
the economic performance but through the impact on the other four categories of 
factors. 
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Inspired by Porter’s differentiation by type of factors, we also distinguish 
different hierarchies. Factor conditions play a role in initial development based on 
resource endowment, which, however, could not be created or accumulated. Demand 
conditions and social structure largely influence or determine the utilization and 
distribution of the factor conditions. Industry stands at the top of the hierarchy 
because of its growth importance in economic development (Chart 1). Weights are 
assigned: Industries (+3), Demand conditions (+2), Social structure (+2), factor 
conditions (+1). Concerning the variables of factor conditions, another classification 
is made with assignment of different weights: basic factors (×1) and advanced factor 
(×2). Basic factors include geographical location, natural resources, land and labour, 
the value of which cannot be accumulated or created. The rest is considered as 
advanced factors which can be upgraded and are more significant for the competitive 
advantage, including infrastructure, knowledge and technology, demand conditions, 
social structure and related industries. The mechanism of two additional factors 
works differently. The impact of ‘government’ is rather consistent, thus we consider it 




, 1, 2). ‘Chance’, instead, plays a 
role of bringing in discontinuity and great change, as the impact is usually sudden 
and dramatic. We consult this variable in two ways: (1) the mark of periodization 
(political decisions); (2) extra consultancy (economic shift, wars). 
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Each variable needs evaluating before we can present a complete picture. Data 
and evaluation are based on the discussion in the previous chapters. Depending on 
the characteristics of the variables, two different methods are adopted here. 
Concerning the basic variables, the evaluation is assigned by using a 4-point scale 
(very disadvantageous (+1), disadvantageous (+2), advantageous (+3), very 
advantageous (+4)). For the other dynamic variables, we use a cumulative assignment 
(the effect of these variables can be created, accumulated, but also degraded in the 
time series). The cumulative value is controlled from 0 to 10, but standardized at the 
level of 4-point scale. The different initial values also reflect the regional difference 
between Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands from the beginning. 
The aim of using Diamond Model is to seek a pragmatic approach to link 
theories of both comparative and competitive advantage. According to (neo)classical 
economists such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, E. F. Heckscher and B. Ohlin, trade 
is realized and stimulated because of regional comparative advantage vis-à-vis other 
countries, gained mainly from the following factors: (1) technological superiority, (2) 
resource endowment, (3) demand patterns, and (4) commercial policies. Concerning 
its concrete application in this triangle, Huff attributes Singapore’s dominance in 
trade to geographical advantage more than port facilities in the colonial period.13 
Considering the trade of Malaysia, P. P. Courtenay has also highlighted the role of 
geographical position of the peninsula. Together with the liberal policies since the 
middle nineteenth century, free trade thus offered great opportunities for 
development, stimulating the later export economies. 14  Modern critics of 
colonialism attribute its continuation to the policies of the colonial powers, and there 
is ample evidence to show the importance of colonial policy in promoting this 
pattern of trade when government intervention became more and more significant. 
Even in their works, Courtenay and Huff have analysed the later development of 
Malaya and Singapore in a global long-term context, attributing the different 
economic patterns to the change of colonial polices, from laissez-faire, to more 
government intervention. Similarly, my MA thesis on the influence of geography on 
the Riau Islands shows that the geographical distribution of productive resources as 
an exogenous variable and the effect of natural advantage or locational fundamentals 
can also explain embryonic development in this region.15 
 However, the theory of comparative advantage relies on certain assumptions 
that may or may not hold, particularly in an environment of free trade.16 The 
following points are not incorporated into comparative advantage: transport costs, 
diseconomies of scale due to increased specialisation, government intervention, and 
                                                          
13 Huff, The Economic Growth.  
14 Courtenay, A Geography of Trade and Development in Malaya. 
15 Xu, ' Link Sumatra with the World; A Study of Regional Port Networks, 1870-1940'. 
16 http://www.americaneconomicalert.org/view_art.asp?Prod_ID=3076 
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dynamic advantage. Ever since the 1930s when protectionism and interventionism 
became more prevalent, the ‘inherited’ and ‘static’ factors emphasized by theory of 
comparative advantage are not sufficient to explain and support modern 
international business. The theory of competitive advantage is favoured, especially by 
non-economists, as a predictor of economic fortune. Compared to the theory of 
comparative advantage, competitive advantage focuses more on ‘created’ factors, 
such as innovation, technological improvement and demand. 17  These inherent 
reasons explain why some countries and industries are more successful than others 
on a global scale.18  
 Porter’s Diamond Model is only applicable to internal integration of growth 
triangle. The value assignment of variables is dealt with differently throughout the 
study. The discussion of factor conditions is largely based on existing historiography 
and empirical results. The aspects on social structure and government are discussed 
in Chapter 2. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with demand conditions and Chapter 5 aims at 
giving discussing related industries. The provisional overview of the results is 
displayed at the end of chapter 5. 
 
3. External integration 
Although the different economic performance of Singapore, Johor and the Riau 
Islands can be attributed to individual competitive advantage, the long-term 
development did not take place in isolation but was closely interacted. Their mutual 
connections resulted in economic flows between the three, cementing a regional 
economic system connected to the world market. However, the description and 
analysis of mutual connections within the triangle is confined to a regional 
perspective. In practice, such a regional economic system must not be separated from 
the global world. Accompanied by the expansion of international trade, shipping and 
capital investment, the integration of the regional system to world market is also 
gradually deepened in the process of globalization. Noticeably, the primary basis of 
regionalism worldwide has been economic. Cooperation and integration through 
trade, foreign investment, international finance and cross-border development 
projects has been the main foundations for regional grouping to cohere.19 In order to 
reveal individual levels of economic globalization of Singapore, Johor and the Riau 
Islands, we applyi the model suggested by Held, McGrew and other co-authors. 
                                                          
17 Gupta, 'Comparative Advantage and Competitive Advantage: An Economics Perspective and 
a Synthesis'. 
18 Özer et al., 'International Competitive Advantage of Turkish Tourism Industry: A 
Comperative Analyse of Turkey and Spain by Using the Diamond Model of M. Porter'. 
19 Dent, 'Paths Ahead for East Asia and Asia-Pacific Regionalism'. 
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Globalization is not a new term, but its definition varies from scholar to scholar. 
Nevertheless, it reflects a widespread perception that the world is rapidly being 
moulded into a shared social space by economic and technological forces. To sum up, 
Held, McGrew and others define globalization as ‘A process (or set of processes) 
which embodies a transformation of the spatial organization of social relations and 
transactions – assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact – 
generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, 
interaction, and the exercise of power.’20 
In short, globalization describes ‘flows’ between the major regions in the world 
economically, locally, regionally, or internationally; the flows can be in the form of 
commodities, people, capital, social impact and cultural ideology. In order to assess 
the forms of globalization, Held, McGrew and others have adopted eight dimensions 
to assess globalization:  
Four spatio-temporal dimensions:  
  The extensity of global networks 
  The intensity of global interconnectedness 
  The velocity of global flows 
  The impact propensity of global interconnectedness 
 Four organizational dimensions: 
  The infrastructure of globalization 
  The institutionalization of global networks and the exercise of power 
  The pattern of global stratification 
  The dominant modes of global interaction 
Four historical forms are distinguished, representing four historical periods: thin 
globalization (pre-modern period), expansive globalization (early modern period of 
Western expansion), thick globalization (late nineteenth century) and diffused 
globalization (contemporary).21 Such a classification is also disputable. As criticized 
by scholars, this model and its periodization are based on developed countries 
without considering the Third World.22 The pattern of global stratification is 
one-sided. Moreover, the distinct historical forms also need a careful examination, as 
most attention is paid to the contemporary period. 
To undertake a supplementary analysis, the triangle region of 
Singapore-Johor-Riau Islands provides an ideal case study, particularly from the 
                                                          
20 Held et al., Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, 16. 
21 Ibid., 16-27. 
22 Such as Bentley, 'Global Transformations by David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, 
Jonathan Perraton (Book Review)'. Short, 'Global Transformations by David Held, Anthony 
McGrew, David Goldblatt, Jonathan Perraton (Book Review)'. Winters, 'Global 
Transformations by David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, Jonathan Perraton (Book 
Review)'. 
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perspective of economic globalization. Merits are as follows: (1) one common 
characteristic of different forms is the high extensity. Thus on the other hand, the low 
extensity is considered as localization. The analysis of different extensities of 
Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands thus can help reveal the relationship between 
localization, regionalization and globalization; (2) the incorporation of Johor and the 
Riau Islands which are relatively poorer can help better reveal the global 
stratification; (3) the discussion of the process of globalization can be enriched by 
focusing on this long research period of one century. 
The analysis is based on the original model by consulting the four 
spatio-temporal dimensions concerning Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands. 
Extensity is evaluated by trade and shipping networks, foreland and hinterland 
analysis and the origin and destination of capital. Intensity is quantitatively indicated 
by volume and value of trade and shipping, whereas velocity is qualitatively measured 
by the development of technology in transport and communication. Regarding the 
impact, four types are distinguished by Held, McGrew and others: decisional, 
institutional, distributive and structural. In the triangle area, this aspect is indicated 
by social structure of a region as influenced by the external forces, such as the 
population of foreigners, foreign enterprises and capital, Western institutions, etc. 
Four periods are distinguished in accordance with the periodization: early 
imperialism, high colonialism, war and decolonization. Assignment of evaluation is 
by ranking based on spatio-temporal dynamics, ranging between -3 (extremely low) 
and +3 (extremely high). This globalization model only serves as an analytical 
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A unique feature distinguishing this region from other places in the world is the 
dynamic socio-political relationship between different ethnic groups rooted in 
colonial times. Since then, both conflict and compromise have occurred among the 
Europeans, Malays and Chinese, as well as other regional minorities, resulting in two 
regional dichotomies: (1) socially, the indigenous (Malays) vs. the outsiders 
(Europeans, Chinese, etc.); (2) politically, the rulers (Europeans and Malay nobles) vs. 
those ruled (Malays, Chinese). These features have a direct impact on economic 
development. A retrospective survey of regional political development and 
demographic features are therefore needed to provide a context for the later analysis 
of economic development. 
 
1. Political development 
The formation of Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands was far from a sudden event, 
but a long process starting with the decline of the Johor-Riau Sultanate in the late 
eighteenth century. In order to reveal the coherency of regional political 
transformations, the point of departure of this political survey begins much earlier 
than the researched period here.  
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The beginning of Western penetration (pre-1824) 
Apart from their geographical proximity, Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands had 
also formed a natural and inseparable part of various early unified kingdoms in 
Southeast Asia. The kingdoms of Srivijaya, Majapahit and Malacca had successively 
incorporated this region from the eighth till the early sixteenth century.1 Under their 
influence, the Johor-Riau area emerged as a regional religious and political centre 
which was not challenged until 1511 when Malacca was conquered by the 
Portuguese.2 After several decades of resistance, another independent kingdom, the 
Johor-Riau Sultanate was established on the ruins of the old kingdom by the son of 
the exiled sultan of Malacca, Sultan Alauddin Riayat Shah. The capital was in Johor 
Lama, located near present-day Kota Tinggi in Johor state. It was moved to Bintan 
Island in the Riau Islands in 1587.3 This was the origin of Singapore, Johor and the 
Riau Islands as a unified power. The Riau Islands became the political gravity of the 
mighty sultanate and was long considered the centre of the Malay sultanate, 4 
whereas the mainland territory of Johor together with Singapore served as one of the 
fiefs of the sultanate 
The history of the Johor-Riau Sultanate is an almost uninterrupted record of 
wars. Various powers, including the Portuguese, the Dutch, the British, the Acehnese, 
the Bugis and the Malays fought with each other over both political and economic 
interests. Temporary peace was not achieved until 1784 when the Dutch recognized 
the Malay sultan as ruler of the sultanate, and drove the Bugis to a small island, 
Penyangat, off Bintan Island. Later on, in 1818, the Dutch colonial government 
stationed, at the capital of the sultanate, Tanjung Pinang, a Resident and a garrison to 
achieve effective administration of the sultanate.5 In this bureaucracy, the Malay 
sultan6 and Bugis viceroy 7 had to accept their positions as dependent princes. 
Losing real power and independence, the old sultanate fell into dissolution.8 In the 
early nineteenth century, the temenggong, one of the important Malay officials of the 
                                                          
1 Abshire, The History of Singapore, 14. 
2 ARFM (1949), 182-3. 
3 Lim, Johor, 1855-1957: Local History, Local Landscapes, 13. 
4 For more discussion see the literature about the history of Malays, such as Falarti, Malay 
Kingship in Kedah: Religion, Trade, and Society.  
5 Matheson, 'Mahmud, Sultan of Riau and Lingga (1823-1864)', 119-46. 
6 In Malay: Yang di-Pertuan Besar, which literally means ‘He Who Is Made Great’ or ‘Great 
Ruler’ in the monarchs of the ancient Johor-Riau Sultanate (c. seventeenth to nineteenth 
centuries). This was a secondary title, the primary title being sultan. 
7 In Malay: Yang di-Pertuan Muda; in Dutch: Onderkoning. It is also known as deputy ruler or 
crown prince. 
8 JAR (1930). 
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sultan, left his settlement on the island of Bulang in the Riau Islands to escape the 
conflicts and instability in the Malay court. He settled in Singapore, off the southern 
tip of Johor, and never returned to the Riau Islands.9 This situation remained until 
the British obtained a complete cession of the island of Singapore by virtue of treaties 
concluded in 1819 and 1824 with Hussein (elder brother of the Dutch-appointed 
sultan in the Riau Islands) and Temenggong Abdul Rahman.10 The island gained 
both political and economic importance in the following decades, largely due to the 
British free port policy.11 
 
Map 2. Johor-Riau sultanates in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
 
The territory covering the approximate territory of present-day Singapore, Johor, the Riau 




                                                          
9 Lim, Johor, 12. 
10 ARFM (1949), 183. 
11 CSAR (1956), 315. 
 Political Development and Demographic Features  25 
 
 
The rise of Western sovereignty (1824-c.1870) 
The Anglo-Dutch Treaty (also called the Treaty of London) in 1824 was a bilateral 
agreement which determined future paths of regional political evolution. The earlier 
Johor-Riau Sultanate was split into two parts: Singapore and Johor under British 
protection to the north of the Malacca and Singapore Straits; and the Dutch 
controlled Riau-Lingga12 to the south of Singapore, including the islands in the 
South China Sea and inland Indragiri on Sumatra, which also temporarily 
incorporated parts of the Sultanate of Siak. 
According to the agreement, Singapore became fully and securely a British 
possession.13 In 1826, this new settlement was integrated with Penang and Malacca 
to form a new administrative unit, the Straits Settlements, under the administration 
of the Governor and Council of the Incorporated Settlements (India).14 Following 
the decline and eventual dissolution of the English East India Company (EIC) and 
intensified communication between Britain and its Asian colonies, the weakness of 
administration of the Indian Government became obvious. It was also at this 
juncture that the British government dropped its traditional policy of 
non-intervention and adopted a policy of protection and guidance in the indigenous 
Malay states. The plan of the government was to take direct control in administering 
Singapore. On 1 April 1867, the Straits Settlements area was transferred from control 
by the Indian Government to that of the Secretary of States for the Colonies (known 
as the Colonial Office). Singapore became a Crown Colony, playing a primary and 
leading part in the prosperity of the British colonies.15 
However, there was still conflict among the Malay nobles in British-controlled 
Malaya. Both the British-appointed sultan and the temenggong claimed the vast 
territory of Johor, despite the fact that they were both seated in Singapore. Tension 
between them was not solved until 1855 when the British negotiated a treaty between 
Tunku Ali (son of Sultan Hussein) and Temenggong Daeng Ibrahim (son of Abdul 
Rahman). Regulated by the terms of the treaty, Ali received the title of sultan but 
transferred the sovereignty of Johor to Temenggong Daeng Ibrahim. Sultan Ali and 
his heirs possessed a small territory between the Muar and Kesang rivers.16 In 1866, 
Temenggong Daeng Ibrahim moved his government from Teluk Belanga in 
                                                          
12 The former Johor-Riau Sultanate was then called Riau-Lingga Sultanate. 
13 Abshire, The History, 45. 
14 ARSS (1921), 5. 
15 CSAR (1956), 317. 
16 Lim, Johor, 13. 
26  Genesis of a Growth Triangle 
Singapore to Johor Bahru at the mouth of the Johor River. This marked the 
beginning of effective administration in Johor.17 
On the Dutch side, the Riau-Lingga Sultanate was transformed into ‘the 
Residency of Riau and its dependencies’ according to the contracts concluded in 1784, 
1818 and 1830 between the colonial government and local Malay rulers. The 
sultanate became a fief of the Netherlands Indies government. Nevertheless, the 
trilateral equilibrium between the sultan in Lingga, the Bugis viceroy in Penyengat 
and the Dutch Resident in Tanjung Pinang remained relatively stable. The Malay 
sultan, recognized as the nominal ruler (bestuurder), settled in Daik in Lingga and 
exerted his limited influence in the local court. As a puppet, he had nothing to do but 
to put his signature on the documents prepared by the judiciary to confirm the 
decision of the latter.18 Real power lay in the hands of the Dutch Resident and the 
Dutch-favoured Bugis viceroy. The latter possessed all commercial and effective 
political strength as a holder of military power. It was the Resident who ruled this 
region indirectly by making use of the dissension between the sultan and the Bugis 
viceroy.  
 
From indirect to direct rule (ca.1870-1940s) 
From the second half of the nineteenth century, European colonial rule in Southeast 
Asia entered a new stage of both intensive and extensive expansion. However, there 
were different processes of political transformation in the three states.  
Singapore was firmly in the hands of Britain. As the capital of the Straits 
Settlements, it had already been under direct British rule since 1826. This efficient 
political system was led by a Governor aided by an Executive Council and a 
Legislative Council. The Governor and the members of the two councils were all 
constituted and appointed by a Commission. The Executive Council consisted of the 
Governor as President; the General Officer Commanding the Troops, Malaya; the 
Colonial Secretary; the Resident Councillor, Penang; the Attorney-General; the 
Financial Secretary; and the Resident Councillor of Malacca. 19  This political 
administration remained stable and effective until the outbreak of the Pacific War.  
                                                          
17 ARFM (1949), 182. 
18 MvO: Riouw en onderhorigheden (1908). 
19 ARSS (1937), 216-7. 
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Sultan Ibrahim of Johor. 
Source: KITLV/3816. 
The intention of more efficient colonial administration was also extended to 
adjacent Johor, when the British government realised that a more progressive and 
realistic policy was necessary.20 The aim of the policy was to promote free trade and 
communication between the Straits Settlements and Johor as facilitated by the 
agreement of 1885 by which 
the temenggong of Johor 
attained the title of sultan, and 
which contained a clause 
requiring him to accept a 
British advisor.21. The Colonial 
Office was persuaded to 
impose more formal control 
over Johor in order to improve 
the state’s administration.22 
Nevertheless, the process 
of British interference in Johor 
was slow and mild. The supply 
of coinage, defence of the 
territory, administrative affairs 
and foreign relations were all 
handled by the British colonial 
government.23 In 1895, Sultan 
Ibrahim, son of Abu Bakar, 
undertook to receive a British 
advisor with the function of a 
Consular Officer. 24  In 1910, 
the clause of the 1885 treaty 
was invoked and D. G. 
Campbell was appointed as the first General Advisor with undefined powers,25 
although the sultan had an unofficial advisor for some years. Sultan Ibrahim 
ultimately reorganized his government with the assistance of the Straits Settlements.26 
                                                          
20 ARFM (1949), 186. 
21 Lim, Johor, 93. 
22 Turnbull, 'British Colonialism and the Making of the Modern Johor Monarchy'. 
23 CO882/4/22: Straits Settlements: agreement with sultan of Johore regarding relations 
between HM government of the Straits Settlements and the government of Johore. 
24 ARFM (1949), 187. 
25 Lim, Johor, 93. 
26 JAR (1910), 3. 
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A new agreement was concluded in 1914, giving the General Advisor additional 
powers similar to those of British Residents in other states.27 Johor was finally drawn 
into the British system of colonial rule.28 Compared to the FMS under direct British 
colonial administration, the political regime in Johor was rather a form of indirect 
rule, although British intervention was more intensive than in the nineteenth century. 
A series of treaties and provisions made in the early 1910s finally regulated the 
British-Johor relations as stated by the official government reports:29 
(1) The Malay States agreed to accept British protection and to have no dealing 
with foreign powers except through Great Britain. 
(2) Great Britain guaranteed the States protection against attack by foreign 
powers. 
(3) The agreement provided for the appointment to the State of a British Officer 
whose advice must be taken and followed except in matters concerning the 
Malay religion and Malay custom. 
(4) Johor then also agreed to have European judges, and to appoint European 
official members on its Executive Council; Malay and European officers 
were to be treated on terms of equality. European officers were seconded to 
the State from the Malayan Civil Service and the joint departments of Straits 
Settlements and FMS.30 
Political development progressed differently in the Netherlands Indies, where a 
liberal policy was pursued accompanied by an expansion of Dutch political in the 
Outer Islands. The temporary stability in the Riau Islands was disturbed in 1883 
when Sultan Sulaiman died without offspring. After a brief interregnum, the Dutch 
chose the elder son of Bugis Viceroy Yusuf to succeed him as Sultan ‘Abdu’l-Rahman 
II Mu’azzam Shah. It meant that the direct male line of the Malay royal house became 
extinct. Unfortunately, the choice by the Dutch authorities did not meet with 
universal approval by the Malays, since this selection contravened the traditional adat 
of Bugis and Malays which called for a separation of powers and offices between the 
two ethnic groups. The deteriorating situation reached its climax in 1899 when the 
Bugis Viceroy Muhammad Yusuf died. His son, the sultan, refused to nominate a 
new Bugis king and took the position himself.31 He left Lingga, where previous 
sultans had lived, and settled on the Bugis island of Penyengat, which he made his 
official residence. This behaviour broke the oath of loyalty with the Bugis and again 
annoyed the Dutch.32 It resulted in the contract of 1905, according to which the 
                                                          
27 ARFM (1949), 187. 
28 Lim, Johor, 93. 
29 ARFM (1949), 187.  
30 JAR (1932). 
31 For more information, see KV (1898, 1899, 1900), Hoofdstuk C, Gewestelijk Bestuur. 
32 Matheson, 'Strategies'. 
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position of viceroy was abolished. Troubled by a new war of succession, the Dutch 
government took over the administration on 3 February 1911. The sultan of 
Riau-Lingga fled to Singapore on 11 February, having no wish to live under Dutch 
colonial rule. On 9 January 1913, he was finally exiled and the whole region came 
under direct rule of the Dutch. The former sultan received a monthly allowance of 
2,400 guilders to cover living costs. Nevertheless, the political administration was still 
firmly in the hand of the Dutch. Meanwhile, the sultan of Johor and the sultan of 
Indragiri were still flying their own flags, expressing their Malay dignity! 
In conformity with the bureaucratic system of colonial administration in the 
Netherlands Indies, Riau Residency was ruled through a bureau headed by the 
Resident. The central bureau was established in Tanjung Pinang, and dealt with daily 
affairs of the whole residency, while regional administration was implemented in 
several divisions (afdeeling) and subdivisions (onderafdeeling) for more effective rule. 
Reflecting the dualism of indigenous administration (Binnenlandsch Bestuur or 
Gewestelijk Bestuur), these divisions or subdivisions were either administerd by a 
Dutch colonial official directly, or by Malay leaders under the supervision of the 
Dutch at various levels such as Assistant Resident, Controller (Controleur) etc.33 In 
the local court, administrative and judicial affairs were handled by a council of 
Judiciary (Mohakamah34), the members of which were all Bugis who represented the 
Dutch. But later on, they gradually lost their limited power and only kept their old 
position as a court (rechtbank).35 Outside the court, Amirs36 were established in 
different places throughout the sultanate, possessing certain autonomy beyond the 
sultan, whose position was strengthened by the renewed contract of 1905, just a few 






                                                          
33 Before 1911, there were two self-governing indigenous states: the Riau-Lingga Sultanate and 
the Indragiri Sultanate; the latter was a dependency of the former. After the abolishment of the 
Riau-Lingga Sultanate, the Indragiri Sultanate continued to exist into post-colonial period). See 
RAN (1870); Cribb and Kahin, Historical Dictionary of Indonesia. 
34 Mohakamah, court dealing with all political and judicial affairs.  
35 MvO: Riouw en onderhorigheden (1908). 
36 Amirs, wakils of the sultan, a title of rank as for instance in Perak. 
37 MvO: Riouw en onderhorigheden (1908). 
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Map 3. Riau Islands and Indragiri in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
 
On mainland Sumatra, the vast region of Mandah and Reteh between the Kampar River 
and the Tungkal River was ruled by the Sultanate of Indragiri, which existed as a 
dependency of the Riau-Lingga Sultanate but was declared to be under Dutch suzerainty in 
the 1838 contract with the Dutch. The renewed 1843 contract provided the Dutch with 
more power over domestic affairs. From then onwards, the succession of the throne had to 
meet with the approval of the Dutch and the sultan of Riau-Lingga. The final decision was 
stated on the Government Decision (Gouvernemenst Besluit). Another kingdom, the 
Sultanate of Siak, confined to the valley of the Siak River, north of Indragiri, was also part 
of the Riau Residency before 1873 when the Residency of East coast of Sumatra (Residentie 
Oostkust van Sumatra) was formed. Source: MvO: Riouw en onderhorigheden (1908); RAN 
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Regarding political changes of the three regions in this period, it is necessary to 
give a snapshot of their communities and regional differences. This especially 
concerns the administration of the Chinese. In the colonial era, they brought with 
them distinctive forms of social organization, which continued to characterize their 
life in Nanyang, the lands of Southeast Asia bordering the South China Sea. They 
gradually attained a high economic status as early as at the time of the foundation of 
Singapore. Attributed to their growing number and importance, both British and 
Dutch colonial governments adopted various measures for an efficient 
administration of the Chinese population. In British Malaya, the Chinese were 
incorporated in a system of self-organization under various names, such as kongsi, 




                                                          
38 Thorough studies about the Chinese kongsi in Southeast Asia have been conducted by Carl. 
A. Trocki. Here we give a supplementary description about them in the Riau Islands in the 
second half of nineteenth century, based on the collective documents by M. Schaalje, a Dutch 
official in the Riau Islands at the time. These documents are kept in the Special Collection of 
Leiden University Library. 
Sultan Sulaiman of Riau-Lingga (1857-1883) 
Source: KITLV/30493. 
Sultan Abdul Rahman II of Riau-Lingga 
(1883-1911) 
Source: KITLV/6200. 
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A diploma of Yicheng Kongsi registered in Singapore. It could also be written on a red 
piece of cotton cloth. Collected by M. Schaalje in the Riau Islands. 
Source: BPL 2106.II.12.E3, E5. 
 
 
These kongsi had their origins in China, where they appeared in times of 
hardship and weak administrative control when discontented men from the lowest 
strata of society were drawn together by a combination of mutual need and rebellious 
resentment of authority.39 Kongsi, in its various manifestations, formed the principal 
means of social solidarity among the Chinese. In addition, it also performed a key 
role in the recruitment of overseas Chinese to the community, the absorption of 
newcomers, the maintenance of discipline, and the organization of new economic 
enterprise.40 Large societies registered in Singapore included Ngee Heng, Yi Fu, 
Fuxing, Songbai, Guangzhao, Cunxin. Among them, the Ngee Heng Kongsi was 
largest Chinese community, particularly of Teochew Chinese in Johor. 
In 1877, the British set up a body in Singapore called the Chinese Protectorate, 
which was responsible for the welfare of the ethnic Chinese.41 It indicated direct 
British control of the Chinese in the colony. The establishment of the Chinese 
Protectorate triggered the decline of Chinese secret societies in Singapore and Johor. 
In 1890, the British colonial government enacted a Dangerous Societies Suppression 
Ordinance to put an end to these secret societies. These kongsi or secret societies 
began to be dissolved by the government in the 1910s. Ngee Heng Kongsi came to an 
end without any trouble in 1916. By then, there were only two secret societies left in 
                                                          
39 Lim, 'Continuity and Connectedness: The Ngee Heng Kongsi of Johore, 1844-1916', 302. 
40 Chandler and Steinberg, In Search, 171. 
41 ARSS (1877). 
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Johor.42 After suppression, the Chinese Association of Johor Bahru, which was a 
modern-style organisation, was formed. It played a similar role as the secret society 
for Chinese communities afterwards. The same process also took place in Singapore, 
as the boundary between Singapore and Johor during that time was very weak. After 
the ban of secret societies, the Chinese community there continued in the form of the 
Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce which was established in 1906. These new 
Chinese organizations were well operated up to the post-war period, but lost both 
their economic and political importance which they obtained during the pre-1920 
period. 
Such a pattern of autonomy still existed in the Riau Islands and was organized 
in a more systematic way, known as the Chinese kapitan (kapitein, capitan) system. 
Although de Ambtenaar voor Chineesche zaken (The Official for Chinese Affairs) was 
established in the residency and became the interface between the Chinese 
community and the Dutch, the Chinese here, mostly originating from Guangdong 
and Fujian, were still headed by a kapitan, who were usually rich merchants with 
good reputation appointed by the Dutch. The kapitan had his seat in Tanjung Pinang 
on Bintan Island (before 1904 there was also a kapitan settled in Lingga)43. In 
divisions or subdivisions, several assistants of the kapitan were appointed as 
lieutenant and secretary. Through this system, the Chinese possessed certain 
autonomy and both the Malays and the Dutch managed to guarantee peace and reap 
economic benefits from this system. There was an official election and resignation of 
new kapitans, but like the kapitan system in other regions, the position was passed 
down within local distinguished families who possessed political and economic 
authority.44 Meanwhile, the position of lieutenant was in the hands of the Tan clan. 
Tan Ah Cho, a Teochew, came to the Riau Islands (Senggarang) in the later 
nineteenth century. Gradually he started his own gambir cultivation and became 
prominent, both economically and socially. He and one of his sons were successively 
appointed as lieutenant during the Dutch period.45 By virtue of obtaining the leading 
position, kapitan in the Chinese community, these Chinese capitalists also obtained 
the right of to farm opium, and collect tax revenues. The high-ranking officials in this 
                                                          
42 JAR (1916), 7. 
43 The seat of the kapitan was in Tanjung Buton. Gouv. Bt. 21 Oct. 1904 no. 17 (Ind. St. no. 414) 
decided that the Chinese administration in this region would be led by a lieutenant instead of a 
kapitan. See KV (1905), 135. 
44 In the Riau Residency, most of the kapitans and lieutenants came from the families of Oei 
and Tan. The first kapitan with a recorded name was Tan Hoo (Kapitan Tua). Other early 
katipans included Tan Yuanjiao and Tan Hengjing in Senggarang in the early nineteenth 
century. Tan Jincheng was appointed as kapitan by the Dutch colonial government in the 
middle nineteenth century. See RAN (1870), Ng, The Chinese in Riau: A Community on an 
Unstable and Restrictive Frontier, 17-31.  
45 Ibid., 55. 
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system of indirect control – the Chinese council were without exception the leaders 
of kongsis in the Riau Islands and vice versa.46 
All sorts of evidence show that the organization of kongsi in the Riau Islands 
had frequent contacts and various relations with those in British Malaya, as all the 
above-mentioned secret societies established their branches and had members both 
in the British and Dutch colonies. Following the decline of the societies in British 
Malay, similar organizations were also established in the Riau Islands, such as 
Chung-hua tsung-hui (Chinese General Association), indicating the continuation of 
the relationships with Singapore and Johor. 
Concerning the government’s economic policies in the SIJORI area, in the 
colonial period, the general condition in this area was one of intensified colonial 
expansion and intervention. Nevertheless, the general economic policy was explained 
as a kind of ‘liberal policy’, although from the late 1920s, a gradual protectionism 
became apparent represented by the introduction of ‘restriction schemes’ of rubber 
and tin. The ‘free’ attitude of the colonial governments in both British Malaya and 
colonial Indonesia towards economic growth was expressed in the belief ‘that free 
trade, accompanied by government provision of essential services, would in some 
undefined way increase the wealth of the business in the colony and its government 
revenue.’47 Such protectionism was somewhat weaker in British Malaya than in the 
Netherlands Indies. The British colonial government was opposed to all monopolies. 
As a result, the mobility of migrants was stimulated by the development of the 
plantation economy and mining, especially in Singapore and Johor. The subsequent 
high mobility of population resulted in a strong connectedness both between the 
three areas and with the outside world. 
In all, the Western colonial expansion in this area showed more similarities than 
differences in the transformation from indirect rule to direct rule, while the different 
measures taken by the British and Dutch reflected the institutional boundaries  
between Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands as imposed by the colonial rule.   
 
War and independence (1940s-1970s) 
The gradually achieved stability was brought to an abrupt halt when the Imperial 
Japanese 25th Army, which had previously operated in China, invaded Thailand and 
North Malaya on 8 December 1941, opting to approach Singapore overland through 
the Malay Peninsula.48 With this ‘back door’ approach, supported by air and naval 
superiority, Japanese troops advanced rapidly to the south. By the end of January 
                                                          
46 Lim, 'Continuity', 305. 
47 Courtenay, A Geography, 132. 
48 Kratoska, The Japanese Occupation of Malaya: A Social and Economic History, 36. 
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1942, Japanese forces moving down the east and west coasts had arrived in Johor, and 
on 8 February, they launched an assault on Singapore, which surrendered on 15 
February.49 The Netherlands had declared war on Japan on 8 December 1941, the 
same day the Japanese armed forces launched the attack on British Malaya. Without 
serious resistance, the Dutch surrendered on 8 March 1942. The Riau Islands with 
mainland Sumatra fell to the Japanese.50 
Following the capture of Malaya, Singapore and Sumatra, the Japanese 25th 
Army served primarily as a garrison force for the occupied territories. The whole area 
of Singapore – renamed Syonan-to – was governed through a Military 
Administration Inspection Bureau of the army.51 The territory under 25th Amy’s rule, 
where the SIJORI area was included, was described as ‘the nuclear zone of the 
Empire's plans for the Southern Area’ because of its strategic importance as well as its 
economic value as a source of oil, rubber, and tin.52 In April 1943, the 25th Army 
relinquished responsibility for Malaya, focusing its particular attention on Sumatra, 
and a new 29th Army was established in Taiping in northern Perak in January 1944 to 
handle military activity between the Kra Isthmus and the Riau Archipelago, and to 
run the Malayan military administration. Later, on 13 April 1944, the 29th Army was 
placed under a newly created 7th Area Army which assumed responsibility for the 
defence of Singapore and Johor, defined as the Singapore Perimeter Zone.53 The 25th 
Army left Malaya in 1943, but its headquarters remained in Singapore until the 
middle of 1945 when it was transferred to Bukit Tinggi in the highlands of West 
Sumatra, where it stayed until the surrender of Japan in August 1945. 
 
                                                          
49 Ibid., 36-41. 
50 The Riau-Japanese relationship was formed even before the war. For example, one sultan and 
his followers in Riau sought Japanese assistance to carry out an anti-Dutch resistance 
movement which failed owing to lack of popular support. See: Goto and Kratoska, Tensions of 
Empire: Japan and Southeast Asia in the Colonial and Postcolonial World, 108. Considering the 
fact that the Riau-Lingga Sultanate was abolished in the early twentieth century, the sultan here 
probably refers to the sultan of Indragiri.  
51 Kratoska, The Japanese Occupation, 54. 
52 Reid, 'The Birth of the Republic in Sumatra'. 
53 Kratoska, The Japanese Occupation, 54. 
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Chart 2. Structure of the Japanese military administration in army-occupied areas in 
Southeast Asia, in December 1941 and April 1943. 
 
 
Source: Benda, Irikura and Kishi, Japanese Military Administration, 53, 57. 
Dec, 1941 
Apr, 1943 
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Although the Japanese policy aimed at annexing Malaya and Sumatra, different 
strategies were adopted concerning regional conditions (Chart 2). In Malaya, the civil 
administration remained in the hands of the pre-war bureaucracy throughout the 
occupation, with the Japanese military administration exercising overall control and 
Japanese filling senior positions. Beyond the formal administrative structure, 
communal organizations, neighbourhood associations and paramilitary groups 
helped control the population.54 Singapore became the Syonan Special Municipality 
under a Japanese mayor. The pre-war distinction between municipal and rural board 
areas was eliminated. In the Riau Islands, where an efficient bureaucratic body did 
not exist, law and order was maintained by the Residents sent from the 25th Army.55 
A major effect of the Japanese occupation of Sumatra was to end all organizational 
activities there.56 The circumstances of administration in both Malaya and the Riau 
Islands favoured the military, and civilian officials found it difficult to assert their 
authority.57  
The British historian David Gilmour uses the term ‘moral deterioration’ to 
describe the Japanese occupation during the Pacific War, represented by ‘a decline in 
respect for law and duly constituted authority, a loss of traditional values, and an 
overriding selfishness.’ 58 During this period, the great majority of government 
servants were either interned or suffered the rigours of occupation. Nevertheless, it is 
worth mentioning that within the concept of the Japanese ‘Greater East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere’, these three regions were under a unified Japanese military and 
political administration in order to take their advantage of regional strategic location 
and rich natural resources, which would serve both economic and military aims. 
Therefore, it ironically became the nearest prototype to SIJORI decades later! 
 On 5 September 1945, Lord Louis Mountbatten bloodlessly recovered Singapore. 
The Riau Islands remained under the British Military Administration, but civil 
government was resumed on 1 April 1946. Singapore was no longer part of the Straits 
Settlements, but became a British Crown Colony.59 Singapore then began its search 
for independence, prompted by the nationalist movement. It achieved 
self-government within the Commonwealth in 1959. In 1963, Singapore declared 
independence from the UK and joined with Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak to form the 
new Federation of Malaysia, from which Singapore departed in 1965, gaining 
independence as the Republic of Singapore, but still in the Commonwealth. 
Singapore became a sovereign nation-state with the People’s Action Party (PAP) 
                                                          
54 Ibid., 55. 
55 Sluimers, 'The Japanese Military and Indonesian Independence'. 
56 Reid, 'The Birth'. 
57 Kratoska, The Japanese Occupation, 58. 
58 Ibid., 348.  
59 CSAR (1956), 318. 
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firmly in charge to establish tight state control.60 Politically, this aroused the will of 
the government to achieve self-consciousness, self-discipline and self-development.61 
 
Map 5. Japanese operation plan during the Pacific War. 
 
Source: Rottman, Japanese Army, 16. 
 
                                                          
60 Turnbull, A History, 11-2. 
61 CSAR (1960), 1. 
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In British Malaya, after the unconditional surrender of the Japanese, Johor, 
together with other states, experienced political and military upheaval for decades. 
Various provisional governments were organised in the peninsula and Johor was 
incorporated. In September 1945, a military administration was established under the 
command of the Supreme Allied Commander Southeast Asia. This administration 
remained unchanged until the establishment of the transitional Civil Government of 
the Malayan Union on 1 April 1946. The Federation of Malaya, which succeeded the 
Malayan Union, came into being on 1 February 1948 on the conclusion of the 
Federation of Malaya Agreement of 1948 between Britain and the rulers of the Malay 
States.62 The Federation gained independence in 1957. Johor has remained as one of 
the states of the federation ever since then. 
To the south of Malaya, in the closing months of the war, the Riau Islands, 
which was under the administration of Sumatra at that time, experienced a different 
process compared to Java. A Republican government was established in Sumatra in 
mid-1945 but characterized by more autonomous revolutions.63 After four years of 
fighting against the Dutch after the Japanese surrender and Sukarno’s declaration of 
Indonesian Independence in August 1945, sovereignty was transferred to Indonesia 
in December 1949. The Riau Islands were incorporated into the Republic of 
Indonesia in 1950 as part of the province of Central Sumatra. In the meantime, the 
process of economic and political decolonization started in the Riau Islands just as in 
other regions in the country as a result of the emerging concept of Indonesianisasi 
(Indonesianization)., which figured in the public discourse about how to establish a 
nation state and achieve economic nationalism. 64  However, this process was 
complicated by the anti-government and self-autonomy movement, particularly in 
Sumatra. It was not completed until the late 1950s when Dutch corporate assets were 
seized and eventually nationalized.65 In 1958, Central Sumatra was divided into the 
provinces of West Sumatra, Jambi, and Riau. Riau was thus a separate province 
consisting of both mainland and island areas. The provincial capital was at Tanjung 
Pinang, on Bintan Islands, and in 1962 it moved to Pekanbaru on Sumatra itself.66 
Those island territories of the Riau Province were separated administratively from 
the mainland Riau in 2004 to form the Riau Islands Province, partly attributed to the 
internal conflict between the Golkar Party (Party of the Functional Groups) and the 
PDI-P (Democratic Party of Struggle). 
 In accordance with political separation from Malaysia, there were also 
differences between the three regions in terms of the economic policies. Singapore 
                                                          
62 ARFM (1949), 189. 
63 Reid, 'The Birth'. 
64 Lindblad, Bridges to New Business: The Economic Decolonization of Indonesia. 
65 Lindblad, 'The Economic Decolonization of Sumatra'. 
66 Esmara, 'An Economic Survey of Riau'. 
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started the process of the early stage of industrialisation, concentrating on mopping 
up unemployment in labour-intensive industries and on import substitution – 
catering to the potential Malaysian common market by a continuation of liberal 
policies and an amicable attitude towards foreign capital. 67 By contrast, more 
intensive government guidance and intervention were shown in both Johor and the 
Riau Islands by the implementation of economic planning and various government 
policies which gave particular preference to the Malays. 
 
2. Demographic features 
The multi-ethnic character of political development requires a survey of the 
demographic features of the ethnic groups who played different roles in both the 
colonial and independent periods. The reconstruction of a demographic history of 
the three regions during such a long period is a difficult task, due to the lack of 
reliable statistical sources, particularly concerning the nineteenth century. This 
section gives a sketch of regional demographic features based on both retrievable 
primary data and secondary information. 
 
Singapore 
Early records of the population of Singapore are scarce. Here we quote four figures 
for the total population in Singapore to show a rough demographic picture before the 
1870s: 11,000 in 1824, 16,634 in 1827, 35,389 in 1840 and 81,734 in 1860.68 These 
figures indicate an extremely high growth rate (more than 4% per annum) which can 
only be explained by a high immigration rate. The free port policy of Singapore 
attracted not only a large influx of trade, but also a growing number of immigrants – 
Bugis and Indians, and Chinese in particular. An increased population in this initial 
stage was dominated by Chinese immigrants who accounted for around 70 per cent 
of the total population in 1867. They came mainly from two different places. The first 
was the nearby Riau Islands, from where quite a number of Chinese were attracted to 
Singapore for gambir and pepper plantation work, and also for private trade as the 
followers of the temenggong who had moved to Singapore after the Anglo-Dutch 
Treaty, or alternatively due to rivalries and conflicts between different Chinese dialect 
groups in the Riau Islands. Another place of origin was mainland China, especially 
the southeast. Chinese immigration to Singapore reached a peak after the Taiping 
Rebellion of 1848-1865 which reflected and exacerbated the worsening conditions of 
the growing peasant population in China and caused large-scale migration to 
                                                          
67 Turnbull, A History, 307. 
68 Tremewan, The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore, 7. Abshire, The History, 
45-6. 
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Southeast Asia. As a result of this flight of people, Singapore became the centre of the 
distribution of labour in the British and Dutch territories.69 
Singapore’s population since 1871 is well recorded by official government 
reports, and also as estimated by scholars. It has to be admitted, though, that only the 
figures for 1881, 1891 and 1931 are from official censuses. Other estimates are higher. 
These statistics show an overall growth rate of around 2.8% per annum during the 
researched period. This was in conformity with the booming economy of Singapore. 
The only exception was, during the Pacific War period, which saw a sudden increase 
(more than 50%) between 1937 and 1947, possibly because Singapore during the war 
offered a relatively stable and safe environment that attracted a large number of 
people from other places suffering from chaos. Nevertheless, we can draw a rough 
conclusion that the higher growth rate of Singapore in the colonial period was mainly 
attributed to the influx of immigrants, whereas natural growth was only achieved 
after independence as a result of increasing fertility (Table 2.1). 
 
Table 2. 1. Estimated overall population growth rates of Singapore, pre-1870 to 1970. 
(average percentage rate) 
Pre-1870 1870-1910 1910-1940s c.1945 1947-1970 
4 2.9 3.5 > 4 2.4 
Source: Appendix i. 
 
For a good understanding of the composition of the population, it is necessary 
to look further at the different ethnic groups (Figure 2.1). The Chinese had clearly a 
dominating share in the total population; more than 70 per cent throughout the 
period. The share of the Europeans, although possessing more political power than 
the Chinese, particularly during the colonial period, declined steadily from around 
five per cent in 1871 to just above three per cent at the end of this period due to 
slower growth in the post-war period than other ethnic groups, especially the Malays, 
the second largest ethnic group and the one growing the fastest from the 1950s. This 
trend reveals the rise of Singaporean national identity and political consciousness, 
particularly while part of the Federation of Malaya. 
 
                                                          
69 CSAR (1960), 17-18. 
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Figure 2. 1. Composition of the population in Singapore, 1871-1966. 
(thous.) 
 
Source: Appendix i. 
 
Johor 
Johor, a state covered by dreary forest without human habitation or apparently the 
marks that there ever had existed any, remained sparsely inhabited until the 1840s.70 
Political instability in the early nineteenth century further gave Johor a deserted 
character: in 1847 the capital71 consisted merely of 25 huts.72 But then, some 4,000 
Chinese arrived from Singapore for gambir and pepper cultivation. They were the 
pioneers encouraged by the temenggong of Johor. Since that time, a large number of 
Chinese labourers have been brought into the plantations. This massive inflow of 
Chinese, together with Malays and Indians, contributed to a rapid increase in 
population. They settled on the coast and in the vicinity of rivers where agricultural 
cultivation was possible. In the absence of roads and bridges, the rest of the state 
remained largely unoccupied except for some aborigines and other wild tribes.73 The 
Sakai and Jakun (described as Proto-Malay) were reported to be found in the central 
districts of North Johor.74 These aboriginal people were poor in material culture and 
                                                          
70 Trocki, Prince of Pirates, 75. 
71 Referring to the former capital, Johor Lama near Kota Tinggi. 
72 JAR (1930). 
73 Ibid. (1910). 
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appeared to have originated in the Riau Archipelago. Another group, the former 
boat-dwelling Orang Laut (sea people) had settled in fishing villages, notably along 
the west coast of Johor.75 
Lacking systematic statistics, the real figures of population in the nineteenth 
century rely very much on estimates which differ from source to source. Nevertheless, 
fragmentary pieces of information demonstrate a rapid increase of the Chinese 
population, gradually outnumbering the Malays in Johor.76 Even the estimates of 
50,000 and 140,000 for Malays and Chinese in 1890 given by Guinness seem far from 
reality,77 considering that the Chinese population was recorded as 63,405 in 191178. 
There is no other evidence to rely on. Since population growth in Johor in this period 
shared a similar pattern with Singapore, the lesser economic importance of Johor 
resulted in a slower population growth rate in Johor, lower than 2.9%. 
From 1911 onwards, a relatively complete picture can be obtained from various 
official records. The Chinese and Malays were dominant in the total population and 
there was a continued rapid expansion which could be attributed to the prosperity of 
the plantation economy and the exploitation of mineral sources, resulting in the 
influx of a large amount of labour forces. In the post-war period, the population 
growth rate of Chinese and Indians slowed down, whereas the Malay population had 
a high growth rate, exceeding the Chinese one and becoming the largest ethnic group 
in Johor (Figure 2.2). The record of the European population is also available from 
1911, when a number of 205 Europeans was recorded. The figure rose to 782 in 1932 
and further to 1,080 in 1938 as a result of the enforcement of British political 
interference in the court of Johor. Based on the available information, the estimates 
of population growth in Johor in this long period are shown in Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2. 2. Estimated overall population growth rates of Johor, 1870-1970. 
(average percentage rate) 
1870-1910 1910-1940s c.1945 1947-1970 
< 2.9 4.5 c. 1.5 2.5 
Source: Appendix ii. 
 
                                                          
75 ARFM (1949), 179. 
76 Ibid., 1. 
77 Guinness, On the Margin. 
78 JAR (1911). 
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Figure 2. 2. Composition of the population in Johor, 1911-1971. 
(thous.)  
 
Source: Appendix ii. 
 
 
Table 2. 3. Birth and death rates, and infant mortality rates in Johor, 1930-1938. 
(per 1000) 
Year Birth rate Death rate Infant mortality rate 
1930 35.84 24.89 186 
1932 40.61 21.00 140 
1934 43.42 27.14 228 
1936 40.87 20.01 181 
1938 42.54 19.72 170 
Source: JAR (1938). 
 
Like Singapore, Johor in the colonial era was also characterized by a high 
mobility of people crossing borders. In 1919, 23,549 passengers arrived and 22,588 
passengers left the port of Muar, carried primarily by steamers in daily service 
between Singapore and Johor. Equivalent figures for Batu Pahat in the same year 
were 15,987 and 17,163; those for Endau were 4,658 and 4,356. The total was 44,194 
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include passengers arriving in Johor Bahru by railway.79 The movement of these 
people indicated a frequent communication between Johor and other places, 
Singapore in particular on the one hand, and suggested a possible large proportion of 
immigrants in the total population. In 1932, there were 35,303 immigrants, 
suggesting a share of seven per cent in the total population.80 If migration explained 
the rapid growth of population in Johor in the beginning, improvement in fertility 
accounted for the continuous growth later on as indicated by the increasing birth 
rates and declining death rates (Table 2.3). Although there were no exact clues to 
explain the post-war situation, it has been generally agreed that immigrants made a 
declining contribution to population growth. If these cross-border immigrants are 
conceived as an indication of the connection between Johor and Singapore, then, a 
declining trend is clear. The connection was strong in the colonial period and weak in 
the post-war period. 
 
The Riau Islands 
Compared to Singapore and Johor, the reconstruction of population in Riau is even 
more difficult. Although various documents present all sorts of estimation, even the 
official census and surveys are by no means reliable. This difficulty lies in the 
untraceable population in the inland areas and the ever changeable territories of Riau 
as an administrative unit, which resulted in the change of statistical units and sudden 
fluctuations in the population. Therefore, the estimation of population reflects the 
improvement in the registration of population rather than real growth rates in the 
entire Riau. Retrievable quantitative information of the population size is presented 
by Table 2.4. 
It is difficult to ascertain the reliability of these estimated numbers, especially 
concerning the indigenous Malay population, which is distributed widely within the 
border of Riau. By contrast, recording Chinese and European populations was 
relatively better because the distribution of these groups was so converged that the 
registration was easier: the majority of Chinese settled in Senggarang and Tanjung 
Pinang on Bintan, Penyengat, and Daik, and the Europeans in Tanjung Pinang. The 
demographic development of these two groups showed a similar trend with Java, 





                                                          
79 Ibid. (1920). 
80 Ibid. (1932). 
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Table 2. 4. Average annual growth rates of population in Riau Residency, 1880-1942. 

















Java CEI 1.6 1.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.5 
Outer 
Islands 
Lindblad - - - - 1.1 - 
CEI - - - - 0.95 - 
Sumatra CEI - - - - 0.7 - 
Riau 
Lindblad - - - 0.4 0.4 0.4 
CEI - - - - 0.4 - 
Gooszen 0-0.5 1.0-2.0 2.0-3.0 - 
M Riau 
CEI - - 8.3 1.6 0.4-2.6 - 
Lindblad - - - 0.36 0.36 0.36 
C Riau CEI 2.6 -0.01 1.3-2.5 5.5 - 
E Riau CEI 0-1.4 4.7 2.7 2.4 - 
Note: M: Malays; C: Chinese; E: Europeans 
Sources: CEI, vol. 11, 36; Lindblad, New Challenges, 245, 251-2; Gooszen, A Demographic 
History, 33, 87-8, 115, 221-3. 
 
Anthony Reid assumes a very slow, long-term population growth (zero to 0.5% 
per year) for Southeast Asia in the pre-colonial period. And this estimate has been 
accepted by Hans Gooszen to apply to Central Sumatra in which the Riau Residency 
was included for the 1880s and 1890s.81 In the early twentieth century, encouraged 
by the strengthened colonial presence and the expansion of smallholder rubber 
plantations, more migrants were attracted to this region. Pierre van der Eng has 
quoted De Meel’s estimate of annual growth rate in Riau: c. 5% for the period 
between 1930 and 1942, which Van der Eng himself has thought too high.82 Gooszen 
has estimated a growth rate per annum between 0.5% and 1.5% from 1900 to 1920 
and a higher one, from 2% to 3%, between 1920 and 1930.83 Although he has 
emphasized the Banjarese immigrants from southeast Borneo and Buginese from 
southern Celebes to Riau from the seventeenth century onwards, 84  the main 
attention has been paid to the mainland Riau (the Indragiri area) and there was little 
description of the Chinese population and Chinese migrants in this area. In fact, the 
Riau Islands area was one of the major Chinese settlements in Indonesia, and as early 
as 1870, some 17,756 Chinese were recorded as living there, occupying more than 50 
per cent of the grand total. From this point of view, the estimated population and 
                                                          
81 Gooszen, A Demographic History of the Indonesian Archipelago, 1880-1942, 223. 
82 Van der Eng, 'Bridging a Gap: A Reconstruction of Population Patterns in Indonesia, 1930–
61'. 
83 Gooszen, A Demographic History, 224-5. 
84 Ibid., 27, 33. 
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growth rates given by Gooszen seem underestimated. The low growth rate of the 
population has also been questioned by Boomgaard and Gooszen who give an 
estimated growth rate of 0.4% per year in Riau for the 1920s85, one of the lowest in 
the Outer Islands. This figure is adopted by Thomas Lindblad, who pays more 
attention to the indigenous population in the twentieth century, based on an 
assumption of stable demographic development over time. He also admits that the 
Chinese population did not meet the criteria of this stable growth.86 Therefore, here 
we would rather assume that the overall growth rate lay above his estimates, since 
well-documented data show a higher than 1% of Chinese population growth per year 
in the long period. 
 The reconstruction of demographic features, especially in the colonial period, 
depends on the quality of the statistical work, which was extremely hard to get in the 
Riau Islands, the periphery of the Netherlands Indies. Therefore, the real population 
growth should not be higher than that in Java, considering the general difference 
between socio-political and economic conditions, whereas the calculated growth rate 
is higher than supposed, mainly attributed to the deficiency of population 
registration and the high mobility of migrants. Before the 1910s, the still undeveloped 
plantation economy was unable to attract a large inflow of migrant labour. The high 
number of Malays resulted in a more or less same growth rate of Malays in the whole 
of Indonesia. Under these conditions, we have applied a growth rate of between 1-1.5% 
per annum for the population growth in Riau. 
 Entering the second period between the 1910s and 1940s, the development of 
aplantation economy resulted in a great demand for labour from outside areas. The 
immigrants/population ratio of Riau is 1930 is estimated at 0.16 by Gooszen, and this 
implies a higher growth rate and a net influx of more people than normal, as the 
out-migrants/population ratio of Riau in the same year is 0.017. And this number is 
little higher than that of Johor in the same period. A higher growth rate was without 
doubt achieved. However, still attributed to its limited economic importance, the 
population growth could not be much higher than that of Johor. Therefore, we prefer 
to accept the estimated growth rate of c. 1.5% annually applied by Lindblad to the 
population growth of the Outer Islands after 1921. Considering the undiscovered 
population, we have adjusted it to 1.5-2% (Table 2.5). 
Post-war population growth in Riau is better documented, but only available for 
a total of all ethnic groups. The growth rate per annum in the 1960s and early 1970s 
is supposed to be between 2.2% and 3.0% (Appendix iii). This higher growth rate 
seemed to be due to the rising birth rate and declining death rates resulting from 
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the First Conference on Indonesia's Modern Economic History, Jakarta, October 1-4, 1991, 
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improved living standards and declining migration activities, but the real growth rate 
of population is supposed to be at the same level of the 1970s. This number also 
seems reasonable for the post-war population growth. 
 
Table 2. 5. Estimated overall population growth rates in Riau Residency, 1870-1970. 
(average percentage rate) 
1870-1910 1910-1940s Ca.1945 1947-1970 
1-1.5  1.5-2 - 2.2-3 
Source: Appendix iii. 
 
Our analysis shows that there was a rapid population growth in all the three 
regions between 1870 and 1970, especially in Singapore and Johor during the period 
of high colonialism. At the same time, regional difference was also clear. Singapore 
had the largest total population, followed by Johor and the Riau Islands. In terms of 
demographic structure, in Singapore, there were more Europeans and Chinese 
population due to its successful development as a free port, whereas in the Riau 
Islands, Malays had a dominant part.  
 
3. Ethnic relationships 
Political and demographic developments show a strong impact on the change of 
ethnic relationships, which directly reflects the rise and fall of regional economies 
and the economic connections between Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands. The 
realization of capital investment by both European and Chinese ethnic groups was an 
ideal combination of political status and economic prominence possessed by the 
three parties: Europeans, Malay rulers and Chinese capitalists. The mutual 
relationship between them showed a dynamic pattern in the period being studied 
here.  
In the early period of colonial expansion, by virtue of their political authority 
and the advantage of global business, the Europeans undoubtedly dominated capital 
investment through international companies. Internally, although Malay nobles were 
the nominal rulers of this region, for various reasons, they preferred to gain profits 
directly from land lease rather than invest by themselves. It was Chinese capital that 
focused on economic production not only in Singapore, but also in adjacent Johor 
and the Riau Islands. The predominant political status of Europeans and Malay rulers 
forced the Chinese to maintain good relationships with other ethnities. A pattern of 
mutual benefit thus developed. European capitalists managed to dominate 
international shipping and regional industries by virture of their political authority 
and to penetrate into regional production and shipping by cooperation with the 
Chinese due to their unfamiliarity with regional conditions. Chinese capitalists on the 
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A letter with red envelope from a 
Chinese leader to M. Schaalje, a 
Dutch official in the Riau Islands. 
Words on the envelop: 缎沙烈老
夫子老夫人尊前 (To Mr and 
Mrs. Schaalje) . 
Source: BPL 2106.II12.A. 
other hand were able to maintain their existing capital network and avoid fierce 
competition with the European by subjecting to the latter. The indigenous, especially 
the Malay rulers, accumulated their wealth mainly by land lease and later also by 
participating in some industries.  
There was, in general, a friendly 
relationship among the three main 
population groups, which could be reflected 
by the honoured title given by the European 
and Malays rulers to the Chinese leaders of 
the community. In the Riau Islands, rich 
Chinese capitalists obtained their political 
status by both their wealth and intimate 
relationship with the Dutch and Malay rulers, 
reflected by the continuation of the kapitan 
system, in which the kapitans or the 
community leaders always received the 
recognition of the Dutch. Moreover, Dutch 
officials were often invited by these Chinese 
leaders to attend important occasions such as 
weddings, inaugurations or family 
get-together. M. Schaalje, the Chinese 
interpreter of the Netherlands Indies used to 
receive a rich Chinese businessman to attend 
a marriage banquet.87 The courteous and 
respectful words and humble manner showed 
by the Chinese inviter indicated that their 
relationship was not only intimate, but also 
subordinate on the Chinese side. 
In the self-governed Johor, the Malay 
rulers and the Chinese were also in a 
favourable relationship. Tan Yeok Nee, a 
prominent Chinese in Johor, began his career 
as a cloth peddler, making daily visits to 
Telok Blangah, a district in Singapore, where the temenggong’s family became his 
customers, and he struck up a friendship with the Temenggong Abubakar, who 
afterwards was styled maharaja of Johor. By 1866, Tan Yoek Nee had established 
himself as a prosperous gambir and pepper trader at Boat Quay under the Chop 
Kwang Hong, and obtained extensive kangchu88 rights in Johor territory. He was 
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88 About kangchu, see Chapter 4. 
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made Major China of Johor by Temenggong Abubakar in about 1870.89 Tan Joor 
Tiam, another Chinese capitalist, came from China in the 1870s. He established 
himself in business as a gambir merchant under Chop Hua Heng in Teochew Street 
and as a cloth merchant under the Chop Kia Heng in Upper Circular Road. For many 
years he figured as one of the leading gambir and pepper planters in Johor, and he 
had the honour of being decorated by the sultan of Johor.90 Tan A Tjon (or Tan A 
Tiao), was an opium farmer in Tanjung Pinang. His services were appreciated by the 
Johor government, and in 1904 he was a S.M.J.91 He owned considerable landed 
property both in Singapore and Johor, and his estates in Mersing and elsewhere in 
Johor were planted with gambir, pepper, tapioca and rubber.92 
However, rather than being a peaceful and diligent ethnic group as often 
perceived, the Chinese community was full of rivalry and conflicts, resulting from 
their differences in origin and clan, such as that between the Teochew Chinese and 
Hokkien Chinese. This was well exemplified by the migration of Chinese gambir and 
pepper planters from the Riau Islands to British Malaya in the early nineteenth 
century. On the one hand, the migration was attributed to the opening of Singapore 
and the encouragement of the temenggong of Johor. On the other hand, it was said to 
be due to the conflicts between the Teochews and the Hokkiens. Most Hokkiens 
resided in Riau’s capital Tanjung Pinang, which they called Hsiao-po or Fu-po, 
whereas the Teochews lived in nearby Senggarang, known as Ta-po or Chao-po. 
Considering their difference, the Dutch colonial government appointed separate 
kapitans to administrate their communities. Although the Teochews began their 
plantation on Bintan in the 1730s, much earlier than the Hokkiens (in the 1730s), the 
econominc position of the latter in the Chinese community rose much faster. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Hokkiens replaced the Teochew 
gambir-producers in Senggarang and grasped the economic leadership of the Chinese 
community.93 
The tension between the Teochews and Hokkiens also showed up in British 
Malaya, where conflicts between various secret societies arose, especially between 
Ngee Heng Kongsi and Haishan Kongsi. With regard to the labour division among 
the different dialect groups in the archipelago, one may say in general that the 
Teochews were engaged in the production of commercial crops, while the Hakka 
                                                          
89 Song, One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore, 335. 
90 Ibid., 35. 
91 S.M.J. stands for Seri Mahkota Johor, a decoration Showing loyalty and meticulous service. 
92 Song, One Hundred Years' History, 354. 
93 Ng, The Chinese, 23. 
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were mainly miners.94 These internal conflicts and disharmony undermined both 
political and economic importance of the Chinese community in the region. 
The relationships between Western countries showed another pattern. In the 
triangle region, as the most dominant Europeans, the British and the Dutch 
represented the Western relationships. In their colonies in Southeast Asia, for a long 
period, their common continental interests have led to a close understanding 
between the British and the Dutch. This understanding resulted in a cooperative and 
stable relationship between the two countries, although the natural antagonism could 
not completely be overcome.95  
Above-mentioned various patterns of relationship between different ethnic 
groups were maintained up to the outbreak of the Pacific War. During the Japanese 
occupation, the Japanese attempted to harness and control the forces of nationalism 
and ethnicity by promoting an Asian identity, a concept of Asian unity and a 
pan-Asian nationalism under Japanese leadership.96 Before the invasion, Indians and 
Malays did not have strong feelings about the Japanese, but there was intense hostility 
among the Chinese.97 But the result was that the Europeans were expelled, whereas 
the Chinese were recognized for their abilities and their significance for Malaya’s 
economic recovery.98 However, the Japanese were extremely wary of the Chinese. 
They dissolved many existing Chinese organizations, notably dialect and clan 
associations, and created an Overseas Chinese Association (OCA) with branches 
throughout Malaya as their principal agency for dealing with the Chinese 
community.99 This hostile ethnic relationship was far from conducive for regional 
economic development. 
In the shadow of the Japanese, the relationship between other ethnic groups is 
not clear. After achieving independence, more regional differences transpired. In 
Singapore, the Europeans and the Chinese still held their economic importance, in 
which shows a continuity from colonial times. By contrast, a cleavage between the 
Europeans and the Chinese on one side, and the Malays on the other emerged 
because of the advance of Indonesian and Malay nationalism.100 The status of Malays 
was purposely enhanced by the government. Such government intention was even 
more serious in Indonesia. By the end of the Japanese occupation, the dominant 
Indonesian nationalist force (the Sukarno-Hatta group) was geared towards a 
socialist economic, which in practice advocated state enterprises and encouraged 
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100 Twang, The Chinese Business Élite in Indonesia and the Transition to Independence, 
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indigenous business, leaving Chinese business in limbo.101 The Indonesian business 
class was coming very close to gaining state power as reflected in the great political 
influence of Hatta. The Chinese, who were politically impotent, seemed upset, as they 
were about to lose the political protection which they enjoyed during the colonial 
period.102  It resulted in the decline of Chinese power. Their property rights were 
denied, undermining their stagnant business position.103  
The European-Malay relationship was also unsatisfactory, especially in 
Indonesia. Hostile attitudes of the Indonesian government resulted in the 
confiscation of foreign assets, and a sharp decline in foreign investment when the 
process of economic decolonization gained momentum. However, the influence of 
these ethnic policies on the Riau Islands was not very effective. Firstly, the peripheral 
location of this area made government policy difficult to implement. Secondly, 
compared to other places in Indonesia, the economic importance of the Riau Islands 
was extremely limited. There was a lack of foreign business, so that the process of 
economic decolonization was scarcely felt. Thirdly, concerning local Chinese 
businessmen, many of them were Singapore-based. Both formal and informal 
connections to Singapore provided flexibility. Therefore, a relatively stable ethnic 
relationship inherited from the colonial period was retained, although the rise of 
Malays and Malay economic importance must not be neglected. 
In both Indonesia and Malaysia, a relatively ‘freer’ economic environment was 
not created until the establishment of the New Order by Suharto in 1966 and the 
implementation of the NEP which was in effect in Malaysia from 1971 onwards. 
These new policies smoothed ethnic relationships to some extent and resulted in a 
rapid economic development of the two countries in the late twentieth century.
 This pattern of ethnic relationship facilitated the creation of a varying 
connection within the triangle area. Due to the establishment and expansion of 
Chinese networks, social connections between the three states were reinforced during 
the colonial period. It reached the strongest point under unified Japanese military 
administration. This connection became weak after the Pacific War as a result of the 
disturbed relationships between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. 
 
4. Overview of socio-political development 
The interplay of trade, shipping and capital created by the movement of people and 
organisations maintain vibrant links with the outside world. The study of the political 
development and demographic features of Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands not 
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only provides a general context, but also demonstrates the key issues in this study 
from a different perspective. 
By comparing political change in the three regions, we found that Singapore 
experienced a relatively stable political evolution, only disrupted by the Pacific War, 
even though, the political environment showed a sustainable pattern, which was 
particularly characterized by the continuation of the free port policy. Johor shows 
more similarity than difference with Singapore. In the colonial period, there was a 
process of completing and reinforcing the political system by means of a constitution 
under indirect British rule. The maintenance of the sultan as ruler of the country 
during the whole period guaranteed a smooth transition from the colonial period to 
independence. However, there were drastic changes in the Riau Islands, which 
successively existed as a puppet sultanate, a residency and an isolated province with 
changeable bureaucratic institutions, as well as an unstable border region. 
From a long-term perspective, individual political transformation was not an 
independent process but is best characterized as being mutually influenced. For a 
long period, the British and the Dutch dominated regional political evolution. The 
1871 Anglo-Dutch Treaty guaranteed a relatively stable and non-hostile regional 
political environment. However, this came to an end with the Japanese invasion. 
Japanese influence was dramatic but temporary. The immediate post-war situation 
was characterized by intermittent cooperation and confrontation. It reached a peak in 
the period between 1963 and 1966, known as the Indonesian–Malaysian 
Confrontation, as a result of Indonesia's political and armed opposition to the 
creation of an expanded Malaysia federation. Both political and economic unrest 
befell the three regions. On 1 June 1966, Malaysia and Indonesia signed a bilateral 
agreement to end the Confrontation,104 which would result in a new beginning of 
regional development. But the end of the Confrontation did not signal the end of 
hardship. It was not until 1968, when relations between Singapore and Indonesia 
were normalised, that regulated communication began to improve, again as a result 
of restored cross-border mobility.105 Nevertheless, colonial influence was not easily 
eliminated in the three areas under discussion. In the triangle area, socio-economic 
activities were still frequently conducted in defiance of the central government, 
although considered  illegal or secret. Therefore, the one and a half centuries of 
political development in the triangle showed more continuity than discontinuity. 
Political transformation also had an impact on economic policies. In general, a 
rather liberal and stable policy was continued in Singapore from the colonial period 
to the present, whereas in Malaysia and Indonesia, higher priority was given to the 
Malays in both countries under the guidance of development of the national 
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economy after achieving independence. It indicated a shift from liberal policy to 
government interventionist in Johor and the Riau Islands. 
Regarding the relationship between the change of regional politics and 
demographic development, population growth show a high correlation with 
economic and political significance. Rapid population growth accompanied 
economic expansion and rising political leverage. During the colonial period, 
European political supremacy resulted in a rapid growth of the European population, 
although absolute numbers were quite small. Under European colonial policy, the 
Chinese gradually gained importance in the economic field. This fuelled Chinese 
immigration, which in turn contributed to the growth of the Chinese population in 
this area. Considering the demographic structure and ethnic relationships, the influx 
of Chinese was also partly a result of close relations with both Europeans and Malay 
rulers. The kinship between Malay rulers in Johor and the Riau Islands was an ethnic 
bond within the triangle region. The Malay population received an impetus in the 
post-war period as a result of the policy-encouraged higher birth rate, as well as their 
gradually enhanced political status, but it was at the expense of the Europeans and 
Chinese. 
In short, from a socio-political perspective, the interconnectedness between 
Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands shows a first increasing, then decreasing 
process with the Pacific War as its turning-point. Malay political dominance in 
post-war Malaysia and Indonesia, however, finally made the mutual connection less 
and less relevant. This was not changed until the establishment of the SIJORI Growth 
Triangle. 
Regional socio-political aspect corresponded to two factors in the Porter’s 
Diamond Model: social structure and government. The factor of social structure 
includes two variables: demographic composition and ethnic relationships. 
Assignments after standardization are shown by Table 2.6. 
With regard to demographic composition, the absolute share of different ethnic 
groups in the total population is not accurate enough to reflect their economic 
importance. Instead, we need to focus on their growing relative importance and to 
take consideration also their hierarchy or position in the community, especially the 
European and the Chinese who possessed economic importance in this region. 
Although the Europeans only had a small share in total population, they possessed 
the most economic and political advantage in the colonial period. This advantage was 
maintained to a certain extent in the post-war period. 
 Regarding ethnic relationships, the relationships between different ethnic 
groups can be characterized as rivalry, competitive, or cooperative. It has been widely 
accepted that a harmonious ethnic relationship has a positive impact on the 
accumulation of regional competitive advantage, whereas a hostile relationship 
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brings negative impact. During the colonial era, a relatively stable and plural social 
order was meant by colonial ‘good government’, in which Europeans controlled the 
economy and Malays occupied the land in the context of growing communities of 
migrant Chinese and Indian labour. After independence, an increasing number of 
ethnic riots and social inequalities led to a more questionable social order.106 
 
Table 2. 6. Standardized assignments of social structure in Singapore, Johor and Riau Islands 












S J R S J R S J R S J R 
Demo- compo. – 
E 
1.6 0.8 0.4 3.2 2 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 4 2.4 0.8 
Demo-compo. – 
C 
2.4 1.6 1.6 2.8 4 2.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 3.6 3.2 2.4 
Ethnic 
relationships 
4 4 3.2 2.8 3.2 2.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 4 3.2 1.6 
Mean value 2.7 2.1 1.7 2.9 3.1 1.9 0.7 0.7 0.7 3.9 2.9 1.6 
 
The factor of government considers three variables: political stability, policies 
and effectiveness. Political stability and harmony generally guaranteed rapid growth 
of the economy despite the change of political regime, whereas political chaos left 
opportunities for the growth of illegal smuggling trade with political rivalry 
disturbing mutual connections between Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands. 
Regarding policies, regional measures are recognized as a policy contributing to 
competitiveness. Regions are recognized as actors which make political and economic 
decisions, and whose local knowledge can be harnessed to improve the performance 
of the world economy.107 Generally, liberal economic policies have a more positive 
effect on the economic environment, whereas interventionist and protectionist are 
relatively negative, if we adopt the doctrine of economic liberalism which supports 
and promotes laissez-faire economics, private property, free competition, limited 
government regulation, but opposes government intervention in the free market that 
inhibits free trade and competition. Thus a positive evaluation is assigned to 
laissez-faire policies with limited government intervention, while a negative 
assignment is given to strong interventionism. During the colonial period, a relatively 
liberal economic environment prevailed, except in the 1930s when there was a 
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growing tendency towards protectionism. State intervention was at its strongest point 
in Indonesia in the 1950s and early 1960s. 
Assignments after standardization are shown by Table 2.7. In general, an 
effective administrative system facilitates the influx of foreign capital, helps 
implement government policies, improves the investment climate, etc. The 
effectiveness of government administration varies according to the political and 
geographical hierarchy of the region in a nation. In Singapore, as the political gravity 
of the Straits Settlements and later the independent government, there was a high 
level of effectiveness of administration. By contrast, in the Riau Islands, located on 
the periphery of Indonesia, there is a tendency away from the central government, 
resulting in low effectiveness. This was lowered by indirect rule in the second half of 
the nineteenth century. Therefore, a more effective administrative system was 
established, allowing the influx of foreign capital. 
  
















S J R S J R S J R S J R 
Political 
stability 
2 1 ½ 2 2 1 ½ ½ ½ 2 2 1 
Policies 1 1 1 2 2 2 ¼ ¼ ¼ 2 1 ½ 
Effectiveness 2 1 ¼ 2 2 ½ ½ - - 2 1 ½ 


















It was suggested in the introduction that mutual connections between Singapore, 
Johor and the Riau Islands can be observed in three spheres: trade, shipping and 
capital. This chapter focuses on the trade flow between the three regions. In this 
regard, external trade refers to trade between the Singapore-Johor-Riau Islands 
region and other places, whereas internal trade means the movement of commodities 
between Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands. The main attention of this chapter is 
paid to the internal connections, which stimulated internal integration within the 
triangle area. 
As far back as the early nineteenth century, trade development had been 
stimulated by the free port policy in both British-colonized Singapore and 
Dutch-controlled Riau Islands. As the most important participants of trade, the 
Europeans and Chinese dominated all international and regional trade. Their 
complementary roles stimulated internal integration based on a pattern of mutual 
benefit. Under these conditions, both international and regional trade experienced 
rapid growth. However, from the 1860s onwards, new elements, such as a more 
aggressive colonial expansion, the opening of the Suez Canal, the arrival of 
steamships and the laying of submarine telegraph cables, changed the pattern of trade. 
The new factors, together with the rise of Hong Kong in the trade between China and 
the West, gave Singapore a more important role in the Southeast Asian network. In 
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this system, the Malay Peninsula and the Netherlands Indies served as the hinterland 
of Singapore. Regional agricultural and mining products were shipped to Singapore 
in large quantities, and from there further transported to Western countries.1 In 
exchange, manufactured goods from the West were imported into Singapore and 
distributed to its hinterland. This pattern is characterized as East-West trade. 
Meanwhile, the position of Singapore as an entrepôt for regional trade was 
maintained, especially for transhipment of rice from Thailand, Vietnam and 
Cambodia to British Malaya and the Netherlands Indies, designated as intra-South 
China Sea trade. 
As the closest neighbour of Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands reacted 
differently to these changes. Johor performed exclusively as the hinterland of 
Singapore. Most of its products were directly transported to the Singapore market. In 
return, rice, textiles and other daily necessities were imported from Singapore for 
local consumption. The dependence of Johor on Singapore fitted into British colonial 
policy in unifying the entire Malay Peninsula. By contrast, in the Netherlands Indies, 
the Dutch colonial government adopted a different attitude. Instead of full 
cooperation, the Dutch regarded Singapore as their main rival. In order to attract 
trade flows from Singapore to ports in the Netherlands Indies, the Dutch colonial 
government made the whole of the Riau Islands as free trade region. On the one hand, 
the Riau Islands became the hinterland of Singapore for the trade of agricultural 
products because of geographical proximity. On the other hand, it also performed a 
role as an entrepôt in domestic interinsular trade in the Netherlands Indies. Such 
differences in trade within triangle region existed throughout the entire period of this 
study.  
Departing from this context, the chapter begins with an overview of general trade 
development individually, followed by an analysis of mutual trade connections 
within the triangle. Part three pays attention to the main actors of trade and analyses 
the role of the Europeans and Chinese in regional trade development. Two different 
methodologies are applied. Quantitative analysis is applied to describe the general 
development of trade and the structure of exports and imports, whereas an analysis 
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1. General trend of trade development 
 
1870s-1910s 
It is commonly agreed that the last forty years of the nineteenth century constituted a 
period of relatively liberal world trade.2 Benefiting from it, the trade of Singapore in 
this period achieved a rapid growth at an average rate of 3.4% per annum, although 
deeply influenced by the depreciation of the Mexican dollar that traditionaly was 
widely used in Southeast Asia (Figure 3.1).3 This growth rate was given in current 
prices, but it did not show considerable difference with the growth rate in real terms. 
Deflated with the Sauerbeck-Statist overall price index, real annual average growth 
rate of Singapore merchandise exports between 1870 and 1910 was estimated at 
around 3.3% by Huff.4 Also Sugimoto’s estimate of price indices between 1900 and 
1910 does not show much deviation from the trend in current prices. 5  Our 
hypothesis of rapid growth in Singapore can therefore be accepted. Characterized as 
entrepôt trade, there was little difference in the structure of imports and exports but 
with a net import surplus. Traded commodities in this period can be classified into 
two categories. The first category included products for daily consumption, such as 
rice, cotton piece goods and opium, imported from the international market and 
distributed to the regional hinterland. The second category included commercial 
products from the hinterland destined for Western countries, such as tin, pepper, 
gambir, copra and other agricultural products. 
The relative importance of these commodities changed dramatically during this 
period. The share of rice and opium in total imports rose slightly due to the growth of 
the population in Southeast Asia. The share of cotton piece goods, however, declined 
sharply from around 10 per cent in 1885 to only three per cent in 1910. The same 
trend can be observed in the trade of gambir and pepper. The combined share of the 
two was more than 13 per cent in 1885, but by 1910 this figure had dropped to 5 per 
cent. They were replaced by tin, rubber and copra. In 1885, the trade of tin only had a 
share of four per cent of total imports. But from the early twentieth century, 
Singapore imported a large amount of tin ore, and exported tin products after being 
smelted locally. The total share of tin and tin ore was nearly 20 per cent in the first 
decade of the twentieth century. Another newly emerging commodity was rubber, 
                                                          
2 Courtenay, A Geography, 18. 
3 Original statics on prices in Singapore and Johor are recorded in different kinds of dollars 
(Mexican dollar, Straits dollar, etc.). The growth rate of 3.3% is based on the pound value. If 
calculated in dollar currency, the growth rate is around 5.5% per annum. 
4 Huff, The Economic Growth, 44. 
5 Sugimoto, Economic Growth in Singapore in the Twentieth Century: Historical GDP Estimates 
and Empirical Investigations, 136. 
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which, however, had not gained much importance yet. In 1910, its share was still 
below 5 per cent of total exports (Table 3.1). 
 
Figure 3. 1. Imports and exports of Singapore, 1870-1910. 
(£ mill. in current prices) 
 
Source: Appendix iv. 
 




1885 1900 1910 1885 1900 1910 
Gambir and Pepper 13  5  4 16  7  6 
Cotton goods 11  5  4  9  5  3 
Rice and opium 16 15 22 16 14 18 
Tin and tin ore  2 15 13  7 19 17 
Gutta-percha  2  5  1  4  8  2 
Copra  2  2  5  2  2  6 
Rubber  -  - - - -  5 
Others 54 53 48 46 45 43 
Note: “Others” include rattan, fish, etc. 
Source: Appendix v. 
 
In Johor, a rapid growth of trade also took place, but it was characterized by an 
export surplus, unlike Singapore. Akin to Singapore, the growth rate was recorded at 
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estimate was also in current prices, limited influence of inflation was expected on the 
real growth of trade in Johor as governed by Straits Settlements. 
With regard to trade structure, Johor differed markedly from Singapore. 
Although there is no detailed information about imported commodities into Johor, 
fragmentary evidence shows that imports were dominated by food and other basic 
products for daily consumption. In 1886, rice imported into Johor amounted to 
368,093 piculs, valued at £200,000, about 40 per cent of total imports into Johor.6 
Concerning exports, during the heyday of the plantation economy in the second half 
of the nineteenth century, a large volume of pepper and gambir was produced and 
exported from Johor. Pepper and gambir remained the only regional products of 
significance until the early twentieth century when other commodities gained more 
importance, such as tapioca, copra and rubber, contributing to the diversity of trade 
in Johor (Table 3.2).   
These products were planted or collected not only by smallholdings, but also by 
large European estates concentrated in Batu Pahat, Pulo Kokob, Panti, Johor Bahru 
and Pengerang.7 Moreover, traditional fisheries were still in the hands of indigenous 
people, but were without economic importance. The single largest change that took 
place was the emergence of rubber, which became the most profitable product for 
Johor in the following half-century. In 1910, total exports of rubber from Johor 
amounted to £175,000, 21 per cent of the total exports. 
 
Figure 3. 2. General trend and export structure of Johor, 1870-1911. 
(£ thous. in current prices) 
 
Source: Appendix vii. 
 
                                                          
6 Courtenay, A Geography, 104. 
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Table 3. 2. Structure of exports in Johor in 1890 and 1910. 
 (percentage share) 
 
Gambir Pepper Rubber Tapioca Areca nuts Copra Fish 
1890 56 44  - -  -  - - 
1910 26 14 21 8 17 14 - 
Source: Appendix viii. 
 
The Riau Islands from 1873 onwards also benefited from a liberal economic 
policy, just like elsewhere in the Netherlands Indies. The influx of foreign investment 
stimulated the plantation sector and exports of various commercial estate products, 
such as pepper, copra and rubber, both by the local population and European firms.8 
In exchange, rice and other stuff for daily use were imported and re-exported to other 
places in the Netherlands Indies. The general trend of trade development is given in 
Figure 3.3, indicating a net export surplus and a growth rate of 1% per annum based 
on current prices. Bart van Ark’s estimate shows that export indices in the 
Netherlands Indies during this period deflated by 12 per cent over these forty years.9 
The annual average deflation rate was hence estimated at only 0.3%, which had a very 
limited impact on the growth rate in real terms. We adjust the real average growth 
rate to 1.3% per annum, much lower than that of Singapore and Johor. Rather than a 
steady growth, the regional process showed sharp fluctuations, implying the 
vulnerability of the Riau Islands to outside influence. 
Concerning the structure of imports, a limited range of products was imported. 
Rice, clothes, textiles, sugar and opium were the most dominant and this picture did 
not change throughout the whole period. Industrial manufactured goods, iron, 
machines and oil products were not imported until the twentieth century and in very 
small volumes (Appendix xiv). This reflected the small scale of industrial activity 
both in the Riau Islands and in the Netherlands Indies in general. The structure of 
exports showed many similarities with Johor (Table 3.3), notably the predominance 
of gambir and pepper in the late nineteenth century and increasing diversification 
into the twentieth century, when a number of other agricultural products were also 
exported, such as pineapple, sago, copra, etc. 
 
                                                          
8 Touwen, Extremes, 90. 
9 Van Ark, 'The Volume and Price of Indonesian Exports, 1823 to 1940: The 
Long-Term Trend and its Measurement'. 
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Table 3. 3. Structure of exports in Riau Islands, 1866-1909. 
(percentage share) 
 
Gambir Pepper Sago Copra Other 
1866 60 35  -  -  5 
1879 61 34  -  -  5 
1895 70 22  -  -  8 
1909 39  8 14 25 14 
Source: Appendix xv. 
 
Figure 3. 3. Imports and exports of Riau Islands, 1866-1910. 
(£ thous. in current prices) 
 
Source: Appendix xi. 
 
1910s-1940s 
Liberal world trade since the early twentieth century was adversely affected by 
growing protectionism which reached its peak in the 1930s. Although the trade of 
Singapore during this period was marked by a growth rate of 2.1% per annum in 
current prices. During this period, import and export price indices deflated by 27.4 
per cent and 29.1 per cent respectively. 10 Influenced by the estimated annual 
deflation rate of 1%, the real annual growth rate of trade of Singapore can therefore 
be set at around 3.1% during this period. Similar to the fluctuations of price indices 
(Appendix l), the volume of trade was severely influenced by both political and 
economic instability, especially the First World War (1914-1918), restriction schemes 
and the worldwide economic depression in the 1930s (Figure 3.4). 
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The First World War resulted in global political instability and economic unrest, 
but it also stimulated tyre manufacture, which generated a large demand for natural 
rubber. Regional trade was thus to a large extent stimulated by the export of rubber 
products. Rubber, as well as tin products, constituted the main part of Singapore’s 
trade. However, the production and trade of them were both regulated and limited by 
various restriction schemes from the 1920s to the 1940s. The output of rubber in 
British Malaya was restricted by the Stevenson Restriction Scheme in the years 
1922-1928, and the International Rubber Regulation Scheme from 1934 to 1937, that 
also applied to the Netherlands Indies. These intervenions intended to stabilize 
declining rubber prices resulting from excesss supply. The International Tin Control 
Scheme, aiming at restricting supply by export quota, became operative on 1 March 
1931. It was renewed several times, notably in 1934 and 1937. These intensive 
interventions by government not only reflected the new character of regional trade, 
but also the integration of regional economy with the world market. They also 
resulted in drastic fluctuations of trade in the 1920s, as both production and prices of 
rubber and tin were rather unstable. The decline after 1930 was due to the world 
economic crisis, the influence of which was so far-reaching that trade of Singapore 
did not recover its earlier levels before the Pacific War. 
Change also occurred with regard to trade structure. On the export side, the 
once important gambir and pepper lost their previous significance. They were 
replaced by rubber, canned pineapple and petroleum (Table 3.4). Instead of being 
refined in the region, the oil products were mainly transported from the Netherlands 
Indies. They were stored and redistributed through the island of Pulau Bukom by 
Royal Dutch Shell. These products did not have much impact on the Singapore 
economy as they created little new employment, with installations confined to 
Singapore’s offshore islands.11 The share of tin and other minerals remained stable. 
Among imports, the structure began to show a difference compared to exports. 
Imports of tin products were replaced by imports of tin ore, which was smelted in 
Singapore before being exported. The same pattern was also observed in other 
processing industries such as rubber, canned pineapple and palm oil, which were 
based on primary products imported from adjacent regions. 
These subtle changes demonstrate the emergence of industries for 
semi-manufactured products, which gave Singapore the character of a staple port.12 
Nevertheless, its position as an entrepôt for regional distribution of rice, cotton piece 
goods and other manufactured items remained and was reinforced. 
 
                                                          
11 Huff, The Economic Growth. 
12 Ibid., 71. 
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Figure 3. 4. Imports and exports of Singapore, 1911-1939. 
(£ mill. in current prices) 
 
Source: Appendix iv. 
 
Table 3. 4. Structure of exports in Singapore, 1911-1939. 
(percentage share) 
 
Rubber Canned pineapple Tin Petroleum Other 
1911 6 1 18  - 75 
1920 32 1 10  - 57 
1929 28 1 12  7 52 
1939 41 1 16 12 29 
Source: Appendix vi. 
 
A much faster growth of trade was achieved in Johor. Both imports and exports 
more than quadrupled at a growth rate of about 6% per annum in current prices. 
Applying the annual deflation rate of 1% in Singapore, we estimate the real annual 
trade growth rate at around 7%. The depression of the 1930s also deeply affected 
regional trade, which, however, recovered immediately after the crisis. The net export 
surplus continued in this period (Figure 3.5). 
The steep rise of trade from the 1920s onwards was due to exports of tin, iron 
and bauxite ores, which radically altered the export structure of Johor. Under the tin 
restriction schemes, exports of tin ore from mines near Kota Tinggi were governed by 
the tin quota release each quarter of the year. This created a difference between the 
amount of tin ore produced and the amount held by miners as ‘permissible stocks’, 
representing a percentage of the assessment of each mine. Iron ore was mined in the 
vicinity of towns of Endau and Yong Peng by Japanese companies. Bauxite mining 



















 Trade Connections: Commerce and Merchants  67 
 
 
washing plants in the mine were enlarged and output increased. All iron and bauxite 
ores were exported in its crude state to Japan, where they were processed.13 
Another contribution to export diversity came from rubber and palm oil. From 
the beginning of the twentieth century, all planters, whether European, Malay or 
Chinese, and whether capitalists or not, had devoted their efforts to rubber.14 The 
share of rubber in total exports increased from 32 per cent in 1913 to 71 per cent in 
1939. From the 1930s onwards, exports of palm oil also gradually gained importance, 
although its share was only two per cent of total exports in 1938. By contrast, exports 
of traditional agricultural products declined. In 1913, although gambir, pepper and 
other agricultural products still had a significant share in total exports, they faded out 
completely after the 1920s (Table 3.5). 
Rising production of tin and rubber required the import of materials for 
exploration and processing. This was reflected by a change in the structure of imports. 
Different from the import of daily necessities in the former period, the imports of 
manufactured products included textiles, metals and machinery, other construction 
equipment. The growing value of this category of imports indicated a growth of 
regional industry as well as technological improvement. 
 
Figure 3. 5. Imports and exports of Johor, 1913-1938. 
(£ thous. in current prices) 
 
Source: Appendix vii. 
 
                                                          
13 JAR. (1938), 14. 
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Raw material Manufactured material Other 
1913 80 6 11 3 
1920 69 9 17 5 
1928 52 7 41 - 











1913 32 21 4 34 9 
1920 69  2 6 20 4 
1930 66  - 7  - - 
1939 71  - 9  - - 
Source: Appendix viii. 
 
Apart from Pulau Bukom in Singapore, another distribution centre of Royal 
Dutch Shell was Pulau Sambu, one of the small islands in the Riau Islands situated 
very near Singapore. Since 1911, it had been selected as a storage and distribution 
centre of the Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij (BPM, the Batavian Oil Company, a 
subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell) after a year-long negotiation between the company 
and the sultan of Riau-Lingga.15 The transhipment of petroleum brought recovery to 
the once prosperous entrepôt trade in the Riau Islands. Although the register of the 
value of oil products from Pulau Sambu in the Riau Islands is only available for a 
brief period between 1911 and 1922, Pulau Sambu has kept operating up to the 
present day. The total value of oil products was far higher than the total of other 
exports from the Riau Islands, although compared with other oil ports such as 
Balikpapan in Borneo and Pangkalan Branden in Suatra, the value of exports from 
Pulau Sambu was insignificant (Appendix xii). Because of the incomplete records of 
oil products transhipped from Pulau Sambu, we do not include them in the 
description of the trade of the Riau Islands. Growth rates of imports and exports 
showed at 3.7% and 2.9% per annum respectively in current prices. According to Van 
Ark’s calculation, export price indices in Indonesia deflated by 53 per cent from 1911 
                                                          
15 Lindblad, 'The Petroleum Industry in Indonesia before the Second World War'. 
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to 1938. The annual deflation of export price was hence estimated at 2.6%.16 We thus 
adjust the real growth of import and export to 6.3% and 5.5% per annum respectively. 
They are lower than in Johor, but higher than in Singapore (Figure 3.6). 
The structure of non-oil trade also experienced much change elsewhere in the 
region. Although rice, cloth, and textiles remained the most important import 
products in the beginning of this period, their share fell from 38 per cent in 1911 to 
20 per cent in 1938. By contrast, the combined share of machines, iron and oil 
products rose from four per cent in 1911 to 33 per cent in 1938, which may be 
attributed to demand from construction in Pulau Sambu and the development of 
other industries (calculation based on Appendix xiv). 
Diversification also took place in the structure of exports. As in Johor, gambir 
and pepper lost their former importance and were replaced by rubber, copra, wood 
and tin ore (Table 3.6). But unlike the preponderance of rubber in the total exports of 
Johor, the structure of exports in the Riau Islands was more balanced. Although the 
rubber boom had also performed its magic in the Riau Islands from the 1920s, the 
export of rubber was rather negligible compared to Indragiri.17 The export of forest 
and marine products constituted another part: logging for production of lumber and 
charcoal, and both fresh and salted fish. Their economic importance was not as large 
as rubber and copra. Apart from agricultural and forest products, tin ore also held a 
large share. Tin exploitation had begun as early as in 1887 by the Singkep Tin 
Company. The ore was not smelted in Singkep, an island in the Lingga archipelago, 
but transported to Singapore by the own steamships of the company (Straits Trading 
Company).18 Since then, the share of tin in total exports increased steadily.  
 
Table 3. 6. Structure of exports of Riau Islands, 1911-1938. 
(percentage share) 
 
Rubber Gambir, pepper Tin ore Sago Copra Other 
1911  - 44  - 7 45  4 
1920 67  5  6 4 16  2 
1929 29  4 20 5 19 23 
1938 21  5 22 2 12 38 
Source: Appendix xv. 
                                                          
16 Van Ark, 'The Volume'. 
17 Touwen, Extremes, 91. 
18 KV (1899), 209. 
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Figure 3. 6. Exports and imports of Riau Islands (excluding oil), 1911-1937. 
(£ thous. in current prices) 
 
Source: Appendix xi, Appendix xiii. 
 
1940s-1970 
The Japanese invasion of Malaya brought a sudden halt to regional trade. Although 
no detailed statistics about trade during the war are available, it can be assumed that a 
sharp decline took place. Restricted by the Japanese to control economic resources as 
part of its planned Co-Prosperity Sphere, all international trade was cut off 
completely except with Japan. 19 On the other hand, regional inter-island trade 
grasped the opportunity to develop, especially after 1943 when the liberal trade policy 
was abandoned and the Syonan Import-Export Control Association, run by 
Mitsubishi and other Japanese firms in Malaya and Sumatra, was set up. Under these 
conditions, the only commodities produced and exported were in the category of 
minerals, petroleum and rubber. However, Japanese wartime requirements were 
largely below production capacity. This difference led to a sharp decline in regional 
exports of these commodities. 
Recovery took place immediately after 1945 when the development of trade 
showed a new pattern compared to the previous period. In the 1950s Singapore 
regained its position as the main commercial centre of Southeast Asia, indicated by 
the rapid expansion of trade with Peninsular Malaysia as a result of general Malayan 
expansion programmes and the stepping-up of capital investment and purchase of 
equipment.20 From 1947 to 1971, exports from Singapore increased more than six 
times and imports increased about five times. Average growth rates per annum were 
                                                          
19 Twang, The Chinese Business Élite, 78. 
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8.2% and 7.3% for export and import respectively, the highest since 1870 (Figure 3.7). 
Since the price indices did not deviate very much in the 1950s and 1960s,21 our 
estimated growths rates reflect growth in real terms. 
The rapid development was accompanied by a change in the trade structure. 
Rubber still remained very important in the total export, but its share declined from 
47 per cent in 1950 to only 24 per cent in 1970. The same trend applied to the export 
of tin. The decline was rather obvious immediately after 1945.22 These commodities, 
which were traditionally imported from adjacent Malaya and Indonesia for re-export, 
underscored the decline of Singapore’s entrepôt trade. By contrast, the export of 
manufactured goods and petroleum formed the main part of exports (Table 3.7).  
Changes in the pattern of trade reflected the difference between the traditional 
entrepôt trade and the currently developing trade with a higher proportion of 
retained imports and domestic exports.23 In general, both political and economic 
changes have affected Singapore since 1960, transforming the country from an 
entrepôt of regional trade of very limited value into an entrepôt-manufacturing 
centre for industrialization through the policies of import substitution and later 
export orientation.24 
 






Copra, palm oil, canned 
pineapple, tin 
Other 
1950 47  5  - 10 38 
1960 41  8 26  4 21 
1965 22 14 41  3 30 
1970 24 17 48  3  8 
Source: Appendix vi. 
 
                                                          
21 Sugimoto, Economic Growth, 129. 
22 Ibid., 135. 
23 Courtenay, A Geography, 236. 
24 Ibid., 238. 
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Figure 3. 7. Imports and exports of Singapore, 1947-1970. 
(£ mill. in current prices)  
 
Source: Appendix iv. 
 
Immediately upon the conclusion of the Japanese occupation, recovery took 
place in all domains and output quickly exceeded pre-war levels in Johor. The general 
trend is observed at the national level as Johor formed an important part of the 
Malaysian national economy. There was a good performance immediately after the 
war in the early 1950s as a result of the Korean War, which resulted in a large 
demand for natural rubber. After that, there was a mild growth of both imports and 
exports. Considering its geographical location and tradition, Johor’s trade probably 
followed the same trend of bilateral trade as between Malaysia and Singapore, which, 
however, did not record much growth after the mid-1950s. Later on, exports did 
stagnate, while imports actually declined per annum, albeit with a limited inflation. 
Therefore, the trade of Johor in this period was not as satisfactory as before, with an 
average growth rate of 5% per annum under limited impact of inflation (Figure 3.8). 
Although industrialization came to be regarded as the means to generate 
productive employment and to diversify the economy, the effect of related 
government policies, such as import substitution was somewhat limited before the 
adoption of the NEP in 1971. Changes in the structure of trade immediately after 
were not noticeable, in spite of the intention of government policies to diversify the 
national economy.25 In Muar, the major plantation area of rubber in Johor, the 
regional economy still largely depended on the export of raw rubber without 
processing in the first two decades after the war.26 This could also be observed in 
                                                          
25 Mohamed, Export Trade and the West Malaysian Economy: An Enquiry into the Economic 
Implications of Export Instability, 15-9. 
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other towns in Johor. Up to the late 1960s, exports of products from the primary 
sector stayed above 76 per cent of the total, whereas exports from the secondary 
sector only had a share of about 12 per cent. Rubber, palm oil, canned pineapple, tin, 
iron, bauxite, timber and fish remained the most important commodities in Johor. As 
a newly emerging export product, canned pineapple increased from £285,000 million 
in 1947 to £5.9 million in 1970. Similarly, exports of palm oil became the main 
component of regional exports replacing rubber. Exports of timber also grew in 
importance. 
 
Figure 3. 8. Trade of Peninsular Malaysia, 1947-1968. 
(£ mill. in current prices) 
 
Source: Appendix ix. 
 
Like in Johor, the general development in the Riau Islands in this period is also 
difficult to observe at the regional level. On the national level in Indonesia, the quest 
for independence and decolonization took a long time and the process was not 
completed until the late 1950s. Moreover, the colonial influence did not vanish easily, 
causing much difficulty in the struggle for economic recovery and independence. 
Although a recovery took place after the war, the general development of trade 
showed a slight decline up to 1960. After a jump in the late 1950s, trade fell into 
stagnation throughout the 1960s and did not improve until the 1970s (Figure 3.9). 
But we have to bear in mind that the Indonesian rupiah had been in a long-term 
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depreciation since the early 1950s. The real trade development was even worse if 
expressed in international currency. 
 
Figure 3. 9. Imports and exports of Indonesia, 1951-1971. 
(Rp. mill. in current prices) 
 
Source: Appendix xi. 
 
Although it is hazardous to assume a correlation between all of Indonesia and 
the Riau Islands, it seems likely that the unstable political situation and changing 
government polices at the national level had a negative influence on regional trade. 
Although regulations were made in 1950 to permit a freer export of produce from its 
‘duty free’ area of the Riau Islands to Singapore, 27  there were no optimistic 
expectation until the late 1960s after the ending of Indonesian–Malaysian 
Confrontation. From the mid-1960s, when the situation had improved, there were 
signs of recovery of trade as shown by the growth of trade in Tanjung Pinang, which 
was internationally oriented (Figure 3.10). In 1973, total exports from Riau amounted 
to £10.8 million in current prices, far higher than the pre-war figures.28 It is difficult 
to estimate an accurate growth rate, but it is safe to say that there was a ‘slow 
recovery’. 
 
                                                          
27 Singapore Free Press, 12 April 1950. 
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Figure 3. 10. Exports in Tanjung Pinang, 1963-1970. 
(£ thous. in current prices) 
 
Source: Appendix xvii. 
 
The structure of exports did not differ much from previous period. In 1950, 
major export commodities still consisted of fish, rubber from the Riau estates, copra 
from the Pulu Tujuh Islands, gambir from Bintan Island, and timber from Karimun. 
Tin and bauxite were prohibited from export, but all other produce could be 
exported in small quantities provided an export permit was obtained at Tanjung 
Pinang, Belakang Padang and Tanjung Balai. 29 Pulau Sambu was still used for 
transhipment for oil products. The limited export of industrial products suggested 
that regional economic development had not yet achieved significant transformation 
and was still at a low level. By 1975, at least, no real change had taken place (Table 
3.8). It was only much later that Indonesia underwent an increasing integration with 
the world economy, profound structural changes and intense diversification.30 
Forced by the blockade on international trade and the cut-off of their traditional 
trade route to Singapore, the Riau people had to rely on shipments of foodstuff from 
Java. Domestic trade flows between these two islands expanded quickly (Table 3.9). 
The goods, mostly rice, textile, fish, copra, and coconut oil, were first sent to Tanjung 
Pinang and from there transported by boat to Java, Borneo and mainland Sumatra. 
This port was thus transformed into a domestic port for the interinsular entrepôt 
trade and developed quickly in the 1960s. However, these poor-quality goods did not 
bring structural change to this pattern of domestic trade compared to the colonial 
period. The Riau Islands was the last of three regions to experience industrialization. 
This story only starts seriously with the emergence of the SIJORI Growth Triangle. 
                                                          
29 ‘Indies Relaxes Export Rules.’ Singapore Free Press, 12 April 1950. 
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Table 3. 8. Exports from various ports in Riau Islands,in 1975. 
(£ thous. in current prices) 
 A B C D E F G H I 
Tanjung Pinang 76 1,083 - 12 - - 4 77* 321 
Batu Ampar 47 - 1,211 1 - - - 406** 1,149 
Pulau Sambu - - - - 25,677 5,555 - - - 
Tanjung Uban - - - - 3,210 1 - - - 
Dabo Singkep - - - - - - - 5,098*** - 
Pasir Panjang - - - - - - - 17**** - 
Note: A: live animals, fish and shrimps, food, copra cake, tobacco; B: rubber and rubber 
products; C: carbonate; D: gambir, seaweed, jelutung; E: oil products; F: wax; G: wood; H: 
mineral products, metal and machinery, instruments (* bauxite; ** blowlamps, strongboxes; 
*** tin and ore; **** granite); I: mangrove charcoal, agar-agar and other. 
Source: RdA (1975). 
 
Table 3. 9. Interinsular trade of Riau Islands in 1961. 
(Rp. thous. in current prices) 
 
Rice Fish Copra Coconut oil Textile Cement 
Import 683 8 - 18 1,714 46 
Export 66.3 5,435 370 619 - - 
Source: SI (1961). 
 
To sum up, from a long-term perspective, the gloomy development of the Riau 
Islands was largely attributed to its peripheral position in the Netherlands Indies and 
its limited export commodities, whereas the rapid expansion of Johor trade in the 
period of the 1910s-1940s was attributed to the exports of rubber. Post-war 
performance of Singapore was better than Johor and the Riau Islands as a result of 
several factors. First, Singapore moved gradually away from fully depending on 
entrepôt trade to based on domestic manufacturing. Second, the export of raw 
materials was replaced by value-added industrial products. Third, complete political 
independence resulted in a greater flexibility in governing trade than before. In Johor 
and the Riau Islands, the export structure was still dominated by traditional 
agricultural and mining products long after the war. Belated and slow 
industrialization left them lagging behind Singapore. Singapore’s trade composition 
mirrored, not simply an urban-rural dualism, but more a tripartite division; this 
broadly corresponded to the domestic, Malay and extra-Malay markets.31 
 
                                                          
31 Huff, The Economic Growth, 115. 
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2. Trade connections of Singapore-Johor-Riau Islands 
Trade connections within the triangle are formed by the trade flows between 
Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands, including exports of primary products from 
Johor and the Riau Islands to Singapore and imports of basic consumer goods from 
Singapore into Johor and the Riau Islands. 
 
1870-1910 
Singapore has developed various trade connections since its establishment as a free 
port in 1819. Although up to 1870 the advantage of a free port was no longer the 
monopoly of Singapore, its trade did not suffer from competition, since it still 
possessed the advantage of a superior geographical location and probably possessed 
the best facilities for trade compared to other ports in this region.32 By means of its 
entrepôt position, Singapore established a wide trade network on account of its 
pivotal position in regional trade. Concerning intra-South China Sea trade, the 
entrepôt trade in foodstuff (rice in particular), connected Singapore with European 
colonies in Asia, such as India, Burma, Vietnam, Malaya and the Netherlands Indies. 
The latter two had a share of around 20 and 30 per cent respectively in Singapore’s 
re-export of Western manufactured goods around 1900.  
This regional network with Singapore at the centre was gradually extended and 
intensified as trade grew and more regions were incorporated. Johor was fully 
included in this network by exporting gambir, pepper, copra, sago and importing rice 
and cotton goods. This pattern was the result of political unification. In the Riau 
Islands, by contrast, exports of regional agricultural commodities were also entirely 
transported to Singapore, even including those destined for Java. However, this 
pattern rather went against the intention of the Dutch colonial government to attract 
trade from Singapore. It was because trade in the Riau Islands was completely in the 
hands of Chinese businessmen from Singapore. Imposition of taxes on trade with 
Java forced these exports to Singapore, where another group of businessmen 
transported them to the Netherlands Indies. But for the imports of foodstuff, they did 
not entirely come from Singapore. Some regional traders also conducted direct trade 
between the Riau Islands and Thailand and Vietnam. 33  Still, these external 
connections declined as Singapore became the chief supplier of imports destined for 
the Outer Islands of the Netherlands Indies. 
The intensity of internal trade connections can be seen by the importance of the 
Singapore market for Johor and the Riau Islands. The statistics indicate gradually 
intensified trade between Singapore and the others, as exports of gambir and pepper 
                                                          
32 Wong, The Trade, 199. 
33 SHS (1866, 1870). 
78  Genesis of a Growth Triangle 
kept growing in the nineteenth century, but the low percentage of trade of Johor and 
the Riau Islands in the total of Singapore indicates that, trade between Singapore and 
Johor-Riau Islands was important for the latter, but not for Singapore. However, 
from the 1890s onwards, the influx of agricultural products from Sumatra and the 
decline of gambir reduced the competitiveness of Johor and the Riau Islands in 
Singapore’s market. The emergence of rubber in Johor created another connection 
with Singapore, but this did not materialize in the Riau Islands until a decade later. 
Therefore, during the expansion of Singapore’s trade network, Johor’s links with 
Singapore was maintained and even intensified, first by pepper and gambir, and later 
by rubber, but the delay of structural change in the Riau Islands resulted in a slightly 
loosened connection with Singapore in the early twentieth century. The geographical 
advantage of the Riau Islands was offset by the rise of other regions in the 
Netherlands Indies due to the lack of diversity of exports. This was also the reason for 
a limited expansion of the foreland both of Johor and the Riau Islands, since imports 
of foodstuff also depended on Singapore. And this dependency was possibly stronger 
than expected, because a large proportion of the coastal trade was carried by Chinese 
junks and other small craft, the owners of which, through ignorance or to avoid 
trouble, did not report their arrival and departure.34 Therefore, the trade of the three 




The boom of rubber and tin industries resulted in an expansion of the international 
market for both British Malaya and the Netherlands Indies. Singapore was 
transformed from a precarious entrepôt into a confident hub of expanding regional 
economy.35 Although Johor and the Riau Islands also expanded the trade with other 
regions except Singapore, their internal connections were still intensified during this 
period. 
Johor still served as the hinterland of Singapore’s agricultural exports. Gambir 
and pepper were for the last time booming. New business was created and intensified 
by exports of rubber and tin ore. The emergence of the canned pineapple industry 
further diversified the regional export structure. The same products were exported 
from the Riau Islands to Singapore for the world market. In 1915, the export 
structure of Johor showed much similarity with the import structure of Singapore, 
and the share of import commodities stayed at a high level in the Singapore market: 
rubber (53 per cent), tin ore (five per cent), gambir and pepper (100 per cent), copra 
(19 per cent). Exports of forest products also emerged in this period despite of serious 
attempts to conserve valuable timber and other products of the state forests. Most 
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timber from Johor was exported, while a number of sawn softwood plants were 
imported from Sumatra and the Riau Islands. Even into the 1930s, the share of 
commercial agricultural products from Johor retained a stable share in Singapore’s 
market. The situation in the Riau Islands was different because the cultivation of 
rubber had not yet begun on a large scale. The export structure of the Riau Islands 
was still dominated by gambir and copra: both gradually lost their market in 
Singapore. However, the importance of the Riau Islands for Singapore maintained 
because of the growth of transhipment of oil products from Pulau Sambu by a 
subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell which were destined for Singapore. 
In short, the bilateral connection between Singapore and the other two states 
was a continued process of intensification. Is the Riau Islands, this process was slower 
because of the limited scale of the smallholder economy, but Singapore was still the 
sole market for regional produce from the Riau Islands. It was also from this period 
that Singapore was not the only outlet for regional export from Johor and the Riau 
Islands. Their outward connection had been established and reinforced. 
 
Japanese occupation and revolutions 
The Japanese occupation of this region lasted only three and a half years, but it 
completely destroyed existing trade networks by its aim of restructuring the pre-war 
economic system in order to exploit Malaya’s and Indonesia’s economic resources for 
the benefit of Japan. Externally, all international trade connections were cut off. 
Allied forces evacuated their vessels and blockaded the Japanese maritime connection 
to the international market. Under this influence, Singapore, which was controlled by 
Japan, lost its position as a trade centre in Southeast Asia, as well as in the world. The 
sole international connection with Japan, however, was also full of obstacles. 
Although the Japanese military government attempted to lay the groundwork for 
future development along these routes to Japan, the occupation was primarily a time 
of expedients designed to overcome short-term difficulties.36 Japanese attempts to 
impose central control over trade received little support from the local population, 
and were impeded by corruption and inefficiency. In the first place, this was because 
Malaya was an integral part of a larger economic system, a segment of the British 
Empire which lacked the resources to operate in isolation. In the second, the 
autarchic economic policy practised in the entire region did not allow sufficient 
amounts of foodstuffs to be exported to Singapore.37 Even the internal Asian trade 
suffered from transport shortages which impeded plans for industrial expansion and 
made it difficult to obtain supplies from overseas sources.  
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The blockade of the external exports forced the Japanese military administration 
to focus on internal trade. As a result, the Singapore-Johor-Riau Islands region 
became the core of the Japanese military unit, within which the economic boundary 
between the former Dutch and British spheres disappeared. 38  Therefore, raw 
materials, including bauxite, tin and rubber, were produced and exported on a 
modest scale in Johor and in substantial quantities in the Riau Islands for Japan.39 By 
the end of 1943, Chinese merchants from Sumatra and Singapore were in full control 
of the trade across the Straits of Malacca.40 There was a remarkable local political 
and economic integration, especially between Sumatra and Singapore.41 Alongside 
the legal trade, smuggling across the Straits reached a peak. It was facilitated by the 
settling of kumiai (co-operatives), grouping of firms in the same line of business 
which were given quasi-monopolies over certain types of wholesale and retail trade.42 
They were engaged in cross-Straits trade to reduce wasteful competition by forming 
local companies.43 Karimun Island in Riau managed to evade in the trade web 
controlled by the Japanese. It became the unofficial trade centre of Malaya, Sumatra 
and Java, and was the hub of smuggling, tax evasion, and black marketeering. In 
March 1945, when the war was close to its end, a revealing move was made by the 
Syonan-to authorities: a Karimun branch of the Syonan Rice Import Kumiai was 
founded on Singapore to serve to ease the distribution of imported rice.44 
This pattern of cross-border trade remained intact in the immediate 
post-colonial period due to the strong demand in Singapore for items from the 
islands, including coconut, copra, rubber and fish. People from surrounding islands 
travelled frequently to Singapore to purchase goods and services. Due to the military 
confrontation between newly-independent Indonesia and the Netherlands, this trade 
had very much the character of illegal smuggling carried out by a small number of  
private traders. Invisible exports of rubber from the Riau Islands to Singapore were 
recorded at 5,825 tons in 1947, 7,919 ton in 1948 and 8,518 tons in 1949.45 Later, the 
Chinese import-export organizations (e.g. the Singapore Overseas Chinese 
Importers-Exporters Association (SOCIEA) established after the war on 1 January 
1946) were one of the most striking post-war inventions in the region. Such 
organizations were established not only in major entrepôt cities such as Singapore 
and Penang, but also in various parts of Sumatra and Java. Of crucial importance for 
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the smuggling trade in the region were not only those in Indonesia, but also the one 
in Singapore.46 Awang, a Malay teacher from Tanjung Balai Karimun, recalled that 
during the 1950s he was one of the richest men in his community because of the high 
prices his copra attracted. He would ship coconuts from Sumatra to the islands and 
manufacture copra, which was then sent by ship to Singapore.47  
Purposely or not, this was the period when internal connections within the 
Singapore-Johor-Riau Islands triangle reached its strongest momentum in political 
terms. Johor and the Riau Islands enhanced their positions from the periphery of 
British Malaya and the Netherlands Indies to the core of the ‘Southern Territory’. 
However, in the meantime, their international connections were almost blocked. This 
resulted in an imbalance between regional and international trade for Johor and the 
Riau Islands, and an economic decline. 
 
1947-1970s 
The impact of the Japanese occupation was so far-reaching that it took a long time for 
post-war Malaya and Indonesia to complete the task of attaining independence and 
realizing decolonization. The period between the late 1940s and the mid-1950s were 
full of disputes, confrontation and rivalry.  
In Johor, regional economic development also guided the general policy of 
Malaysia, which aimed at developing national economy. Trade from Johor was 
politically intended by the Malaysian government to be directed via domestic ports, 
but geographically and economically it was still passing through Singapore. At the 
same time, a substantial proportion of imports into Johor went to the Federation.48 
As the chief port of the Federation of Malaya, 73 per cent of total imports and 63 per 
cent of total exports in Malaya passed through Singapore in 1950.49 Rubber, canned 
pineapple, palm oil and tin ores still retained their importance and were exported 
through Singapore. 
Indonesia’s trade experienced a similar pattern of transformation. International 
trade were re-created and recovered rapidly in the post-war period. Total Indonesian 
trade with Singapore reached a record value in November 1950. This was mainly 
attributable to higher prices drawing more rubber into Singapore. 50  However, 
Singapore exports to Indonesia showed an unsatisfactory performance in the 
remainder of the 1950s. Following monetary and trade reforms in Indonesia in 
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August 1960, when import policy was to some extent liberalised, there was hope that 
Singapore’s exports to Indonesia would increase. However, it appeared that import 
restrictions against Singapore were being lifted.51 This hope was finally shattered by 
the Confrontation in the early 1960s when the Riau Islanders were cut off from ‘their 
paddies and fields’ in Singapore and Malaysia. The decline of international trade did 
offer opportunities for the development of domestic interinsular trade. Therefore, the 
trade pattern of the Riau Islands showed much similarity with the situation in the 
nineteenth century. External links were limited to Singapore and Malaysia, but its 
position as a domestic entrepôt was strengthened. However, it is doubtful whether 
government policy had a much effect in the Riau Islands, since regional agricultural 
products still relied on Singapore for export, such as rubber, tin and copra. This 
intensification was to large extent attributed to smuggling, as well, especially during 
the Confrontation. It is estimated that at least 5-10 per cent of the total exports from 
the Riau Islands were smuggled to Singapore.52 It was not until 1968, when relations 
between Singapore and Indonesia were normalised, that things began to improve 
again as a result of restored cross-border mobility.53 Nevertheless, ‘it is hard to stop 
smuggling because it is traditional,’ as the governor of the Riau Province, Mr 
Subrantas Siswanto said.54 
From a political perspective, regional connections were loosening, as indicated 
by the change in trade structure and the implementation of divergent government 
policies. This continued until the late 1960s. The pattern of trade showed a continuity 
with the colonial period, in disregard or violation of government intentions. Johor 
and the Riau Islands continued to depend on Singapore as a hinterland of export, but 
the trade of Singapore relied less on Johor and the Riau Islands. 
 
3. The actors of trade connections 
Both international and regional trade connections could not have been realized 
without the participation of people of different ethnic groups. The shift of their 
power in trade reflected the change of these connections. Regional trade of Singapore, 
with its strategic geographical position, was for a long time in the hands of Asians 
before the coming of British, who established it as a free port.55 Chinese, not only the 
main labourers on the plantations, but also traders, were the most important among 
the Asians. From the 1870s, Chinese businessmen collected and transported 
agricultural products to Singapore where they purchased consumer goods and sold 
them in Singapore and adjacent Johor and the Riau Islands. In global trade, 
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Europeans had dominated the international trade of Singapore since the early 
nineteenth century, and then expanded into the world market, acting as 
intermediaries between the global market and Southeast Asian markets. 
Manufactured goods were imported in bulk by the larger European import houses 
either for distribution in smaller quantities to entrepôt markets, or on account of 
local distributors. Similarly, a large percentage of bulk exports of Straits produce, 
such as rubber copra, forest products, spices, tea and coffee, were also handled by 
Europeans (Chart 3).56  
European international trade was operated through merchant firms, known as 
agency houses or merchant houses. Initially, in the early nineteenth century, the 
prime business of the agency houses was to buy and sell on behalf of principals in 
return for commission and other charges. Later these houses also acted as promoters 
and subsequent managers of joint-stock companies.57 In Singapore, these European 
firms gradually set up branches in the main towns of Malaya, especially in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when the local economy experienced a rapid 
expansion.58 Branches of these trading companies were set up in large cities all over 
Asia, rather than in small towns in adjacent Johor and the Riau Islands. 
 
Chart 3. Import and export chains in colonial Singapore, 1870s-1940s. 
 
In this chain, the merchant acted as financier to the dealer, who, after the goods reached the 
consumer (he was also the producer, making payment in kind in Straits produce) in effect 
makes payment to the merchant in Straits Produce. Source: British Military 
Administration, The Entrepôt trade. 
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In 1897, there were 20 European import-export firms engaged in the westward 
trade, and this number grew to 60 in 1908.59 Many of the European merchant houses 
had a long history. The firm of Guthrie & Co. is believed to be the oldest trading 
house in Singapore, founded in 1821 by Alexander Guthrie. Most of these companies 
started their business as general merchants, commission agents, contractors or 
shopkeepers. In the following decades, their capital penetrated into various fields. In 
the case of Guthrie & Co., one of its partners, Thomas Scott, took an active part in the 
development of the harbour works in the late 1860s and early 1870s. He was 
succeeded by John Anderson in 1902, one of the pioneers of the plantation rubber 
industry, being a man of great energy and initiative. In 1903, the firm was 
incorporated as a limited liability company, registered at No. 7 Battery Road.60 
These European firms were organized by a scale of capital and favoured 
capital-intensive enterprises. Like industrial enterprises, these firms were also 
concentrated in Singapore. In 1889, only eight joint stock companies were registered 
in Singapore. Five of them had nominal capital more than £10,000: The Borneo 
Steam Ship Company (£11,700), The Mahlembu Mining Company (£17,500), The 
Jelebu Mining and Trading Company (£26,300), The Pahang Semantan Jellei 
Syndicate (£40,800) and The Pahang Seran Lipis Syndicate (£221,700).61 Some trade 
from the Riau Islands was also conducted by Dutch trading companies. Cooperation 
between the British in Singapore and the Dutch in the Netherlands Indies was 
necessary. This was exemplified by the alliance between Royal Dutch and Shell in the 
exploration of oil products, part of which was transhipped from Pulau Sambu.62 It 
was the product of cooperation between the British and Dutch. 
At the regional level, trade was conducted by Chinese businessmen, especially 
internal trade between Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands in cooperation with the 
Europeans through financial credit.63 The organization of Chinese business was 
through chop, a small grocery store with a wide range of activities that one would 
expect. Many Chinese capitalists in Singapore also extended their business in Johor 
and the Riau Islands but in different directions. In Johor, the initial Chinese 
mercantile capital usually came from Singapore, whereas in the Riau Islands, many 
Chinese capitalists accumulated their capital there and then migrated to Singapore.  
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A paper of red seals of Chinese chops in the 
Riau Islands. Source: BPL 2106.28:1 
The increase of Chinese trade companies was much faster than for European 
companies. However, in terms of scale, 
they were not comparable. In 
Singapore, one of the largest, Chop 
Chin Joo which was established in 
1858, employed a total of 26 
employees in 1891. The number of 
employees dropped to only eight in 
1907. Kim Seng & Co., founded in 
1840, was another notable Chinese 
company; it kept its 11 employees 
throughout its operation. 
 Many of these Chinese firms 
expanded their branches in British 
Malaya and the Netherlands Indies 
and their employees were exclusively 
Chinese. Most Chinese business was 
confined to merchants of agricultural 
products or agents of European 
companies. In 1891, there were 23 
Chinese merchant firms in Muar, 
involved in opium, betelnut, textiles, 
and shopkeeper.64 In Johor, almost 
of these chops were engaged in gambir and pepper trading. The recorded number of 
these firms in Johor was 137 in 1891.65 In the Riau Islands, apart from chops, they 
also opened another form of small shop, which was often referred to as kedi.66 A 
paper with Chinese red seals indicates there were at least 23 Chinese chops operating 
in the archipelago in the 1870s. 
If in the nineteenth century Chinese traders still showed certain dominance 
because of their trade in gambir and opium, then, since the 1900s, Western firms 
have infiltrated gradually into the regional trade, threatening the Chinese position by 
their number, capital and scope. The Straits Trading Company was the sole European 
venture into the South China Sea until the early twentieth century. But then more 
Westerns companies started establishing branches in Malaya. The relationship 
between Europeans and Chinese became both cooperative and competitive. On the 
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one hand, Europeans needed Chinese to get familiar with the local situation. A 
number of Chinese thus worked as clerks in European companies. On the other hand, 
many Chinese chops had to retreat and were forced to establish their business outside 
Singapore because of competition. Therefore, in contrast to the long histories of 
Western companies, the life of Chinese firms was much shorter. Of the 53 Chinese 
firms in 1891 in Singapore, only 35 were still in operation in 1907. In addition, their 
business was conducted on a small scale, with fewer clerks and a more limited range 
of trade than in European firms. This situation between Europeans and Chinese was 
maintained until the Japanese occupation (Table 3.12), when European business was 
completely restricted or closed down. Chinese traders were still active, especially in 
the trade across the Malacca Straits. The seaborne trade between the east coast of 
Sumatra and Malaya illustrates the cooperation of some Chinese with the Japanese.67 
Under Japanese supervision, Chinese businessmen who were members of the kumiai, 
were able to engage in the import-export trade between Singapore, Indonesia and 
Malaya.68 Many of them acted as danbangke – a small trader personally escorting 
goods from one place to another, or a travelling trader working on his own – engaged 
in smuggling, a measure of risk, smallness of scale, irregularity, and 
non-specialization. These individual one-boat traders were the key to the trade and 
connected different regions with each other.69 
From the 1920s, a number of Japanese firms emerged, showing an interest in 
trade in the Malay Peninsula. In Johor, they dominated all trade with Japan. The 
Japanese occupation marked the end of dominance of European merchant houses. 
Based on Singapore and encouraged by the army, various kinds of trans-strait 
economic organizations were formed to explore natural resources in this area.70 As a 
consequence, tremendous opportunities opened up for a more popular participation 
in linking the ports scattered throughout the region for the transport of these 
commodities and to distribute food and other necessities.71 In September 1942, 
about 40 pre-war import-export firms were competing in sending vessels to Sumatra 
and the Riau Islands to buy local produce such as coffee and beans. Four months later, 
the number of import-export firms was reported to have greatly increased.  
Many of these firms were still active in the post-war period in all the three 
regions with diversified business, such as the finance of industries. As the influence of 
European trades declined, by Chinese totok traders became predominant in the 
inter-island trade of the wider region of Southeast Asia, in particular Hokkien – 
whether from Java, Sumatra, the Riau Islands, or Malaya. In the Riau Islands, Jambi, 
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and the east coast of Sumatra, the Teochew also played an important, though lesser, 
part in the maritime economic activities.72 This situation did not change much up to 
the 1970s when most of the trade activities in the Riau Islands was still dominated by 
ethnic Chinese traders, who relied heavily on the money market of Singapore and 
Malaysia.73 
The Indian community specialised in textiles and sundry goods, and to a lesser 
extent in fancy goods, spices and foodstuff.74 So did the Malays. However, compared 
to Westerners (including Japanese) and Chinese, Indian and Malay capitalists 
performed a rather limited role in regional economic development. Many of them 
were Malay nobles, especially sultans and their fiefs. The Malay rulers not only 
received an allowance from the colonial government, but also acquired economic 
benefits by land lease. Therefore, they did not have much incentive to undertake 
capital investment.  
 The endeavour to develop national economies in the three countries after the 
war brought indigenous Malays to the foreground. Nevertheless, their inherent 
disadvantage in business meant that ethnic Chinese still played a more important role 
in regional trade, although they were rather identified as the citizens of Singapore, 
Malaysia and Indonesia.75 Despite the heavy influence of Chinese entrepreneurs in 
business in post-war Singapore, the government did fear the affinity of regional 
ethnic Chinese with Communist China.76 In Johor and the Riau Islands, Chinese and 
a few indigenous businessmen continued their regional and interinsular trade under 
political guidance. In Tanjung Uban in the Riau Islands, the lucrative trade of rubber 
and primary products to Singapore by way of smuggling relied completely on 
Chinese.77 The open economy of Singapore allowed foreign companies to conduct 
both international and regional trade. A number of historic European trading houses 
still flew their flags,78 such as The Straits Trading Company with its dominance of 
the Malaya tin trade, and the Metal Box Co. of Malaya Ltd., which dominated canned 
pineapple export. Concerning the regional entrepôt trade, this was dominated by 
Chinese merchants who owned medium and small-sized firms (Table 3.10). 
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The different roles of these traders and trade agents in this pattern of commerce 
created a clear dichotomy between them at different levels. Broadly speaking, the 
Europeans performed a wholesale trade function and the Asians a retailing one.79 
European merchant houses and Chinese chops were not separated from each other 
but cooperated extensively. Many owners of Chinese chops were also on the board of 
European firms, or employed as assistants, clerks, etc. The two networks connected at 
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Boat Quay and the Tanjung Pagar wharves where Westerners and Chinese exchanged 
their commodities.80 Nevertheless, the trading pattern remained stable until the 
post-war period when there were changes both in the political regime and in 
economic policies. The rise and fall of these different ethnic groups indicates the 
changing trade connections. Generally, the Europeans represented the international 
links with the world market, whereas Chinese carried on internal links with 
Singapore-Johor-Riau Islands. From this perspective, both international and regional 
connections were stronger in the colonial period than in the immediate post-war era. 
 
4. Concluding remark 
It may be assumed that all trade – local, interregional or international – is carried on 
because the partners involved all expect to gain some advantage from it.81 It was the 
regional comparative advantages that caused the trade flows between Singapore, 
Johor and the Riau Islands: Singapore’s free port policy and market facilities, Johor 
and the Riau Islands’ richness of agricultural produce and mineral deposits, and their 
geographical proximity. However, such a mutual connection also created an 
imbalance: intensive trade activities between Singapore and the other two, but very 
limited trade between Johor and the Riau Islands.  
Concerning the type of trade, external and internal trade are distinguished here. 
The difference between them is reflected by the distinction between Europeans and 
the indigenous (especially Chinese population). European agent houses dominated 
all international trade with the Western world, whereas regional trade was handled 
by Chinese merchants. During the colonial period, the cooperation between these 
two ethnic groups facilitated both types of trade. The intention to eliminate their 
economic power in post-war Malaysia and Indonesia destroyed the previous regional 
network and forced the connections to function with great difficulty. Nevertheless, 
the pre-war pattern still to a large extent remained. The rise and decline of Western 
and Chinese capital and capitalists thus mirrored the changes in their relationship. 
Therefore, as argued by Evers, the feature of regional trade network was precisely 
reflected by local ethnic and social organization.82  
The traded commodities that constituted the trade flows experienced great 
changes, showing the intensity of trade connections. In the colonial period, gambir 
and pepper, rubber and minerals successively played an important part in connecting 
this region with the world market. As a result, the hinterland position for Johor and 
the Riau Islands was intensified by the booming expansion of the export of these 
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commodities. Both international and regional connections of the triangle area were 
strengthened. The outbreak of the Pacific War cut off international connections, but 
internal connections reached their strongest point under Japanese military 
administration. After the war, internal connections were gradually loosened, each 
region seeking its own market access through domestic ports. Nevertheless, trade 
activities between them could not disappear, showing a continuity of the colonial 
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If trade flows from an abstraction of a regional network, it is the transportation 
system that makes the network tangible and visible. Unlike regions where roads are 
the main arteries of communication, trade and migration in the 
Singapore-Johor-Riau Islands triangle depended, and still depend, heavily on 
shipping. It was because there were virtually no roads in British Malaya in the 1870s, 
not to mention the Riau Islands.1 This chapter deals with the dynamic maritime 
relations between Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands in creating a spatial network. 
Historically, regional maritime activities benefited substantially from the 
strategic geographical location of this area as a gateway between the South China Sea 
and the Indian Ocean. As early as the sixteenth century, both Chinese and indigenous 
Orang Laut were engaged in junk shipping, forming an important part of the Dutch 
East India Company (VOC, Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie) network. Their 
activities were considered an important component of the intra-Asian network, in 
which commodities from adjacent regions were shipped and stored here for exchange. 
This led to the rise and prosperity of regional ports such as Muar, Batu Pahat, Kota 
Tinggi and Mersing in Johor, and Tanjung Pinang and Karimun in the Riau Islands, 
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although they were not comparable to modern ports in size. 2  The regional 
importance was further enhanced by the foundation of Singapore in 1819, which 
became the largest entrepôt in the Asia-Pacific region in the first half of the 
nineteenth century under the auspices of the British laissez-faire ideology of free 
trade.3 Although its position was severely threatened by the rise of Hong Kong in the 
1840s when international shipping between China and Europe showed more 
preference to this newly opened British port, Singapore managed to maintain its 
leading position as a centre for both international and regional (trans)shipment by 
directing its attention to Southeast Asia. Under British administration, local 
legislation was provided for the licensing of various cargo and passenger vessels 
which plied the territorial waters of the colony. Large steamships operated by 
European shipping companies conducted regular passenger and freight services to 
Burma, colonial Indonesia, Thailand, Sarawak, North Borneo and the Federation of 
Malaya, whereas the indigenous sailing craft and fishing vessels of Chinese residents 
carried cargo between Malay and Indonesian ports.4 
Although they were both part of the shipping network of Singapore, Johor and 
the Riau Islands reacted differently to the rise of Singapore because of the different 
political authorities in the two areas. In Johor, undeveloped inland communication 
made sea route the only reliable means for transport which was encouraged by the 
British colonial administration to such an extent that there was a busy traffic of 
‘prahus, sampans, larchans, pukats and tongkangs’ delivering regional produce.5 
This situation created sufficient opportunities for the rise of seaports in Johor where 
rivers were navigable up to the inland plantations and major towns were served by 
ships from Singapore.6 By contrast, the survival of once bustling ports in the Riau 
Islands was seriously threatened. The Riau Islands were intended by the Dutch 
colonial government to become a competitive regional port cluster in order to re-take 
and protect the trade and shipping of the Netherlands Indies. Great endeavours were 
tried such as the designation of Tanjung Pinang as a free port as early as 1829. The 
duty-free area was extended to the entire Riau Islands in the twentieth century.  
From the differing perspectives of Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands from 
the 1870 onwards, the central questions of this chapter are: 
How did regional shipping activities develop? Internally, how did their mutual 
connection form a regional spatial network in the context of either cooperation or 
competition? 
                                                          
2 JAR (1932). 
3 More discussion in Huff, The Economic Growth. Wong, The Trade. Fang, Strategy of Economic 
Development in Singapore. 
4 CSAR (1956), 200-1. 
5 Lim, Johor, 59. 
6 JAR, (1932). 




1. General trend of maritime development 
Although sharing relatively similar geographical conditions, the maritime 
development of the three regions followed very different paths that were subject to 
various socio-political changes during the period under study. Just as with the 
political development, so we have divided the shipping development into four 
periods.  
 
Steady growth: 1870-1910s 
In spite of the lack of detailed statistics, it is widely accepted that there has been a 
brisk traffic across the Straits of Johor to Singapore ever since regional history began 
to be recorded. Shipping in the early period was entirely managed by Chinese and 
European merchants and the small shipping companies they operated. Up to the turn 
of the twentieth century, there were a growing number of coaches and steam 
launches running daily to Singapore, and a telegraph line was constructed between 
Johor Bahru and Singapore port.7 Although traditional small sailing vessels still 
continued to ply the waters between the coast of Johor and other places in the 
Asia-Pacific Rim, shipping between Johor and Singapore had a dominant share 
showing a strong regional orientation.  
Shipping development in Singapore and the Riau Islands is visualized in Figures 
4.1 and 4.2. In Singapore, the total number of vessels arriving and departing 
increased 2.7 times from 1870 to 1891, with a growth rate of 4.9% per annum. In 
terms of total tonnage, the growth rates were higher at 6.2%. Differing from 
Singapore, where an uninterrupted and stable growth took place, the development of 
shipping in the Riau Islands showed another trend with more dramatic fluctuations, 
particularly after 1885. Measured by the number of vessels, the growth rate was much 
slower, around 1.5% per annum. The growth rate of total tonnage was also much 
higher at 4.5% per annum. It was even higher than the average growth rate of 3.7% 
for the whole The Netherlands Indies.8 
 The difference between their growth rates in terms of number and tonnage 
provides a direct means to picture the gradually enlarging gap in shipping capacity 
between Singapore and the Riau Islands (Table 4.1). The ratio of Singapore to the 
Riau Islands fluctuated between 20 and 26 in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century, but rose to 59 in 1905, indicating the growing deviation between the two. 
This can be explained by the introduction of steamers.  
 
                                                          
7 Great Britain, Trade, 77. 
8 CEI, vol. 15, 18. 
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Table 4. 1. Ratios of total tonnage in shipping between Singapore and Riau Islands (including 
Indragiri), 1870-1905. 
Year 1870 1871 1875 1885 1890 1905 
Ratio 20 24 26 20 23 59 
Source: Appendix xviii, Appendix xxvi. 
 
Figure 4. 1. Number and tonnage of vessels clearing into and out from Singapore, 1870-1906. 
(thous., mill. n.r.t.) 
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Figure 4. 2. Number and tonnage of vessels clearing into and out from Riau Islands (including 
Indragiri), 1866-1905. 
(thous., mill. n.r.t.) 
 
Source: Appendix xxvi. 
 
Deviation: 1910s-1940s 
Singapore’s shipping in the first half of the twentieth century was recorded with an 
average growth rate of 2.4% per annum in terms of total tonnage. This was not a 
steady growth, as it was impeded by the First World War (1914-1918) and the 
economic depression of the 1930s. From 1913 to 1918, total tonnage of vessels 
clearing out from Singapore declined by nearly 50 per cent. A similar picture can also 
be observed in the 1930s as a result of the world economic crisis. However, even 
during the period between these two big events, the stable political and economic 
environment did not naturally result in a shipping boom. From 1918 to 1939, a 
moderate c.5.5% average growth rate was achieved both in number and tonnage. 
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dominant share among the total number of ships (Figure 4.3). This suggests a 
continuation of the original technological advantage of Singapore. 
 
Figure 4. 3. Number and tonnage of vessels clearing out from Singapore, 1910-1938. 
(thous., mill. n.r.t.) 
 
Source: Appendix xx. 
 
The story is different in both Johor and the Riau Islands. Statistics for Johor are only 
available for a short period, but offer a rather different impression of the expansion of 
international shipping compared to the earlier period. Total tonnage of ocean-going 
steamers rose from 401,878 tons in 1924 to 619,715 tons in 1931 at a growth rate of 
6.4% per annum (Figure 4.4). The rapid development of shipping was due to the 
arrival of Japanese steamers coming for mineral ores. At the same time, regional 
shipping along the Malay coast also increased following the emergence of plantation 
agriculture which required marine and riverine transport in places such as Muar, 
Batu Pahat and Mersing, where there were insufficient road facilities and no bridges 
over the rivers. Although the period supported by the statistics is not long, a rapid 
expansion can be assumed due to the expansion of estate agriculture and Japanese 
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Figure 4. 4. Number and tonnage of vessels clearing into and out from Johor, 1919-1932. 
(thous., mill. n.r.t.) 
 
Source: Appendix xxv. 
 
In the Riau Islands there was a sudden increase of shipping activities compared 
to the pre-1910 period as a result of the registration of shipment from Pulau Sambu 
for the oil transhipment of the BPM. The small island served as the third largest 
refinery centre of the BPM in the Netherlands Indies. A growth rate of 6.4% per 
annum was achieved between 1909 and 1938. Different from Singapore, shipping in 
the Riau Islands did not feel the negative influence of the First World War too much, 
whereas the Depression of the 1930s did result in the decline of total shipping (Figure 
4.5).  
In order to give the details of shipping in the Riau Islands, we are focusing on 
the separate activities in Pulau Sambu and Tanjung Pinang, the two most important 
ports in this area (Figure 4.6). The former was a purely transit port for BPM carrying 
international shipping, while the latter acted as a regional port in the South China Sea. 
Shipping in Pulau Sambu shows much similarity with that of Singapore, whereas 
Tanjung Pinang followed a relatively independent path. The difference between the 
two Riau Islands ports gave the archipelago a dual character, that, shipment of oil 
products to the world market exposed the Riau Islands directly to the international 
economy, whereas the shipment of traditional agricultural products and minerals 
showed the continuity of regional orientation. 
With regard to the ratio of tonnage, attributed to the arrival of Japanese 
steamers in Johor and transhipment of Pulau Sambu, Johor and the Riau Islands 
experienced higher growth rates than Singapore. The gap between these two regions 
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Figure 4. 5. Number and tonnage of vessels clearing into and out from Riau Islands, 
1909-1938. 
(thous., mill. n.r.t.) 
 
Source: Appendix xxvii. 
 
Figure 4. 6. Number and cargo-carrying capacity of vessels in Pulau Sambu and Tanjung 
Pinang, 1908-1940. 
(thous., mill. n.r.t.) 
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The Bugis fleet in the waters of Singapore during the 
war to carry trade due to insufficiency of steamships.  
Source: SYB (1947). 
Table 4. 2. Ratios of total tonnage in shipping between Singapore and Johor, and between 
Singapore and Riau Islands, 1909-1938. 
Year 1909 1920 1930 1938 
Singapore/Johor  - 152 22  - 
Singapore/The Riau Islands 15   5 14 15 
Singapore/The Riau Islands 
(excluding Pulau Sambu) 
26  10 41 41 
Notes: Estimated figures of Singapore’s total tonnage. 
Source: Appendix xx, Appendix xxv, Appendix xxii, Appendix xxvii. 
 
War and revolution 
The Japanese occupation 
brought an interruption to 
the shipping movements in 
this area, especially 
east-west shipping which 
was completely blockaded 
under the Japanese policy of 
forbidding resources to be 
supplied to the Western 
hemisphere.9 
Correspondingly, the 
British evacuated many ships 
operating in Malay waters or 
took them into the Royal 
Navy or National Armed Force (NAF). In case of the Straits Steamship Company 
(SSC), only six of the 31 ships of the company taken by the British government 
managed to survive.10 This led to transport shortages plaguing Malaya during the 
occupation, hampering internal trade, impeding plans for industrial expansion and 
making it difficult to obtain supplies from overseas sources. 
                                                          
9 Yoji and Mako, New Perspectives on the Japanese Occupation in Malaya and Singapore, 
1941-1945, 134.  
10 Tregonning, Home Port Singapore: A history of Straits Steamship Company Limited, 
1890-1965. 
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Steamship Jarak of the SSC, sailed to Batu Pahat to 
rescue 1,000 soldiers who had been trapped there in 
1941. 
Source: Tregonning, Home Port. 
The Japanese military 
administration took various 
measures and conducted 
salvage operations in the 
waters around Singapore to 
overcome these limitations, 
but transport still remained 
a major obstacle to 
economic development and 
the conduct of the war, and 
few cargo ships operated in 
Malayan waters during the 
latter part of the 
occupation.11 By September 
1942, the Japanese claimed 
to have recovered 94 cargo 
vessels which were sunk by the Allies. Nevertheless, there was still an acute shortage 
of shipping capacity compared to the pre-war situation.12 This is demonstrated by 
comparing shipping statistics of Singapore for 1939 and 1948, when a significant 
reduction of some 60 per cent took place. Meanwhile, the lack of steamships to carry 
on trading during the war gave an opportunity for a temporary resurgence of 
traditional sailing vessels, especially by Bugis, although their ships were already old 
and damaged.13  
 
Decolonization 
A recovery took place immediately after the Pacific War. Guided by different 
governments, all three countries pursued different policies. In Johor and the Riau 
Islands, regional statistics are not available, so we have to infer the local pattern from 
national trends. 14 In Singapore, total tonnage of merchant vessels clearing out 
increased from 21.5 million tons in 1952 to 78.3 million tons in 1971, a growth rate in 
excess of 6.8% per annum (Figure 4.7). In Malaysia, rapid growth can also be 
observed. However, in Peninsular Malaysia, immediate post-war performance did 
                                                          
11 Kratoska, The Japanese Occupation, 16-161. 
12 Ibid.  
13 CSAR (1947), 15. 
14 Between 1957 and 1962, the total shipment of Sumatra had a stable share from 38 to 40 per 
cent in the total shipment of Indonesia. Excluding the large ports of Palembang and Belawan, 
the rest of Sumatra had a share of around 16 per cent in the same period (See, SI (1963)). Thus, 
it is possible to observe Riau at the national level. Similarly assumed, Johor followed the same 
trajectory of Malaysia as it was subject to the national reconstruction plan. 
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not show much improvement compared to the period of Japanese occupation, and 
the situation even deteriorated in the 1950s. Rapid expansion was only witnessed in 
the 1960s (Figure 4.8). Nevertheless, the performance of Malaya lagged behind 
Singapore. In Indonesia, two periods are defined by the cessation of service by the 
KPM (Koninklijke Paketvaart-Maatschappij) in Indonesia in December 1957 (Figure 
4.9). The first period was characterized by a recovery of the KPM as indicated by a 
growth rate of 4.1% per annum in terms of registered tonnage and 3.4% for freight. 
Decolonization forced the re-establishment of national shipping from a very low 
point of departure through the government-owned PELNI (Indonesian National 
Shipping Company).15 Nevertheless, great progress was achieved by the Indonesian 
government in recovering the marine sector, which is indicated by the rapid increase 
in the number of vessels and their registered tonnage, corresponding to growth rates 
at 7% and 6.4% per annum respectively (Appendix xxx). Moreover, there was also a 
difference in the pattern of shipping of the three nations. In Singapore, more 
attention was paid to international shipping, whereas in Malaysia and Indonesia, 
government policies were more domestically focused. 
 
Figure 4. 7. Number and tonnage of merchant vessels clearing out from Singapore, 1939-1971. 
(thous., mill. n.r.t.) 
 
Source: Appendix xx, Appendix xxi. 
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Figure 4. 8. Total tonnage of vessels in Peninsular Malaysia, 1938-1968. 
(mill. n.r.t.) 
 
Notes: 1938-1953: not including shipping between West Malaysia and Singapore 
1963-1968: including shipping between West Malaysia and Singapore. 
Source: Appendix xxiv. 
 
Figure 4. 9. Registered number and tonnage of shipping in Indonesia, 1940s-1970s. 
(thous., thous. n.r.t.) 
 
Source: Appendix xxxii. 
 
For a comparative view, we also need to take into consideration the total cargo 
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pattern with the development of total tonnage: a steady recovery before the 1960s and 
a rapid expansion afterwards. In the entire Malaya, including both Singapore and 
Peninsula, cargo handled in the 1950s increased fast. By contrast, in Indonesia, 
growth was much slower, which reveals that both Singapore and Malaysia underwent 
a more favourable maritime development than Indonesia during this period. 
The trends at the national level can also be applied to the regional level. For 
Johor, the recovery of trade reflected continued demand for shipping and other 
transport. A recovery of shipping could also be expected. For the Riau Islands, we 
have to bear in mind that the recovery and progress achieved by the Indonesian 
government at the time showed a strong concentration on Java. Considering the low 
participation of the region in the recovery (Appendix xxiii), national progress seemed 
to have nothing to do with the Riau Islands, although the Indonesian government 
was still in a difficult situation. Shipping performance in the Riau Islands hence 
seemed by no means promising, except in smuggling, which was always out of 
government control. This is further testified by Table 4.3, which shows total cargo 
handled at different levels. It is not difficult to spot the gap between Singapore and 
the rest. This gap was comparable to the situation in the nineteenth century! There 
was a similar pattern of shipping performance in the period of early imperialism as in 
the Riau Islands after the war. 
 
 
Figure 4. 10. Total cargo loaded and discharged in Singapore, Malaya and Indonesia, 
1939-1971. 
(mill. freight tons) 
 













104  Genesis of a Growth Triangle 
Table 4. 3. Total cargo (excluding oil) handled in Southeast Asia in 1961. 
(thous. freight tons) 
Region Handled freight Ratio to Tanjung Pinang 
Singapore 18,258 429 
Indonesia 17,382 408 
Malaya (excluding Singapore) 6,000 14 
Sumatra 7,506 18 
Riau 912 2 
Tanjung Pinang 426 1 
Source: SI (1963). 
 
2. Shipping connection of Singapore-Johor-Riau Islands 
The mutual connections between Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands are defined 
by shipping movements between their ports. Although we cannot deny the existence 
of shipping activities between Johor and the Riau Islands, there is reason to focus 
only on the Singapore-Johor connection and the Singapore-Riau Islands connection. 
With regard to the transport system of Singapore and Johor, the Singapore-Johor 
Causeway, completed in 1923, was the first land link between Peninsular Malaysia 
and Singapore, and strengthened the bilateral connection between Johor and 
Singapore. 16 Regional shipping created a Singapore-Johor-Riau Islands network, 
while international shipping connected this network to the world shipping network. 




Since the nineteenth century, the development of new maritime technology had 
changed the global maritime network. In Asia, numerous new ports were opened 
such as Hong Kong, Macassar, and Belawan in Deli in northeast Sumatra. Direct 
shipping routes were established with services between Indochina and France in the 
mid-nineteenth century, between the Netherlands Indies and the Netherlands in 
1881, later between the Netherlands Indies and China, Australia and Africa.17 Under 
these conditions, the previous position of Singapore as an entrepôt between East Asia 
and Southeast Asia, was severely undermined. This resulted in a shrinkage of 
                                                          
16 For detailed information about the construction of the causeway, see Johore State Rly. 
(Construction: Causeway), CAOG10/50,  
17 British Military Administration, The Entrepôt Trade of Singapore, 12. 
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Steamship Kaka, used in Singapore-Malacca-Muar service. 
Source: Tregonning, Home Port. 
Singapore’s extra-Malay hinterland as these regions were connected to the rest of the 
world directly. By contrast, Malay states began attracting greater interest after the 
establishment of effective British colonial rule.18 Apart from international shipping 
connections of Singapore with the West, there were also local crafts and sails with 
small tonnage navigating between Singapore and local small ports. They 
strengthened Singapore’s connections with the regional markets. (Table 4.4). 
 
Table 4. 4. Steam connections between Singapore and regional destinations in 1891. 
Port Frequency Line or steamer Agents in Singapore 
Batu Pahat 2 per week Chinese steamers Tay Geok Teat 
Batu Pahat 2 per week Chinese steamers Goh Siew Swee & Co. 
Muar 1 per week ‘Bengkalis’ Wee Bin & Co. 
The Riau Islands Fortnightly KPM J. Daendels & Co. 
The Riau Islands Daily Chinese steamers - 
Singkep Monthly KPM J. Daendels & Co. 
Source: STDS (1891). 
 
Shipping in Johor 
in this period can be 
characterized as 
exclusively regional, 
used to carry people and 
commodities between 
Johor and Singapore. 
For a long time, 
shipping of Johor was 
conducted by sailing 
vessels. This pattern did 
not change until the 
establishment of the 
Johor Steam Ferry Boat 
Company in 1875, 
which introduced a new 
stimulus. The ferry of 
                                                          
18 Ibid. 
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this company left the Singapore side at Woodlands and arrived on the Johor side at a 
pier located east of Sungai Segget, which was therefore called Pier Kuala Segget. On 
the other side of the river, the disembarkation point nearest town was Tangga Duke.19  
The expansion of this pattern of shipping arose from several new changes in this 
region. Politically, from the second half of the nineteenth century the Malay 
Peninsula saw a rapid penetration of British colonial rule which gradually brought 
the peninsula to the foreground, characterized by far more intensive sea and inland 
traffic connections. In Johor, where a significant British influence had not been felt 
yet, the vast inland territory was still controlled by the indigenous Malay rulers. 
Nevertheless, the geographical proximity of the capital, Johor Bahru, to Singapore, 
and the intimate personal relationship of Sultan Abu Bakar and Sultan Ibrahim with 
the British colonial government led to the Johor’s orientation towards Singapore. For 
almost all produce from Johor, Singapore was the port of shipment.20 
Also, the expansion of the estate economy resulted in a large demand for ships 
to transport agricultural products from the plantations, where inland transport was 
still poor.21 Bridges were lacking across major rivers, and there was much difficulty 
in extending roads to the plantations in the interior. In addition, railway construction 
commenced piecemeal on the west coast from the 1880s to transport bulk 
commodities, but the railways had not yet been extended to Johor during this 
period.22 Therefore, this situation gave an opportunity for the rise of port cities on 
the west coast of the state, such as Muar and Batu Pahat, and some inland cities on 
the river estuaries such as Kota Tinggi. On the west coast, shipping activities also 
existed, but on a much smaller scale, since mining products such as tin, iron and 
bauxite near Mersing were not yet exploited on a large scale. There were frequent 
shipping services from these places to Singapore, either along the coast or on 
navigable rivers in the state. Therefore, in the process of British political 
administration and colonial extension, and as a result of the trade development, 
Johor showed a high dependency on Singapore, resulting in a close relationship 
between the two. This suggests an intensified maritime connection with Singapore 







                                                          
19 Lim, Johor, 60. 
20 Great Britain, Trade, 78. 
21 Kirby, 'Johore ', 249. 
22 Shamsuddin, Malayan Railway, 1885-1985: Locomotive Centennial, 11. 
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 Although the Riau 
Islands experienced rapid 
growth of both international 
and interinsular shipping of 
the Netherlands Indies as 
well, this network was much 
smaller than Singapore’s. 
Althoug the Dutch colonial 
government intended to 
attract shipment to Riau 
without passing Singapore, 
the effect of Dutch measures 
was rather limited, since 
ships of the Riau Islands 
destined for Singapore were 
still in a dominant position. 
The share of Singapore kept 
growing in the decades after 
1870. Shipment to 
Singapore had a dominant 
share (c. 80 per cent) in the 
total in the mid-nineteenth 
century. During the 
following decades, this 
network had gradually 
shrunk with ports in foreign 
countries disappearing from 
the shipping network of 
Riau Islands, with the 
exception of Singapore. The 
position of the entire the 
Riau Islands as an entrepôt was maintained but only in the waters of the Netherlands 
Indies and Singapore (Table 4.5). Therefore, we perceive a gradually convergent 
maritime foreland and a gradually reduced hinterland of the Riau Islands as domestic 
shipping routes were directed to Singapore. 
These shipping routes were piled by vessels of various shipping companies 
established by different ethnic groups. In 1866, of 178 vessels belonging to Singapore, 
registered under Act of Parliament – schooners, barques, brigs, junks and sailing 
ships – 58 belonged to Europeans, Indians and Malays, while the rest were owned by 
Table 4. 5. List of shipping companies operating in Riau Islands 
in 1898. 
Dutch Flag 
Resident Schiff Baroe, Goaan Ho Bi (Tanjung Pinang) 
Sailed between Tanjung Pinang and Singapore 
Emily, Goaan Ho Bie (Tanjung Pinang) 
Sailed between Tanjung Pinang and Singapore 
Sri Wang Sie, Oey Tek Seng, Goaan Ho Bie (Tanjung Pinang) 
Sailed between Tanjung Pinang, Lingga and Singapore 
Singkep, Singkep Tin Maarschappij (Singkep) 
Regulated navigation between Singkep, Tanjung Pinang and Singapore 
Foreign Flag 
Alan, Raja Ali (Penjingat (the Riau Islands)) 
Sailed between Singapore and places in the Riau Islands 
Seneng Hati, Nederlandsch-Indische Getahpertja-Maarschappij 
(Lingga) 
Sailed between Singapore and places in the Riau Islands. 
Boon San I, The Yok Tiat (Singapore) 
Sailed between Singapore and places in the Riau Islands 
Ladjoe, Oei Soei Kiat (Singapore) 
Sailed between Singapore, Karimun, and Tanjung Pinang 
Sri Peng Gay, Oey Sim Eng (Singapore) 
Sailed between Singapore, Tanjung Pinggir and Pulu Bulah 
Hok Hoa, Gho Thjing Kho (Singapore) 
Sailed between Singapore, Batam and Karimun 
Soeltana, Nang Tji (Singapore) 
Sailed between Singapore, Batam and Karimun 
Sri Babi, Oei Liong Hing (Singapore) 
Sailed between Singapore and Karimun 
Sri Kedah, Tjia Tjoe Yoe (Singapore) 
Sailed between Singapore and Karimun 
Bennit, Go Toh, Pong (Singapore) 
Operated weekly service between Singapore and Rengat (Indragiri) 
Aing, Go Toh, Pong (Singapore) 
Operated weekly service between Singapore and Rengat (Indragiri) 
Tarfalla, Gaggino, Go Toh, Pong (Singapore) 
Operated weekly service between Singapore and Rengat (Indragiri) 
Ho Sang, Tjia Tjoe Yoe (Singapore) 
Operated two day-service between Singapore and Karimun 
Source: KV (1898), 209. 
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Chinese.23 Singapore lay at the heart of this network, connected to the world trade 
routes by large steamships which were completely in the hands of Europeans and 
through the large shipping companies based there. In 1894, a total of 45 steam ship 
companies were recorded in Singapore.  
 Among them, the SSC began with a nominal capital of £1.2 million. The 
Borneo Steam Ship Company was founded with a nominal capital of £12,000. Apart 
from British capital, there were also many other European firms operating regular 
services to Singapore. The German Norddeutscher Lloyd benefited from a decision by 
Bismarck, the German Chancellor, in 1884 to subsidize services in the Far East.  
French lines, notably the Messageries Maritimes, were also regularly calling at 
Singapore, as were Scandinavian and Italian ships.24 There was one Chinese shipping 
company engaged in international shipping: the China Merchants Steam Navigation 
Company, established with Chinese capital in 1872. However, it does seem that this 
company was established with money from the government of Qing Dynasty rather 
than Singaporean Chinese private capital. 
In the Netherlands Indies, steamship navigation was monopolized first by the 
NISM (Nederlandsch-Indische Stoomvaart Maatschappij, Netherlands Indies 
Steamship Company) and then by KPM. The relationship between these European 
shipping companies was dynamic and competitive. With regard to international 
shipping, in around 1850 the Dutch had a share of 75 per cent against 10 per cent for 
the British. Stepping into the twentieth century, following a series of liberal measures 
which encouraged free competition, the percentage fell to 35 per cent for the Dutch 
and rose to 50 per cent for the British, although later on the Dutch share increased to 
40 per cent, and the British declined to 30 per cent.25  
Unlike European dominance in international shipping, regional shipping was 
mainly operated by Chinese and indigenous Malays. 26 Many of these shipping 
companies started with very limited use of steamships. Instead, there were a number 
of Chinese junks and other small ships sailing in the waters of the Malacca Straits.27 
Because regional ports were too small to attract European steamers and because 
Chinese were more familiar with regional conditions, the Chinese gradually got hold 
of the monopoly to regulate prices. They promoted their business and strengthened 
regional connections, and played a supplementary role next to the Europeans.28 
Among them, the firm of Gho Siew Swee & Co. or Chop Ban Ann had been 
established at this time (1860s), as general merchants and shipowners, by Goh Siew 
                                                          
23 Song, One Hundred Years' History, 119. 
24 Tregonning, Home Port, 11. 
25 CEI, vol. 15, 22. 
26 Ibid., 19. 
27 ARSS (1871). 
28 Tregonning, Home Port, 22. 
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Swee, a China-born Chinese. The business rapidly developed, and the firm became 
the owner of several small steamers plying between this port and the neighbouring 
Dutch and British possessions. 29  The most well-known firm was Wee Bin & 
Company operated by Wee Boon Teck who, until his death at age 38 in 1888, had the 
largest locally registered shipping fleet, with 16 ships in Singapore. 
In the Riau Islands, most of the owners of these small shipping companies were 
Singapore-based. Very few of them were in the hand of Malays. In 1867, 52 Chinese 
kangkar (settlements in river valleys) in the Riau Islands had a total of 109 ships, 
among them, 59 large vessels (sampan poekat)30, 30 sampans, and 20 other ships 
made by Western countries. It is worth noting that, up to the early twentieth century, 
another two Singaporean Chinese jointed the shipping business, operating daily small 
steam navigation between the Riau Islands and Singapore. One was Seah Eu Chin, 
who employed various junks that visited from time to time, practically the entire 
coast of the Malacca Straits, the islands in the Riau Archipelago, the east coast of the 
Malay Peninsula and Singapore.31 Another was called Tio Hoe Lay, who had been 
engaged in shipping between Pulau Tujuh and Singapore with one or two 
steamships.32 He was born in China in 1853 and went to the Natuna and Anambas 
Islands, where he got into the copra trade at the age of 25. After several years, he 
became the owner of the steamers Aing Hong, Flevo, Batavier and Benuit, and acted 
as the consignee of ships belonging to other Chinese owners. 33 These Chinese 
activities exemplified Singapore’s intensified connections with the Riau Islands. 
The relationship between the Europeans and Chinese was also dynamic. The 
European shipping companies did not stop their penetration into regional shipping. 
This can be observed by the shipping routes established by the KPM across the whole 
archipelago to transport passengers and government goods. The shipping routes 
radiating from ports in the Riau area, particularly Tanjung Pinang, strengthened 
connections of the Riau Islands with the outside world. However, the maritime 
network had also undergone great changes in this period. In general, there was a 
gradually intensified shipping network in this region. Up to 1891, among the 13 
regulated KPM shipping routes (with branch routes), four stopped at Tanjung Pinang 
in the Riau Islands.34 However, the extension of the KPM shipping service had a 
serious effect on the survival of small Chinese shipping companies. Many of them 
                                                          
29 Song, One Hundred Years' History, 143-4. 
30 http://resourcessgd.kb.nl/SGD/18931894/PDF/SGD_18931894_0000845.pdf 
31 Song, One Hundred Years' History, 19-20. 
32 MvO: Riouw en onderhorigheden (1908). 
33 Song, One Hundred Years' History, 350. 
34 À Campo, Engines of Empire: Steamshipping and State Formation in Colonial Indonesia, 67. 
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stopped operations or were annexed by European shipping companies, reflecting the 
vulnerability of the Chinese network.35 
If the expansion of the KPM in the Riau Islands reflected the competition 
between Europeans and Chinese, the European-Chinese relationship in British 
Malaya showed some cooperation. In case of the SSC, its seven directors in the year 
of its establishment were Tan Keong Saik, Tan Jiak Kim, Lee Cheng Yan, A. P. 
Adams, D. J. Mathens, J. Burkinshaw and a Dutchman, T. C. Bogaardt.36 Tan Jiak 
Kim was on the board of directors for more than 20 years.37 Moreover, one of the 
grandsons of Tan Tock Seng, named Lee Pek Hoon, was assistant manager of the 
SSC.38 With regard to the vessels of the company, three out of its five ships, Hye 
Leong (406 tons), Malacca (404 tons) and Billiton (335 tons), were contributed by the 
Tan family, navigating along the west coast of the Malay Peninsula in the early 
twentieth century. 
Except for spatial differences, the distinction between the Europeans and 
Chinese can also be observed in terms of technology. In 1891, when the KPM began 
its operations, Chinese shipping companies were the largest competitor in the 
Netherlands Indies. But this changed dramatically after several decades when 
European shipping companies took a leading position because of their comparative 
advantage in technology and capital. The rivalry between the British and the Dutch 
gave an opportunity for Chinese and indigenous firms to operate short-distance 
regional shipping neglected by the Europeans. 
In the case of Singapore and the Riau Islands, this is shown by the 
comparatively complete statistics of numbers of ships and their tonnage (Table 4.6). 
Although not all data is available, an estimate can be obtained for a long-term trend 
based on formulas displayed in Figure 4.11. The four diagrams in Figure 4.11 show a 
much faster quadratic growth of tonnage of ships clearing in and out compared to the 
growth in number, which was a linear growth path. However, hesitation about using 
steamers reduced the Riau Islands’ competitiveness in long-distance shipping.  
Table 4.7 presents the tonnage/number ratios of Singapore and Riau in this 
period. It shows the regional deviation in their capacity as indicated by the prevalence 
of steamers. The increasing proportion of steamers used in Singapore in 
long-distance international navigation against the limited use of steamers in the Riau 
Islands, explains the gap between international shipping and regional shipping. The 
hesitation in using steamers in the Riau Islands was not only due to the relatively 
insignificant economic importance, but also by the short-route but high-risk 
navigation across the Singapore Straits with its shallow waters, reduced visibility and 
                                                          
35 MvO: Riouw en onderhorigheden (1908). 
36 Tregonning, Home Port, 6. 
37 Song, One Hundred Years' History, 197-8. 
38 Ibid., 66. 
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other hazards.39 Many of the steamers used by Chinese shipping companies were old 
steamers purchased from European companies; therefore, this limited scale of 
shipping reflected the gap in technology between the Chinese and the Europeans. 
 
Table 4. 6. Comparative size of European and Chinese shipping companies in Singapore in 
1907. 
Name Number and tonnage Connecting area 




Britain, Spain, Portugal, India, 





Britain, the USA, Germany, 
Australia, Singapore 




Britain, South America, India, 




Netherlands, NEI, Siam, South 
Pacific, Mauritius, China, 
Australia, Singapore 
Koe Guan Co. (Chinese) 
14 steamers 
5,248 tons 
NEI, Malaya, Singapore 
Soon Keck Limited 
(Chinese) 
2 steamers Malaya, Singapore 
Source: STDS (1907). 
 
Table 4. 7. Average tonnage in Singapore and Riau, 1866-1905. 
 
1866 1870 1871 1874 1875 1879 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 
Riau 32 48 36 47 49 30 80 106 68 89 113 
Sing- 
apore 
- 173 183 - 218 - 314 - - 347 - 
Source: Appendix xviii, Appendix xxvi. 
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Note: in the time series, 1870=1. 
 
To sum up, the maritime network of Singapore expanded rapidly by 
establishing various links with both foreland and hinterland, particularly the Malay 
Peninsula, including Johor, which acted exclusively as the hinterland of Singapore. 
This resulted in a gradually intensified bilateral connection between the two of them. 
By contrast, the Riau Islands performed as the hinterland of Singapore on the one 
hand, and served its own maritime foreland on the other. The Riau Islands-Singapore 
connection was strengthened by frequent small-scale shipping between them, but 
from Singapore’s perspective, this relationship was not the same case. The regional 
shipping connection between Singapore and Johor was supported by the British 
because of the aim of British colonial government to create a unified Malay world, 
whereas the Dutch colonial government wanted to direct regional shipping away 
from the Riau Islands to Batavia, rather than leaving it oriented towards Singapore. 
The dichotomy between international shipping and regional shipping resulted in 
Singapore showing a process of gradual internationalization, whereas Johor became 
more regionalized towards Singapore and the Riau Islands remained reluctant 
vis-à-vis Batavia. Neither Johor nor the Riau Islands had much external connection 
with regions outside Asia but only indirectly through Singapore and Batavia.  





In the twentieth century, Singapore’s role as a staple port with the Malay Peninsula as 
its hinterland and as an entrepôt in Southeast Asia was reinforced. Demand for 
rubber, mining products and oil products from the world market called for Singapore 
to offer a higher shipping capacity, which in turn required more frequent shipping 
navigation between Singapore and its hinterland. In order to provide this, in 1931 
and 1932 Sir Cecil Clementi, governor of the Straits Settlements, urged for a customs 
union in British Malaya, arguing that trade with the peninsula was a much higher 
proportion of the total Singapore trade. Therefore, port facilities in Singapore were 
considerably improved. It meant a minimum of delay or restriction to entry and 
export or re-export of goods delivered by both European and Asian merchant fleets 
for all of Southeast Asia. The development of regular shipping services to ports in 
outer, but adjacent, areas led to a convenient distribution of shipment to the final 
destination, so merchants operating their business in Singapore could easily increase 
their knowledge of the requirements of consuming countries and improve their 
ability to meet the standards required by those countries. Singapore’s port could also 
provide identical rates of freight between European and ports in Southeast Asia. The 
port provided auxiliary activities such as shipbuilding, bunkering, ship’s chandlery, 
lighterage and stevedoring and created employment for a large number of people. 
Modern developments in communication, including an advantageous spread in time 
zones, enabled Singapore to be informed of London prices in time for the next day’s 
trading, whereas local prices could be transmitted to London in time for the opening 
of that day’s market. As a result, Singapore remained the natural centre for collection 
and distribution of export goods for a considerable part of the archipelago. The 
volume of shipping passing through Singapore was of greatest importance, both 
internationally and locally.40 
However, in Johor, there was not only regional shipping, as in the nineteenth 
century but also emerging international shipping direct to Japan without passing 
Singapore. In Muar in 1919 and 1920, the share of ocean-going steamers and coasting 
steamers in total tonnage cleared in and out was around 65 per cent and 35 per cent 
respectively. Since most of the ocean-shipping was Singapore-oriented and the river 
steamers were used for domestic connections, their relative share indicates the 
strength of the relationship to Singapore. In Batu Pahat, there was average of one 
steamer daily calling at this port from Singapore. In Endau in 1920, the total tonnage 
of ships entering was 7,492 tons. However, from the late 1920s, there were Japanese 
steamers calling at Batu Pahat for iron transported directly to Japan. Thus the 
                                                          
40 British Military Administration, The Entrepôt Trade, 12-5. 
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Johor-Singapore shipping connection was continually intensified, but Singapore was 
not the exclusive marine foreland of Johor. 
Nevertheless, it is hard to assess whether the importance of Singapore for Johor 
was undermined during this period because of the extensive construction of inland 
traffic of both railway and road. Long before the twentieth century, several plans had 
already been proposed to develop the railway network to (1) suit the needs of rubber 
companies to transport products from the Malay states to Singapore for processing 
and export; and (2) to carry tin from the mines in Perak and Selangor for smelting in 
Penang and Singapore.41 However, these proposals were not seriously realized until 
the formation of the Federated Malay States Railways (FMSR) in 1901, although there 
had already been several fragmented railway systems along the west coast up to the 
end of the nineteenth century. In Johor, several individual railways were constructed 
for commercial use. The first railway connected Johor Bahru and Gunung Pulai, a 
distance of 20 miles, in 1869. Coming into the twentieth century, more serious and 
effective measures were taken to extend and connect existing railways. In 1900, a line 
linking Muar and Parit Jawa was completed, although the construction of another 
line connecting Johor Bahru and Segamat failed to materialize. In 1904, an agreement 
was signed with the FMSR for the construction of a railway line between Gemas and 
Johor Bahru. Railways in the southern Johor State were finally included in the Malaya 
network through a route to Singapore in 1909. This was initially by ferry, then by rail 
over the causeway which was completed in 1923, providing the final link in the 
Malayan road and rail transport system.42  
Railway construction also stimulated inland road traffic for transporting 
commodities and people to the railway stations. In the early 1900s, roads in Johor 
were extended from the coastal to the inland area, although there was still poor traffic 
connection between Batu Pahat, Muar and Johor Bahru other than by sea.43 In 1926, 
‘Branches from the road strike the railway at Renggam, Kluang, Pulai, and Segamat.’ 
‘From a point some 10 miles from Johor Bahru a new road branches off, and passing 
Gunong Pulai on the south strikes the west coast at Pontian Besar, and then runs 
along the coast to Batu Pahat via Benut.’ ‘The remaining road, from Kluang on the 
railway to Mersing, on the east coast is of interest, as it is the only road in Johor 
which is not at present flanked by cultivation throughout the greater portion of its 
length, and passes through the real virgin jungle in the heart of the country.’44 
Although the roads in Johor were poor compared to Malacca, Selangor, and Negri 
Sembilan, they were being improved as soon as funds would permit. And the 
                                                          
41 Kratoska, The Japanese Occupation, 21. 
42 Shamsuddin, Malayan Railway, 11. See also ‘Johore State Rly. (Construction: Causeway),’ 
CAOG10/50. 
43 Leinbach, 'Transportation'. 
44 Kirby, 'Johore ', 249. 
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government aimed at completing the west coast road and the Batu Pahat by-pass, 
followed by feeder to the railway in north Johor.45 
Both railway and road systems of Johor were connected to Singapore by the 
Singapore-Johor causeway which became a great boon, because it permitted the 
running of through-train services from Thailand to Singapore without an exceedingly 
annoying and uneconomic transhipment, and it also gave a great stimulus to the 
motor car industry, as planters from upcountry could not deliver their goods directly 
to the merchant houses in Singapore by road.46 As a result of the extension of the 
inland road and rail system, transport by sea declined and the landing ports fell out of 
use. The Straits of Johor were no longer a sea lane since ships could no longer pass 
through and only small boats could go through the lock. Although coastal sailing 
vessels still called at Sungai Seggat, its importance as a port declined, since goods 
could be more conveniently and more cheaply transported by road and rail.47 In 
general, however, the Johor-Singapore connection in this period was much stronger 
than ever before.  
 
Table 4. 8. International connections of Pulau Sambu in 1919. 
Shipping route No. of vessels 
Total tonnage 
in M3 
Arubay -> Sambu -> Colombo 1 1,009 
Sambu -> Singapore -> Calcutta 2 9,578 
Sambu -> Singapore 50 88,344 
Sambu -> Penang 1 385 
Sambu -> Siam 13 17,794 
Sambu -> Saigon 9 13,375 
Balikpapan – Sambu – China 
(Shantou, Xiamen, Fuzhou, 
Shanghai) 
1 3,152 
Sambu – Tamsui – Hong Kong 2 3,233 
Sambu – Manila 1 3,233 
Sambu – Australia (Adelaide, 
Sydney) 
3 19,539 
Tanjung Pinang – Singapore 189 190,925 
Tanjung Pinang – Siam 1 4,112 
Source: SHS (1919). 
 
 
                                                          
45 Ibid., 250-1. 
46 Ibid., 251. 
47 Lim, Johor, 137. 
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A similar diversification also took place in the Riau Islands. In the Netherlands 
Indies, the KPM operated 134 ships, calling at all major and most minor ports in the 
Netherlands Indies as well as Penang, Singapore, and occasionally Bangkok. In 1940, 
it carried 5.1 million tons of cargo, far exceeding that of all other shipping companies 
in the Netherlands Indies combined. Apart from Dutch mightiness, British shipping 
also had a strong presence. It was represented by Anglo-Saxon Petroleum, a private 
company onwed by Shell and Royal Dutch. It was engaged in transporting surplus oil 
from the Pangkalan Brandan refinery in North Sumatra to Pulau Sambu and 
reshipping to ports outside Indonesian waters. A large number of steamers called at 
this port for the transhipment of kerosene, benzene, gasoline, and fuel oil to the 
global world. Therefore, only around 60 per cent of the vessels, with around 55 per 
cent of total tonnage, were directed to Singapore from Pulau Sambu (Table 4.8).  
In the Riau Islands, the share of shipment to and from Singapore declined 
significantly compared to the previous period when almost all shipping had been 
Singapore-oriented in the Riau Islands. But with respect to the whole archipelago, the 
majority of non-oil shipment was still directed to Singapore because of geographical 
proximity. In Tanjung Balai (Karimun), all vessels sailing beyond the Netherlands 
Indies were destined for Singapore. And in Tanjung Pinang, the only destination 
outside the Netherlands Indies except Singapore was Thailand. In Penuba, which was 
the origin of the tin exploration from Singkep, most of the vessels were directed to 
Bangka and Billitong, from where these products were transported further to 
Singapore (Appendix xxviii). 
At the same time, domestic interinsular shipping navigation within the 
Netherlands Indies expanded. This can be exemplified by the continuous expansion 
of the KPM network (Table 4.9), in which Penuba and Terempa gradually became 
involved, though only in domestic shipping. However, their importance was too 
insignificant to represent a regional pattern. In Tanjung Balai (in Karimun), both 
international shipping to Singapore and domestic shipping within the Netherlands 
Indies expanded rapidly, but shipping to Singapore was larger in terms of total 
tonnage, whereas national shipping was more important in terms of numbers. Pulau 
Sambu and Tanjung Pinang were the largest ports in the Riau Islands, representing a 
devision between international and domestic shipping. In Pulau Sambu, international 
shipping to Singapore expanded much faster than domestic shipping, while Tanjung 
Pinang showed a reverse pattern. Together with the rise of Tanjung Uban, we may 
assume a growing importance of domestic shipping rather than shipping to 
Singapore (Figure 4.12). Therefore, the shipping network of the Riau Islands during 
this period expanded, whil Singapore still played the largest role in the shipping 
network. From a comparative perspective, the importance of Singapore for the Riau 
Islans was still as considerable as in the late nineteenth century. 
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Table 4. 9. KPM shipping routes passing Riau Islands in 1940 
K.P.M. Line 3: Batavia – Tanjung Pandan (Billiton) – Tanjung Pinang (Riau) – Singapore 
K.P.M. Line 3a: Batavia – Tanjung Pandan (Billiton) – Muntok (Bangka) – Tanjung Pinang 
(Riau) – Singapore 
K.P.M. Line 4b: Batavia – Toboali – Koba – Pangkal Pinang – Sungai Liat – Belinyu – Jebus – 
Mentok – Tanjung Pinang 
K.P.M. Line 4c:  Mentok – Palembang – Tanjung Pinang  
K.P.M. Line 4d: Tanjung Pinang – Mura Saba - Jambi 
K.P.M. Line 4e: Tanjung Pinang – Prigi Raja 
K.P.M. Line 5: Surabaya – Cheribon – Batavia – Mentok – Tanjung Pinang – Belawan Deli – 
Edi 
K.P.M. Line 6a: Tanjung Pinang – Tambelan - Pontianak 
K.P.M. Line 6b: Tanjung Pinang – Anambas Islands – Natuna Islands 
K.P.M. Line 6c: Tanjung Pinang – Tambelan – Singkawang 
Source: CEI, vol. 15, 1D, 119. 
 
Figure 4. 12. International and domestic shipping in Riau Islands, 1910s-1930s. 
(thous., mill. n.r.t.) 
 
Source: Appendix xxvii. 
 
The dynamic shipping networks of Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands were 
reflected by changing relations between different ethnic groups. In general, the more 
aggressive expansion of European shipping companies in this period resulted in 
transport dominated by Western shipping companies in British Malaya and the 
Netherlands Indies, whereas Chinese shipping companies gradually lost their 
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A tongkang sailing in the waters of the Riau 
Islands held by Ms. Abraham Crijnssen. 
Source: KITLV/14093. 
coastal lines operated in the 1930s, six of which were Chinese-owned or operated by 
Chinese. However, most of the regional shipping companies had to surrender to the 
Europeans, especially to the SSC for the agreement of freight rates.48 The SSC was 
linked to Straits Trading, the largest tin-smelting company, as well as to an increasing 
number of Chinese mines.49 This also happened to a Muar-based Chinese shipping 
firm, the Hua Khiow Steamship Company, which owned Najam and Hua Tong (280 
tons). It was acquired by the SSC in the 1930s.50 Wee Bin & Company was acquired 
by Ho Hong Steamship Company (founded by Lim Peng Siang in 1914), which in 
turn was purchased by the SSC in 1932. The surrender of the Ho Hong Steamship 
Company to the SSC marked the decline in importance of Chinese shipping in the 
Malay Peninsula. With a total gross tonnage of 38,860 tons in 1940, the SSC 
symbolized British control of both international and regional shipping in 
Singapore.51  
Similarly, in Riau’s waters, 
very few Chinese shipping 
companies were still operating 
independently. By exploiting the 
subtle relationship between the 
British and the Dutch, who were 
rivals and distrustful of each other, 
they kept an unstable balance with 
the KPM, which allied with 
Chinese to fight their British 
competitors in the Netherlands 
Indies. Successfully, but with some 
difficulty, several Chinese shipping 
companies managed to survive in 
the Riau Islands where the KPM 
was reluctant or unable to enter. 
The services of previously 
mentioned Tio Hoe Lay were 
extended by his son to Sarawak, 
Muar and South Sumatra. 52 
Another three shipping firms were 
                                                          
48 Tregonning, Home Port, 138. 
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also associated with the Chinese in Indonesia: the Tiong Hua Loen Chun Kongsi in 
Palembang, Lian Hua in Jambi, and the Heap Eng Moh (associated with the Oey 
Concern) based in Singapore. The first two each owned one steamer sailing between 
Singapore and Sumatra.53  
At the same time, the technological dichotomy still existed between Singapore 
and the rest, between Western shipping companies and the others. Although there is 
data about the exact number of vessels in Singapore, we can conclude that steamers 
dominated the shipping capacity. In the Riau Islands, the tonnage/number ratio 
fluctuated between 99 and 170, which did not exceed the level in Singapore in the 
1870s (Table 4.10). The higher ratio of the Riau Islands in this period was largely due 
to the visit of steamers to Pulau Sambu for oil products. In Johor, these ratios were 
even lower and steamships were even used in transporting mining products from the 
state to Japan. 
 
Table 4. 10. Ratios of tonnage/number in Johor and Riau Islands, 1909-1938. 
Year 1909 1916 1920 1923 1928 1930 1932 1938 
Johor - - - - 41 74 60 - 
The Riau 
Islands 170 121 116 134 - 99 - 153 
Source: Appendix xxv, Appendix xxvii. 
 
To sum up, the internal connections of the triangle showed a process of 
intensification. Although Johor’s growing connection to Japan and transhipment of 
oil from Pulau Sambu in the Riau Islands to countries diversified regional 
connections, from the point of view of Singapore, which paid more attention to the 
regional market, connections with Johor and the Riau Islands were at the same time 
intensified. With regard to shipping authorities, Johor-Singapore shipping was 
shifted to the British, whereas the Riau Islands-Singapore connection was still 
maintained by the Chinese. Rather than full cooperation, the mutual relationships 
between different shipping companies increasingly showed signs of competition.  
 
1940s 
The Japanese invasion in 1942 brought the steady growth of maritime development 
to a sudden end. But it is also the first time since the split of the old Johor-Riau 
Sultanate 130 years ago that we can describe this region as a complete political unit. 
There was a general decline of shipping movements and a disruption of external 
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shipping connections because of the Japanese effort to obtain natural resources and 
goods to wage war, and to blockade communication and supply routes that allowed 
the Allies to send supplies to Chinese forces.54 On the other hand, internal mutual 
connections within the triangle were intensified, both by official improvement and by 
secret means.  
Due to its previous international status, Singapore was considered as occupying 
an important geographical position serving a strategic military purpose for the 
JMA, 55  whereas Malaya and Sumatra were regarded as the core of economic 
development. Products were transported to Singapore from where they were shipped 
to Japan. These maritime activities effectively cut off outward connections of this 
region with the Western world, but strengthened the Japan-Malayan connection and 
Malayan internal connections by transport of raw materials to Japan. On 20 March 
1943, the military administration announced the creation of a Southern Regions 
Shipping Company, which incorporated all Japanese shipping interests in Singapore, 
and mobilized steamships and sailing vessels in order to carry goods within the 
Southern Regions. In January 1944, a Malayan Marine Transport Association 
similarly united all local shipowners.56 Japan also launched a programme to build 
ships throughout the Co-Prosperity Sphere, ordering all districts in the Southern 
Regions to give the highest priority to this effort, which received some 30-40 per cent 
of funds available for civilian enterprises in 1944.57 And the Japanese also made great 
efforts to revive shipping by building wooden vessels and introducing the Syonan 
Shipping Kumiai system in May 1942.58 Nevertheless, these measures could not alter 
the gradually loosened international shipping connections. 
Internal traffic connection was by contrast relatively strengthened. With regard 
to land traffic, the Japanese authorities constructed a new road along the east coast of 
the peninsula, but maintenance of existing roads was poor. Railway service was 
resumed along the west coast by June 1942, but there were breaks in the line where 
bridges had been destroyed, and it was 1943 before a through service between 
Singapore and Bangkok was announced. 59  In maritime development, although 
shipping space was extremely scarce, the re-use of traditional Chinese sails and Bugis 
prahus maintained the internal marine connections. The number of wooden vessels 
sailing between Singapore and neighbouring islands doubled from the pre-war 
number.60  
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Map 6. Roads and railways of Malaya in 1945. 
 
Source:  Kratoska, The Japanese Occupation, 162-3. 
 
Secret means to strengthen internal connections resulted from the navigation of 
small junks used in the black market. They operated more or less openly in occupied 
Malaya despite heavy penalties. Some black market supplies came from authorized 
dealers who diverted rice or sugar intended for sale under the rationing system, but 
the primary source was smugglers who operated along the Malayan coasts. Karimun 
Islands in the Riau Islands became a major transfer point for smuggled goods traded 
between Java, Sumatra and the peninsula, so much so that in March 1945 the Syonan 
Rice Import Kumiai set up a branch there to ‘smooth’ imports of rice. In Johor small 
sailboats entered the Batu Pahat River at night carrying ‘rice, sugar, flour, pigs, 
cigarettes, wine, brandy and opium’, for the most part purchased from the occupied 
The Netherlands Indies. There was also a considerable amount of internal smuggling, 
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with farmers or traders moving goods from production areas to towns where supplies 
were scarce and black market prices attractive.61 
In total, during the Japanese occupation, a severe shrinkage of the serving area 
of shipping was the sole characteristic feature of the external connections of 
Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands as a whole. By contrast, their internal 
connections reached their strongest point. Their mutual relations therefore showed a 
pattern of cooperation and ‘co-prosperity’.  
 
1950s-1970s 
The SSC began trading again as soon as it returned to Singapore after the war, but its 
post-war history was full of fluctuations and decline.62 This happened to the KPM as 
well when faced with economic decolonization in Indonesia. Both Chinese and 
Malays now got an opportunity to play a large part in shipping because of the 
disappearance of Western shipping. After the war, the Japanese left behind some 
vessels which came into the hands of either the Republic or the Chinese. A large 
number of landing-craft was sold by the British colonial authorities to the Chinese. It 
was an important landmark in the development of Chinese shipping in this area. 63   
There had been only a few Chinese shipping firms in Singapore in the late 1930s, 
while in Sumatra there were only two, each owning one single vessel. In 1949, by 
contrast, there were at east 20 Chinese shipping firms based in Singapore, mostly run 
by totok Chinese from Indonesia.64  
Chinese significance was reduced during the process of regional decolonization 
and nationalization. In Singapore, ethnic Chinese were still active in economic 
domains due to their dominance in the total population, but by then, their mother 
country was Singapore, instead of China. By contrast, both in Malaysia and Indonesia, 
indigenous groups received encouragement and support from the government and 
took the place of Chinese in all domains. Nevertheless, the implementation of these 
policies was not effective in the triangle, especially not in the Riau Islands. As a result, 
existing conditions were maintained which suggests a continuity of the colonial 
pattern, at least during the immediate post-war period. 
Government intervention increasingly called for independence in the economic 
sphere. Guided by individual government policies, shipping connections between 
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia were competitive rather than cooperative. 
Appendix xxii provides details of the shipping movements of Singapore differentiated 
by nationality. Although the information is not complete, it is still obvious that the 
share of Indonesia and Malaysia in the total of Singapore fell gradually. 
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In Malaysia, statistics indicate a negative growth of trade with Singapore, after 
the Malaysian government had announced in the Malaysia Plan its intention to 
construct its own port in order to byoass Singapore. The same intention was also 
present in Indonesia from the 1950s to divert the Riau Islands away from Singapore. 
This reached a peak during the process of decolonization when private capital from 
the former colonial mother country was confiscated by the government. The 
nationalization of Dutch firms resulted in a serious economic downturn. The Riau 
Islands-Singapore marine connection suffered a great decline during this period! In 
contrast to the domestic interinsular shipping of the Riau Islands which increased 
gradually, shipment to Singapore declined each year (Figure 4.13). Pulau Sambu and 
Tanjung Uban became exclusive oil ports to distribute oil products to the world 
market without needing Singapore. There is no doubt that this declining trend was 
reinforced by Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation during the years 1963-1966 when 
there was a significant decrease in numbers of vessels. 
 
Figure 4. 13. Cargo loaded and unloaded in Singapore from Riau Islands per month, 
1954-1960. 
( freight tons) 
 
Source: Appendix xxiii. 
 
More changes took place in the 1970s when the political intention to develop a 
national economy became more pronounced, particularly in Malaysia. The departure 
of Singapore from the Federation in 1965 resulted in the intention of the Malaysian 
government to construct its own port for international trade. The understanding 
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industries in Malaysia, as well as trade and economy.65 These new industries would 
be significant generators of industrialization throughout for the port, because Johor 
port could provide the necessary facilities and amenities to attract industrial 
throughput from Singapore port.66 This ambitious plan was finally realized with the 
design of the Johor port in 1974. The government would recognize Johor port as the 
southern terminal point of the Peninsular Malaysia (goods) transport network.67 
Therefore, there was a hope in the government that the majority of the new industries, 
particularly the footloose ones, which would be located in the new industrial estates 
in Johor. The following government policies were announced to enhance Johor port’s 
competitiveness, including:68 
‘  1. Land transport development: the new rail link between Kempas and Johor 
port, and a road link between Johor Bahru and the port. In this respect, with the 
completion of the rail link to Johor port, it is recommended that for the purposes of 
planning for transportation infrastructure, and to tailor its future road and rail 
planning within this context. 
2. Preferential rates to shippers. The policy was created in the hope that cargo 
could be delivered through Johor port rather than Singapore port and the railway 
system. 
3. The establishment of more ancillary services necessary for port operation (like 
forwarding agents, insurance agents, handling agents and banks) in the Johor port 
area. Moreover, the government should seriously consider the possibility of 
designating a free trade zone near the port to allow the port to compete with 
Singapore port for the handling of cargo like rubber and palm oil. 
4. The Johor Port Authority (JPA) should prepare a formal request to the 
Ministry of Transport to present its case to the Shipping Conferences to designate 
Johor port as a Liner Port after the completion of its Phase II expansion programme 
in 1985. The designation of Johor port as a liner port would enable a larger range of 
commodities to be shipped through the port than at present, particularly for cases of 
dry general cargo and containerised cargo.’ 
Existing connections were difficult to cut off. After the war, Singapore 
maintained its position as the main commercial centre of Southeast Asia and as the 
chief port of the Federation of Malaya. In 1950, evaluated from the perspective of 
total imports and exports from Malaysia, 73 per cent and 63 per cent respectively 
passed through Singapore. 69  Between 1957 and 1966, more than one-third of 
                                                          
65 Othman and Fong, Johore Port: An Economic Evaluation and Formulationof a Long-term 
Expansion Strategy, 225. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., 192-225. 
68 Ibid., 192-3. 
69 CSAR (1950), 14. 
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Peninsular Malaysia’s trade used Singapore for shipment. A high degree of 
dependence of Indonesia on Singapore is also observed from the frequent shipping 
activities between the two. The main reason was the comparative advantage of 
Singapore. First, the high frequency and wide range of shipping services at Singapore 
brought about a reduced cargo waiting-time and hence lower storage payments, 
which made Singapore more attractive. Second, Singapore’s more developed banking, 
financial and telecommunication facilities enhanced its position in foreign trade with 
Peninsular Malaysia. Third, the development of container facilities and international 
connections attracted considerable shipments.70 
Despite the expectations of the Malaysian and Indonesian governments, 
maritime development of Johor and the Riau Islands was still slow to materialize. In 
Johor, total cargo throughputs of Johor port in 1980 amounted to 2,064,000 freight 
tons, ranked 5th place, and took 6.7% of the total of Malaysia. The corresponding 
numbers in 1985 changed to 4,327,000 tons, ranked 6th place, and 7.2% of the total.71 
This reflected a certain growth in Johor. Nevertheless, insufficient port services, 
including cargo congestion, delays in cargo clearance, high cost of shipyards, and 
limited market networks, still left an opportunity for Singapore to attract a major 
proportion of Malaysian merchandise. To some extent, Malaysian ports, including 
those of Johor, became mere feeder ports to Singapore. Thus, the task ahead, the 
government figured, was to undertake effective action to make Malaysian ports more 
competitive, encouraging cargo to be shipped through them whenever possible.72 
Therefore, in the post-colonial period, the two-way connections within the 
three regions were expected to be undermined because of the underlying political 
ambitions. Nevertheless, a continuation of historical connections is still visible under 
the influence of colonial legacies. Although their mutual connections grew relatively 
weaker, they still formed the foundation of the next step of economic cooperation, 
the establishment of SIJORI. 
 
3. Overview of shipping development and analysis of demand conditions 
Sea unities through the linkages created by maritime networks have been a feature of 
modern history.73 Locally, the boundary of rivers and sea between Singapore, Johor 
and the Riau Islands makes ships serve as the most reliable and efficient mode of 
transportation. This chapter has offered a survey of marine connections between the 
three regions. 
                                                          
70 Devaser, A Plan for Johore Port, 6. 
71 Rahman et al., The Maritime Economy, 16, Table 2.4. 
72 Ibid., 17. 
73 Frost, 'Asia's Maritime Networks and the Colonial Public Sphere, 1840-1920'. 
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 In general, all regions experienced rather dramatic changes in maritime 
development. However, their mutual connections did not follow paths of individual 
development. During the colonial period, their relationship, represented by various 
shipping companies, generally showed a pattern of both cooperation and competition. 
Johor remained exclusively the hinterland of Singapore until the appearance of the 
Japanese, while the Riau Islands’ position showed some similarity with Singapore. 
Internal connectedness within this region showed a gradually intensification. The 
region as a whole was exposed to the world economy by European steamers, while 
internal connections to a large extent were maintained by the Chinese. During the 
Japanese occupation, all suffered great setbacks. However, internal connections 
reached their strongest point due to the Japanese political and military efforts. After 
the war, political confrontation and economic blockades led to a disruption of the 
existing network. Internal connections were destroyed and outward connections to 
the world economy were strengthened on an individual basis. Due to the 
vulnerability and small scale of Chinese shipping companies, the Riau 
Islands-Singapore connection was not as strong as the Johor-Singapore connection. 
 This chapter together with Chapter 3 also describes the factor of demand 
conditions in Porter’s Diamond Model. The evaluation of this factor is shown by 
Table 4.11. It shows two simple facts. First, Singapore possessed the greatest 
advantage in the spatial dimension, followed by Johor, then by the Riau Islands. 
Second, in the temporal dimension, the advantages in all regions underwent a 
cumulative process, except during the Japanese occupation.  
 
Table 4. 11. Standardized assignments of demand conditons in Singapore, Johor and Riau 















S J R S J R S J R S J R 
International 
trade 
1.2 0.4 0.8 2 1.2 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.4 4 2.8 2 
International 
shipping 
1.2 0.4 0.8 2 1.2 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.4 4 2.8 2 
Regional 
trade 
0.8 0.8 0.4 1.6 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 2.4 2.8 2 
Regional 
shipping 
0.8 0.8 0.4 1.6 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 2.4 2.8 2 
Trade agents 0.8 0.4 0.4 2.4 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 4 2 1.2 
Shipping 
companies 
0.8 0.4 0.4 2 1.2 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.4 2.4 1.6 0.8 








Chapter 5  







It was pointed out in the previous chapters that the expansion of regional trade and 
shipping was due to the exploitation of raw materials which were in great demand in 
the world market. A proportion of the capital accumulated from these exports flowed 
back into the region and served to improve productivity in exploiting these natural 
resources. Processing manufacturing plants, supporting industries and financial 
services were established as a result of both backward and forward linkages. Within 
the triangle, the proximity of geographical location and existing connections 
facilitated the flow and distribution of capital of various ethnic groups. In the colonial 
period, this network was formed and maintained mainly by Europeans and Chinese, 
whereas the Malays were designated to play an increasing role in the post-war period. 
This chapter focuses on capital and capitalists, differentiating by ethnic origin, and 
identifying the impact on capital networks. Rather than following a chronology, the 
discussion is arranged by economic sector, that is agriculture, manufacturing and 
finance. This chapter concludes with an overview of individual and joint 
performance of Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands analysed in Porter’s Diamond 
Model. 
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1. Agriculture 
The production of tropical agricultural commodities was the most important 
advantage attracting both international and regional capital to the triangle, especially 
after the establishment of Singapore which guaranteed access to the world market. 
The production of agricultural primary goods lay at the core of regional trade and 
supported the later industrial and financial development. However, agricultural 
production was quite unbalanced due to two structural characteristics. The first one 
was – and is – the non- or very limited existence of agriculture in Singapore. 
Although land supply was still abundant when Singapore was founded in 1819, 
available land for agricultural production was soon exhausted after several decades of 
intensive cultivation by an exploding population. Up to the 1870s, agricultural 
plantations could only be found in adjacent Johor and the Riau Islands. The second 
characteristic refers to the limited subsistence farming in the region, which forced 
regional food supply to rely heavily on imports. Local agricultural plantation can be 
characterized as an export-oriented commercial agriculture. 
As indicated by the trade structure, there were shifts among important 
commercial agricultural products that played a different role during the long period 
studied here. Before the arrival of Europeans, both Chinese and Malays had already 
been widely engaged in the cultivation of copra, sago, rattan, coconut and vegetables, 
as well as in keeping livestock. Except for local consumption, the surplus was mainly 
sent to Singapore, where there was a strong demand.1 This pattern of agricultural 
production, however, did not require or generate much capital and was not of great 
economic significance. Nevertheless, these traditional agricultural activities have been 
maintained until today, especially in the Riau Islands.2 In this study, we have focused 
on selected agricultural commerce of some economic significance.  
The first important agricultural production after the establishment of Singapore 
was cultivation of pepper and gambir, which was initiated by Chinese in the Riau 
Islands in the eighteenth century. In the nineteenth century, many of these Chinese 
were attracted to Singapore, then later moved on to Johor to set up plantations there.3 
After several decades of cultivation, this area became the world’s largest gambir 
producer and export centre. The second half of the nineteenth century in this region 
has been described as the ‘Age of Gambir’ by historians.4 
After the decline of gambir and pepper plantation in the early twentieth century 
in Johor, many Chinese planters switched to pineapples.5 The pattern was also 
observed in the Riau Islands. In Batam, pineapples were very important for the 
                                                          
1 MvO: Riouw en onderhorigheden (1908). 
2 Ibid. 
3 An, 'Chaozhoulese Pioneers at Johor and Muar In Malaysia'. 
4 邱新民, ‘新加坡的甘密时代’. 
5 Guinness, On the Margin, 6. 
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canning factories in Singapore, such as Tandjong Pinggir, a pineapple plantation, 
employing a total labour force of 20 Chinese in 1908 based on a concession from the 
government.6 Some other Chinese became tapioca and sago planters and sold their 
properties as rubber estates to European companies and company promoters in 
Johor.7 In Riau, sago cultivation and trade also expanded in Benedenlanden Indragiri, 
but stagnated in Lingga and Karimun.8 However, the dominance of smallholdings 
plantations and a sparsely scattered population restricted the scale of the cultivation.9 
Some plantations were also run by the Malays. From the turn of the century, coconut 
and areca nut were widely planted in Muar and Batu Pahat by Malay and Javanese 
smallholders. 10  Meanwhile, some European pioneers also experimented with 
planting on a large scale – sago, coffee, tea, cocoa and tapioca. 
Nevertheless, the production of these commodities remained limited.11 It was 
the plantation of rubber that achieved great success and importance, replacing 
pepper and gambir as the region’s most important export product in the twentieth 
century. Differing from Chinese dominance in gambir and pepper, rubber was rather 
a European business from the beginning. Owing to its large demand in the West, 
rubber became the first regional product which was brought to the world market in 
large quantities. 
Although rubber retained its importance up to the post-war period, its position 
was gradually challenged and it was replaced by palm oil which brought a third 
change to regional commercial agriculture. Malaysia and Indonesia became the 
world’s leading producers of palm oil. However, the situation in Johor and the Riau 
Islands differed markedly. Johor became a major producer of Malaysian palm oil, 
whereas this product had never been tried out in the Riau Islands on a very large 
scale. The shift among the three products reflected the evolution of connections 
between the triangle and the world market, and also the dynamic mutual relationship 
between the Chinese, Europeans and other ethnic groups. 
 
Age of gambir 
Gambir plantation originated from the Riau Islands in the early eighteenth century 
by Chinese, especially Teochew Chinese.12 On Bintan and Batam islands, these early 
                                                          
6 KV (1905), 54. MvO: Riouw en onderhorigheden (1908). 
7 JAR (1910), 6. 
8 KV (1905), 259-60. 
9 Touwen, Extremes. 
10 JAR (1911), 3. 
11 Guinness, On the Margin, 6. 
12 Trocki, 'The Origins of the Kangchu System 1740-1860'. Berkley, An Anecdotal History of Old 
Times in Singapore, 1819-1867, 307. Jackson, Planters and Speculators: Chinese and European 
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Chinese planters, titled as soengie hoofd (river headman), cultivated gambir and 
pepper in their own soengies (river settlements).13 However, such self-sufficient 
production could not generate much capital until it reached a large scale. This was 
not realized until the 1830s when Temenggong Ibrahim, ruler of Johor, introduced 
the kangchu system, whereby the right of settlement and management of a plantation 
(also called kangkar) was granted to a Chinese headman (called kangchu).14 
The kangkar varied in size and were found on virtually every river, ranging from 
2,500 acres to 20,000 acres.15 In 1872, 72 kangchus were recorded in Johor and the 
number increased to 94 in 1891.16 In the Riau Islands, there were still 52 Chinese 
headmen recorded with a total 95 settlements in 1867.17 They were opened up on 
major islands of the Riau-Lingga Archipelago, including Bintan, Batam, Galang, 
Lingga, Singkep, and Karimun.18 The cultivation also expanded to Indragiri by two 
European estates, Gading Estate and Ajer Moelek, but elsewhere experienced decline 
from the 1900 onwards as a result of the decreasing price and the utilization of 
suitable land for firewood.19 It is impossible to obtain a detailed picture of the total 
area and production of gambir and production in Johor and the Riau Islands. 
Nevertheless, their relative importance is indicated by the exports of these two 
products. In 1870, production from the Riau Islands was slightly more than that from 
Johor. However, in the following several decades, Johor recorded a faster growth than 
the Riau Islands. In 1900, total exports of gambir and pepper from Johor was 
recorded at £410,000 and £305,000, whereas the export from the Riau Islands was 
£95,000 and £27,000. 
Unill 1911, the gambir and pepper estates of Johor were all owned by 
China-born traders (mainly Teochews) living in Singapore. These Chinese capitalists 
lived in Singapore or other trade centres, while their representatives called the tauke 
(businessmen) acted as managers and lived on the plantations.20 Neither owner nor 
representative was engaged in the cultivation themselves but through employed 
planters, who agreed to sell the produce to them at a certain fixed price in return for 
                                                                                                                                         
Agricultural Enterprise in Malaya, 1786-1921, 7. Colombijn, 'Een milieu-effect rapportage van 
de gambircultuur in de Riau-archipel in de negentiende eeuw'. 
13 BPL 2106.I.6A. 
14 Tan, 'Li Yih-yuan and the Study of Chinese in Malaya'. The discussion of kangchu system has 
also been mentioned by various historians, note for example Trocki, Prince of Pirates. Trocki, 
'The Origins'. Coope, 'The Kangchu System in Johore'. 
15 Selat, 'The Emergence of Commodity Production in a Malay District - Muar, Johor', 325. 
16 STDS (1891), 295-6. 
17 BPL 2106.I.6A. 
18 Trocki, Opium. 
19 KV (1905), 261. 
20 Fernando and Bulbeck, Chinese Economic Activity in Netherlands India: Selected Translations 
from the Dutch, 214-5. 
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capital and provision. 21  The crops could be loaded directly onto twakows or 
tongkangs (cargo boats) in the ulu (headwaters) and taken to Singapore without 
further handling. Produce was weighed in Singapore, so planters were at the mercy of 
traders. The situation in Riau is assumed to be of a similar pattern, with, most of the 
owners, managers and traders of the plantations Singapore based. Even those small 
capitalists from Johor and the Riau Islands intended to connect themselves to 
Singapore again by selling all their products in the Singapore market.22 
Both in Johor and the Riau Islands, the growing of gambir and pepper was not 
their only interest. They were also involved in other undertakings. In Johor, they 
gradually obtained futher rights, such as collecting taxes, especially taxes on gambling 
and on the sale of pork, opium and alcohol. Similarly in the Riau Islands, many rich 
Chinese capitalists and businessmen also functioned as opium farmers for the 
colonial government. Teo Ho Lye used to be an opium farmer and had a dominant 
influence in the archipelago before engaged in the shipping business. From 1908, 
opium farming was in the hand of Tan A Tjon, the opium farmer of Tanjung 
Pinang.23 Benefitting from the profits of opium farming, many of these opium 
farmers succeeded in accumulating their initial capital to create numerous links 
between capitalist development and opium farmers. 24 Without exception, these 
Chinese capitalists migrated to Singapore after they had become rich, leaving their 
business in Johor and the Riau Islands to the appointed agents. A vast Chinese capital 
and family network was thus indicated by this pattern of farming system. 
In this way, Chinese capitalists and their migration routes created a Chinese 
capital network in this region. The intensity of this network was not only 
consolidated by family, kinship and blood relationships between them, but also 
further strengthened by the establishment of two cross-boundary institutions in 
Singapore promoted by the Europeans: The Gambir and Pepper Society (kongkek) in 
1867 and The Opium Farming Syndicate.25 The kongkek aimed at promoting the 
mutual protection and benefit of financiers and planters, and unifying the planting, 
shipping and trading activities in Johor and Singapore. It also handled complaints 
from European merchants regarding the quality of these products: in 1887, its 
representatives met with the representatives of European firms calling in these 
commodities in the offices of the Singapore Chamber of Commerce to discuss ways 
and means of improving their quality, and agreeing to call upon the sultan of Johor 
                                                          
21 JAR (1912). 
22 STDS (1891), 284. 
23 MvO: Riouw en onderhorigheden (1908). 
24 Trocki, 'Opium and the Beginnings of Chinese Capitalism in Southeast Asia', 297. 
25 Song, One Hundred Years' History, 38. 
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for his help.26 If there was a dispute or quarrel between the owners of gambir and 
pepper estates and their mortgages as regards the correctness of the scales of the 
mortgagees, the kangchu had to fully investigate the matter and send the goods to the 
kongkek to be weighed on government scales provided for the kongkek.27 The Opium 
Syndicate, which was under one joint contract with different governments, tried to 
prevent smuggling and to enter into a mutual understanding that opium farms 
should be apportioned between governments.28 The Syndicate was able to establish a 
uniform price for chandu at the settlements. The cooperation of Tan Seng Poh, the 
Riau opium farmer at the time, afforded valuable assistance to the Syndicate in 
crushing the organized system of smuggling which had for some time robbed the 
farmers of a large portion of the lawful fruits of their monopoly.29 These two Chinese 
institutions, together with the gambir and pepper plantations, generated a golden age 
of strong internal connections within the triangle. 
The languishing in the interplantation of pepper and gambir and the collapse of 
prices from the late 1890s onwards were attributed to several reasons.30 The most 
important one was from the economic and ecological perspective.31 From the point 
of view of the state, cultivation of gambir was very wasteful considering the nature of 
its labour-demanding and soil-exhausting cultivation. It could only be planted on 
newly felled land. If no attempt was made to add manure as fertilizer, as soon as the 
soil showed signs of exhaustion, the plantation was deserted. The clearing soon 
became overgrown with grass, which, being very inflammable, was constantly subject 
to fire, effectually preventing re-afforestation. Nevertheless, gambir production could 
not be prohibited easily, as the cessation of that cultivation would also mean the end 
of pepper cultivation. In Johor, the situation was further worsened by an insufficient 
labour supply which, however, was due to the opening of the Johor State Railway. 
The kangkar furthest from the river mouth immediately became the nearest to both a 
way of escape for the coolies, and an offer of cash wages. The Chinese gambir and 
pepper capitalists were soon drained of their labour supply. Chinese kangkar only 
retained coolies by offering much more favourable terms than had prevailed before, 
at the expense of his profits.32 
Faced with such problems, attempts were made to utilize clearings for 
cultivation of rubber but satisfactory results were unlikely in the exhausted soil.33 
                                                          
26 Chiang, A History, 52-3. 
27 Coope, 'The Kangchu System'. 
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opium farms. 
29 Song, One Hundred Years' History, 159. 
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The headmen or kangchus applied for concessions for the whole or portions of the 
land occupied by them, and were planting rubber or other types of cultivation.34 In 
1911, in Batu Pahat, of the 21 kangkar not more than two showed any signs of 
health.35  Also experiencing the same difficulty, the shift of agricultural plantations 
was not successful in the Riau Islands where the colonial government’s influence was 
limited. Gambir and pepper plantations were in the hands of smallholders, 
particularly Chinese, but the scale of their exported commodities was still 
insignificant compared to elsewhere, for instance in mainland Sumatra. The 
economic importance of the Riau Islands was marginal within the Netherlands 
Indies. 
 
East-west connection: rubber 
Rubber first attracted the attention of British planters in the 1890s. In Johor, the early 
plantations were set up along both coasts and then expanded into the interior. 
However, it was not until the early twentieth century that rubber trees were cultivated 
on a large scale on estates managed by European merchant houses. 36  Many 
shareholders of these merchant firms were Europeans residents in the Far East, 
primarily planters, merchants, bankers, professional men and some government 
officers with capital either in sterling or Chinese currency.37 Among them, Harrisons 
& Crosfield and Guthrie were the pioneers of European estates in Johor: Mount 
Austin and Castlewood established near Johor Bahru, The Malay Peninsula (Johore) 
Rubber Concessions (50,000 acres in 1906) and The Rubber Estates of Johore (25,000 
acres in 1906) near Muar.38 
In the Netherlands Indies, although the Agrarian Law of 1870 promoted the 
investment in agriculture by private capital,39 the effects of this policy did not 
materialize in Riau until the twentieth century when the rubber plantations were 
introduced. Riau had never been an attractive place for Western capital.40 However, 
most of these plantations were located mainland Indragiri, and only in a small part of 
the Riau Islands, especially on Bintan and Karimun islands. Under the administration 
of the Dutch colonial government, the Riau Islands attracted much capital from the 
Netherlands. Regional Dutch capital often showed various relationships with 
Singapore. In 1934, Poelau Loemoet Estate and Soegi Estate were given the right to 
                                                          
34 Ibid. (1911), 3. 
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38 Ibid., 49. 
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exploit rubber lands in Karimun. Although concessions were granted by the 
Netherlands Indies government, permits were obtained at the Consulate-General of 
the Netherlands in Singapore.41 The cultivation of these new estates crops during the 
period 1910-1940 was also partly undertaken by non-Dutch Western private 
enterprises.42 Many of these British business firms that expanded rubber plantation 
in the Riau Islands, such as Bintan Estates, Ltd., were financed by Guthrie and Co.43 
Financed by large Western merchant houses, these estates possessed the 
advantage of substantial investment from the very beginning. The Bintang Johore 
Rubber Estate was registered as a limited company in 1910 in London with a nominal 
capital of £30,000.44 One of the largest European estates in the Riau Islands, Bintan 
Estates, was a British company involved in rubber plantation in Tanjung Pinang. It 
was initiated with a capital of £24,000 which was increased to £85,000 in 1927.45 
Galang Besar Rubber Plantations, a Dutch company founded in 1910 in Tanjung 
Pinang had capital of £150,000.46 
There was also some investment in rubber companies by Asians, notably 
Japanese and Chinese, mainly where they were the owners of property.47 Rubber 
planting by the Japanese was the spontaneous outcome of the interest shown by both 
individual merchants in Singapore and rich businessmen in Japan. By 1917, the 
Japanese possessed about 100,000 acres of rubber estates in Johor, increasing from 
58,424 acres in 1916.48 Most of these Japanese estates were located in Kota Tinggi, 
which had the largest number of Japanese of all districts in the peninsula. By the eve 
of the Pacific War, the majority of Japanese estates were limited companies. They 
were partly registered in Japan, partly incorporated in the Straits Settlements.  
Chinese rubber plantation began much earlier than the Japanese. Cheong Chin 
Heng, one of the Chinese pioneers of the plantation of rubber started his business in 
Johor as early as the 1870s.49 Nevertheless, the Chinese generally did not show much 
confidence in the permanency of rubber cultivation until the late 1910s.50 Following 
his step, many Chinese, especially Singaporean Chinese, established rubber 
plantations both in Singapore and adjacent areas, especially in Johor. Tan Kah Kee 
                                                          
41 Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser, 15 May 1934. 
42 Thee, 'The Impact', 13. 
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established his rubber plantation in Singapore with an initial capital of £210. In 1916, 
there were 39 Chinese estates in Johor with a total of 58,203 acres, 15,990 acres of 
which were cultivated with rubber. This percentage was much lower than that among 
Europeans and Japanese. The Chinese also established rubber estates in the Riau 
Islands, but the number was rather limited. One piece of news in 1929 reported that a 
British planter, James William Futcher, had been murdered by a crowd of Chinese. 
He had acted as an authorised leader in a Chinese rubber and pineapple company in 
the Riau Islands.51 In Johor, some Malay estates were organized. The largest investor 
was the sultan of Johor.52 Sultan Ibrahim had a personal interest in rubber and 
owned two plantations, both located on the outskirts of Johor Bahru (Ayer Molek 
Rubber Estate and Pasir Pelangi Rubber Estate), with a total 2,800 acres of planted 
land of and 625 labourers.53 
Compared to Western estates, the significance of Asian plantations was very 
limited (Table 5.1). Europeans were the main conductors of capital connections 
between Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands. Regional differences can also be 
discerned. From 1907 to 1916, the number of estates plantation rose from 10 to 151. 
Up to 1960, there were a total of 490 rubber estates in Johor. Estates rubber 
plantation in the Riau Islands, however, did not attract significant capital. From 1927 
to 1936, the number of rubber estates increased only by only one, from 21 to 22 in the 
entire Riau Residency, under the influence of the worldwide Depression of the 1930s. 
Although the number of estates increased to 77 in 1970, the total area of these estates 
was much smaller than pre-war. Determined by the number of estates in the three 
regions, the connection was much faster between Singapore and Johor than that 
between Singapore and the Riau Islands. 
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, the rubber plantation in British Malaya 
and the Netherlands Indies was restricted by various restrictions, which were quota 
schemes with basic quotas allotted to the participating territories and applied equally 
to estates and small-holdings (Table 5.2).54 Rubber plantations began to decline 
immediately after the Pacific War, despite the stimulus from the Korean War. 
Reasons for the decline vary. The most important was less demand for natural rubber 
in the world market because of the rise of synthetic rubber. Second, as a result of the 
accident of fire at the Paya Lebar factory of Aik Hoe & Co. in Singapore in 1950, 
insurance companies became reluctant to insure large quantities of rubber at the new 
values. There was hence not enough available money in the country to finance 
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rubber. 55  Third, the post-war political situation did not encourage Western 
investment, especially not in Indonesia, where the process of decolonization brought 
a sudden end to Western rubber estates. In Malaysia in 1966, European-owned 
rubber estates only accounted for 39 per cent of total production.56 In Indonesia, as 
early as 1948, the Dutch had begun putting estates up for sale in Singapore – an estate 
of 2,800 acres on the Riau Islands of Kundur, including 875 acres of exploitable 
rubber and 325 acres of penang nuts, one rubber factory, one sago factory and one 
hospital.57 The decline of the large rubber estates offered an opportunity for rubber 
smallholders. Unlike an estate plantation which is usually larger than 100 acres,  
smallholding ranged from four to 10 acres and the size remained unchanged up to 
the 1960s (Table 5.3).58 They were mainly operated by Chinese and Malays.  
 








Cultivated Production Labour 
force 
Acres Acres Acres Lb 
Johor, 1916 
Chinese 
39 58,203 15,990 16,360 99,400 664 
26% 19% 12% 11% 1% 2% 
European 
63 180,848 83,687 93,201 12,334,679 23,126 
59% 61% 63% 90% 81% 59% 
Indian 
1 - - - - - 
1% - - - - - 
Japanese 
40 58,424 33,659 34,144 760,000 4,028 
26% 19% 25% 23% 6% 14% 
Malay 
6 3,730 576 576 15,800 120 
1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 
Sultan 
2 2,842 2,842 2,842 490938 625 
1% 1% 2% 2% 4% 2% 
Total 151 304,047 136,754 147,123 13,700,817 28,563 
The Riau Islands, 1910 
European 10 14,233 4,219 34,609 83,760 - 
Source: JAR (1916), SHS (1910). 
                                                          
55 Browns Malayan Economic Review, vol. 1, 1951, page 53. 
56 Mohamed, Export Trade, 27. 
57 Straits Times, 12 August 1948, Page 7. 
58 Selvadurai, Socio-economic Survey of Rubber Smallholders in West Johore. 




Table 5. 2. Rubber export quotas for Johor, 1934-1939. 
(percentage share) 
 1929-32 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 
Estates 49.8 57.9 54.3 58.5 58.9 59 57.2 
Smallholdings 50.2 42.1 45.7 41.5 41.1 41 42.8 
Source: Malay rubber: the interwar years, 292. 
 
 
Table 5. 3. Acreage of land planted and number of parcels in estate agriculture in Johor in the 
1960s. 
 Land operated Rubber land Coconut Others 
 Acres No. parcels Acres No. parcels Acres Acres 
Potion 9.8 2.2 8.6 1.9 0.7 0.5 
Muar 14.5 4.1 12.3 3.1 1.2 1 
Batu Pahat 11 2.6 9.6 2.2 0.9 0.4 
Source: Selvadurai, Socio-economic Survey, 2. 
 
The number of smallholdings increased much faster than the estates. Only in 
Muar, 4,797 extracts were issued in exchanges for Surat Sementara, which were 
temporary titles issued to smallholders pending demarcation and settlement in 
1925.59 In the Riau Islands, during the period of export expansion in the first four 
decades of the twentieth century, peasant smallholders played a much greater role.60 
The Great Depression of the 1930s led to a steep decline in agricultural prices which 
hurt both Western estates and indigenous smallholdings. Crop production at various 
estates contracted as a result of export restriction schemes. However, in the Outer 
Islands (including the Riau Islands) in the Netherlands Indies, these restriction 
schemes proved ineffective, notably with the rubber smallholders who increased their 
output through increased tapping to maintain income levels in the face of declining 
                                                          
59 JAR (1925). 
60 Thee, 'The Impact', 12. 
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rubber prices. 61  This also took place in Johor. Up to the late 1930s, rubber 
smallholdings began to outnumber estates in planted areas. In Johor, in 1932, some 
60 per cent of the rubber was still planted on estates. Up to 1939, the total area of 
rubber smallholdings plantation exceeded that of estates (Table 5.4). In the Riau 
Islands in 1936, a total of 9,415 smallholdings were recorded. The situation was 
completely overturned in the post-war period when large estates vanished from 
rubber cultivation and smallholders became the dominant producer. An Indonesian 
farmers’ co-operative association was formed in Tanjung Pinang in 1953, named the 
Koperasi Rakjat Tani Kabupaten Riau di Tanjung Pinang. The association had more 
than 300 members, most of whom were owners of rubber, coconut, and fruit 
plantations.62 Up to 1970, the total planted area by smallholders was almost three 
times that of estates (Table 5.5). 
In general, the estates were more important in the colonial period, whereas 
smallholders gained significance in the post-war era. Their growth reflected the 
picture as a whole of regional rubber plantation (Figure 5.1). Attracting more capital, 
rubber estates in Johor had a greater economic significance than in the Riau Islands 
during the colonial period. However, their importance declined after the war, 
influenced by the world market. By contrast, rubber plantations in the Riau Islands 
kept growing after 1960 because of the rising importance of smallholders. From this 
point of view, the integration of Johor into the post-war world market was deeper 
than the Riau Islands.  
 
Table 5. 4. Land planted with rubber in Johor, 1906-1970. 
(thous. acres) 
 1906 1910 1916 1925 1932 1940 1960 1970 
Total 4 48 137 470 970 954 550 462 
Estates - 44 75 302 459 560 - 161 
Smallholdings - 41 62 168 511 395 - 301 





                                                          
61 Ibid., 14. 
62 Straits Times, 14 December 1953, Page 7. 
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Table 5. 5. Land planted with rubber in Riau, 1927-1975. 
(acres) 
  
1927 1936 1970 1975 














- 623,436 - 
162,051 
Indragiri 26,756 49,715 497,705 
Total 21 72,058 36,193 158,013 77 648,149 130 677,826 
Source: MCKS (1927, 1936). 
 
Figure 5. 1. Land planted with rubber in Johor and Riau, 1906-1975. 
(thous. acres) 
 
Source: Table 5.3, Table 5.5. 
 
Diversification: palm oil 
Although rubber staged a rapid expansion in Johor in the late colonial period, its 
relative share in the total agricultural production declined steadily from 75 per cent 
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Oil palm seeds were brought to Johor as early as 1875. However, planting was 
not widely established until the 1920s when rubber prices fell. Palm oil was regarded 
as a possible alternative to rubber. Thus, when Johor recovered from a decline of 
rubber production in the 1920s, oil palm plantation was again undermined by rubber. 
In 1929, there were only 27 oil palm estates in Malaya, five of which were in Johor. By 
1933, the number had increased to six. The products from palm oil estates were 
exported by railway in tank wagons to Singapore for shipment to a palm oil bulking 
company.63 During the Japanese occupation, palm oil plantations were neglected and 
many of the expensive factory installations were destroyed.64 Great efforts were 
made to rehabilitate the plantations immediately after the war. Guided by the 
Malayan government’s liberal policy, the palm oil plantations in Johor underwent a 
rapid expansion. For the early 1960s, statistics record only 32 estates in all of 
Malaya.65 However, the number increased to 121 in 1965, 19 of them located in 
Johor with acreage of 79,501 acres, producing 62,881 tons of palm oil and 14,315 tons 
of kernels, accounting for more than 40 per cent of total Malaysia production (Figure 
5.2).66 Today, palm oil has already gained a predominant position in agricultural 
estate production.  
 
Table 5. 6. Planted area for palm oil in Johor, 1930-1972. 
(thous. acres) 
Year Acreage, mature Acreage, total 
1930 9,092 20,422 
1933 12,190 30,067 
1939 29,934 36,621 
1968 96,016 179,695 
1969 125,584 204,736 
1970 152,597 231,202 
1971 172,374 250,702 
1972 193,799 292,154 
Source: JAR (1930, 1933, 1939), OCTS (1968-1972). 
                                                          
63 JAR (1933). 
64 Khera, The Oil Palm Industry of Malaysia: An Economic Study, 25. 
65 Lim, Johor, 33. 
66 Williams and Xu, Oil Palm Cultivation in Malaya: Technical and Economic Apsects. 
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Figure 5. 2. Land planted with palm oil in Johor, 1930-1972. 
(thous. acres) 
 
Source: Table 4.6. 
 
Although Indonesia has been an important palm oil producer next to Malaysia 
in the post-war period, this profitable cultivation did not appear in the Riau Islands 
in the period under study.67 Since the 1970s, estate groups under public ownership 
began setting up large oil palm plantations on mainland Sumatra. Nevertheless, the 
mainland Riau Province did not become a plantation area of palm oil until the 1990s 
and these plantation have not extended to the Islands!68 No agricultural 
diversification took place in the Riau Islands. 
Like rubber, the plantation of palm oil was also initiated by large European 
estates. The Malaysian estates were mainly owned by private individuals or by groups 
which exercised management functions. The Palm Oil Plantation with its head office 
in Singapore was the largest company engaged in this cultivation in Johor with a 
planted area of more than 10,000 acres in Kluang district in the colonial period, 
representing a complete British dominance.69 After the Pacific War, many of these 
                                                          
67 Comparative development of oil palm plantation and production could be obtained from the 
statistics given by ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Selected Statistics, 1967-1983, 19-21,148-9. 
68 Corley et al., The Oil Palm, 14-7. 
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estates were still controlled by Europeans as property of public companies which, in 
turn, were managed by British agency houses. Central control under a common 
agency firm enabled groups of estates to achieve greater efficiency and stability by 
drawing from a pool of specialized services and capital resources. Therefore, ‘the 
Management Agency System is an organic link between home capital and overseas 
enterprise in the Eastern plantation industry.’ Foreign-owned estates in 1972 
accounted for 68 per cent of the total acreage of palm oil estates in Peninsular 
Malaysia.70 It is evident that the European estates’ capital inputs were large. By 
contrast, the Malay estates, particularly the smallholdings, few inputs were 
monetized.71 
Post-war development saw an increase of local capital from of smallholders 
(Table 5.7). It was due to some factors in the 1950s and 1960s, in particular the 
emphasis on economic diversification away from rubber as promoted by the 
Malaysian government.72 Guided by the government’s liberal policy, oil palm 
plantations achieved a rapid expansion, attracting and settling people in new rural 
areas.73 This was further stimulated by the foundation of FELDA (Federal Land 
Development Authority) and KEJORA (Kemajuan Johore Tenggara Development 
Authority) which encouraged the smallholding sector to engage in more extensive 
cultivation of oil palm.74 FELDA was established in July 1956 to channel funds into 
development of the remoter parts of the country. It has, since 1960, been directly 
responsible for the actual development, ranging from land clearing, planting of main 
crops, development of villages, selection and emplacement of settlers, management of 
projects, provision of credit, processing, marketing service, and facilitating social and 
community development. As the main government agency involved, it represents the 
largest single producer of palm oil in Malaysia. KEJORA is another State land 
development authority which was established in June 1972 in Johor State in order to 
develop 750,000 acres of land as recommended by the Johor Tenggara Master Plan 
which was formulated in line with the main objectives of the NEP. By 1980, a total of 
31,466 acres of land was developed for oil palm plantation. Up to 1985, 55 projects 




                                                          
70 Khera, The Oil Palm, 128-31. 
71 Ibid., 135. 
72 Pletcher, 'Regulation with Growth: The Political-Economy of Palm Oil in Malaysia'. 
73 Hackenberg, 'Urbanization and Migration in Asean Development'. 
74 Anuwar, The Palm Oil Industry, 2. 
75 Hotta and Wang, Fishermen Relocation Programme in Peninsular Malaysia. 
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Table 5. 7. Estates and smallholders in palm oil production in Johor, 1968-1976. 
(thous. acres) 
 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Estates 149.7 169.2 182.9 198.2 222.4 249.5 291.5 318.3 339.7 
Small 
holdings 
30.0 35.5 48.3 52.5 69.8 100.4 131.2 173.6 162.0 
Source: OCTS (1968-1976). 
 
From a comparative perspective, the unbalanced regional distribution of ethnic 
capital and differential effects of governmental policies resulted in dynamic 
connections between the three regions. A primary sector in Singapore did not exist, 
whereas in Johor and the Riau Islands, regional agricultural economy was initiated by 
the expansion of pepper and gambir from the second half of the nineteenth century. 
The development of gambir and pepper plantations in the nineteenth century relied 
more on intensive Chinese work than capital. Very few successful Chinese cultivators 
could normally net an income of about £120 to £160 a year.76 Therefore, the main 
wealth of both Johor and the Riau Islands was not realized until the large influx of 
capital in rubber and palm oil, both of which required large investment. After 
achieving independence, the state of Singapore’s agriculture was still increasingly 
marginalised in terms of high labour inputs, low applications of technology.77 By 
contrast, a considerable diversification took place in post-war Johor as guided by 
government, especially after the implementation of the NEP of Malaysia from 1971. 
It was indicated by the widely cultivated oil palm, which gradually replaced rubber as 
the most important regional agricultural product. By contrast in the Riau Islands, the 
agricultural structure was less diversified, with a continued high dependence on 
rubber. Although other crops, such as copra and pineapple, performed a 
complementary role in all regions, they did not have much to contribute to 
commercial agriculture. 
In terms of capital investment in the primary sector, Chinese, Europeans and 
Malays were represented in all three periods. Chinese and Europeans were in favour 
of cross-regional investment. A large proportion of Chinese planters and European 
estates were Singapore-based but spread their business to Johor and the Riau Islands. 
Determined by the scale of their capital, the regional connections created by 
Europeans through rubber plantation were much stronger than Chinese pepper and 
gambir relationships. By contrast, Malay smallholders tied themselves firmly to the 
land where they stayed. The flourishing of smallholders in the post-war period 
                                                          
76 Selat, 'The Emergence of Commodity Production in a Malay District - Muar, Johor', 326. 
77 Neville, 'Agribusiness in Singapore: A Capital-Intensive Service'. 
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indicated a loosening connection between Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands. 
This was catalyzed by the Malaysian and Indonesian policies of achieving full 
economic independence. In fact, the Malaysian agricultural plantations have 
depended heavily, and still, to a large extent, on foreign capital and entrepreneurship. 
European capital has long dominated the Malaysian agricultural production with a 
considerable degree of vertical integration.78 
 
2. Manufacturing 
The development of the agricultural sector fostered the formation and expansion of 
the manufacturing sector. To fulfil world demand for manufactured exports, many 
processing and supporting industries were set up as a result of backward and forward 
linkages. Different from agriculture’s concentration in Johor and the Riau Islands, 
most factories were established in Singapore, than extended to the producing area of 
these raw materials. This section provides detailed surveys of agricultural industries, 
mining industries, forestry production and individual supporting industries. 
 
Agroprocessing industry 
A common and traditional definition of agroprocessing industry refers to the subset 
of manufacturing that processes raw materials and intermediate products derived 
from the primary sector. 79  Considering the relative importance of different 
agricultural products, main attention is paid to the processing industry of 
commercial agriculture and food production. According to the period of their 




The embryo of regional industries came from the treatment of gambir. Except for its 
traditional use as an ingredient of betel drug, gambir was also processed in the form 
of small cubes or round cakes to meet the demand from Western leather industries, 
resulting in the establishment of tanning, dyeing and brewing industries in Singapore 
in the course of the nineteenth century.80 In 1889, there were 40 dyers and 20 
tannery establishments in the city to process gambir, which was mainly supplied by 
Johor and the Riau Islands. A few other processing industries, for the products such 
as copra, sago and oil, were also set up, but on a smaller scale (Appendix xxxvi). With 
very few exceptions, these factories were privately owned by the Europeans with 
extensive connections with businesses scattered throughout British Malaya and the 
                                                          
78 Khera, The Oil Palm, 20. 
79 FAO, The State of Food and Agriculture, 1984: World Review: The Ten Years since the World 
Food Conference Urbanization, Agriculture and Food Systems. 
80 Colombijn, 'Of Money'. 
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Netherlands Indies.81 The establishment of these industries and the expansion of 
plantations were founded on large labour inputs and hard work rather than skill and 
capital. This resulted in a large increase of immigration and rapid population growth, 
which in turn required the establishment of food production manufacturing, which 
was mainly operated by European firms.  
Very few industries were actually owned by Chinese. In Singapore in 1889, they 
only possessed five food production factories: Chua Lum (rice mill), Low Juan (sago 
factory), Ang Say Beng (sago factory), Wee Bin (sago factory), Wee Guan Ho (sago 
factory). There was also a Ho Ho Biscuit Factory founded by Chew Boon Lay later in 
the 1890s.82 Compared to Europeans, the Chinese capitalists had a disadvantaged 
position in terms of number and size of their firms. Faced with various problems, 
these small-scale Chinese factories were vulnerable to external disturbances. Among 
these Chinese factories, there was only one, Ang Say Beng, which was still in 
operation up to 1907. 
Due to fierce European competition in Singapore, Chinese capitalists invested 
their capital more in Johor and the Riau Islands. Both numbers and scale were much 
smaller than in Singapore. In Johor, the earliest notable enterprise was the Malacca 
Rubber and Tapioca Company, formed in 1898 by a syndicate of the Chinese, Tan 
Chay Yan, who in the same year showed samples of rubber at the Malacca 
Exhibition.83 Some other industries included sago processing and fisheries. In the 
Riau Islands, Chinese capital was found in the agroprocessing industries of lime-kilns, 
sago-rasp and sago-wash. Although the processing industries of copra, sago, rice and 
other food production industries were not comparable to modern and heavy 
industries in terms of capital, technology and output, they still played a 
supplementary role in regional economic development. Up to the 1970s, this pattern 
of early industries was still the same in the Riau Islands, which suggests a limited 
industrial diversification and technical improvement (Appendix xliii). 
 
Modern industries 
In the twentieth century, industrial development was characterized by expansion of 
existing industries and the creation of new enterprises. The emergence of rubber and 
pineapple plantations, especially, required the establishment of rubber processing 
industries and cannery and preservation factories. The rise of these establishments 
formed the foundation of modern agroprocessing. 
 
                                                          
81 SYB (1947). 
82 STDS (1891, 1907). 
83 Drabble, Rubber, 21. 
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Rubber processing 
In connection with the preparation of rubber, the creaming process for concentrating 
latex was worked on a commercial scale.84 In around 1910, the world saw the first 
rubber boom, with the Malay states the chief rubber producer. The rubber industries 
were also worked on a commercial scale on estates in Singapore, financed not only by 
European merchant houses but also by Chinese smallholders supported by their 
chops. 
Later on, they were also established in Johor and the Riau Islands but in limited 
numbers. In 1932, there were two revertex plants and a large central factory using 
centrifugal concentrators working in the state of Johor.85 One of them was the Lee 
Rubber Company, founded by a Singaporean Chinese, Lee Kong Chian. Starting as 
the Lee Smoke House in Muar, Lee Rubber gradually became the largest Chinese 
rubber processing factory in Johor. These Chinese industries in Johor were not only 
involved in planting but also in rubber processing, export and trade. They soon 
diversified into tapioca processing, pineapple canning, small ice factories, aerated 
water plants, engineering workshops, printing works, beer distilleries, brickworks, 
china clay, jelutong, plywood, etc.86 The establishment of these industries was more 
limited in the Riau Islands where in the early 1900s there were only four European 
factories established, including Galang Noembing, Kepala-Djeri and Kelong, which 
employed Javanese contract labour and produced rubber and copra.87  
In Singapore, the rubber (re-milling) industry remained active and important in 
the colonial period, despite unstable prices and various restriction schemes, until the 
1950s when the quantity of wet slab arriving from neighbouring territories was not 
large and the cost of local rubber was relatively high. In 1947, there were eight 
Chinese companies operating 12 milling factories and two European companies 
operating one each which employed a labour force of more than 5,000.88 But many 
millers found it exceedingly difficult to maintain adequate working stocks.89 Up to 
1970, among the total of 1,790 industrial establishments, only 27 were engaged in 
rubber processing with a total of 4612 workers,90 dropping from 5,683 in 1958.91 
However, in Johor and the Riau Islands, especially the latter, rubber processing was 
still the regional pillar industry (Table 5.8). 
 
                                                          
84 JAR (1932), 15. 
85 JAR (1932). 
86 JAR (1933). 
87 MvO: Riouw en onderhorigheden (1908). 
88 SYB (1947), 59. 
89 CSAR (1956), 88. 
90 YSS (1971/1972), 48, 53-4. 
91 MSMDESS (1960), 11-3. 
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Hua Lian Rubber Manufacturers Company Limited 
Revertex limited 
Shum Yip Leong Rubber Works Limited 















1 - 4 1 6 - 
Crumb rubber 4 3 2 - 5 3 
Source: SMD (1966), RdA (1975). 
 
Pineapple canning 
Pineapple canning was another light industry carried out mainly by Chinese estates 
and smallholders because of the low requirements in technology and capital. 
According to an article on the pineapple preserving industry in Singapore in 1908 by 
E. de Kruff, the industry was not favoured by European capitalists, although 
Singapore took the lion’s share of the preserved pineapple export trade. Almost all 
the factories were in Chinese hands. European hesitation in canning was probably 
due to the following reasons: 
1. Speculation in the product. Owing to lack of working capital, the packers 
had to sell their product at once, and could not wait for a more favourable market. At 
the auctions in London and Liverpool, speculators manipulated the price with 
disastrous results to the Chinese preservers, who worked with insufficient capital. 
2. The advance system. By receiving advances in money and in raw materials, 
such as tinplate, the preservers were at the mercy of exporters. 
3. Want of capital. This represents the employment of machinery to secure 
important saving in manual labour.92 
As early as 1902, some Chinese business firms were also engaged in the sale of 
pineapple preserving machines, implying the emergence of the canning industry.93 
The first Chinese cannery in Singapore was initiated by Seah Eu Chin and his son 
Seah Liang Seah under their Chop Chin Choon and Chop Chin Giap. Later, Tan Taw 
Hee built up a flourishing tinned pineapple factory under the Chop Tek Watt. The 
fruit was obtained from Tanjung Pinggi and Pulu Batam, until its cultivation was 
                                                          
92 Song, One Hundred Years' History, 428. 
93 Kim Hoe & Co., see Straits Times, 4 January 1902, Page 3. 
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superseded by rubber.94 In 1906, 16 factories in Singapore produced 707,943 cases95 
of preserved pineapples, which would represent an average daily output of 4,500 tins 
from each factory. In 1936, there were still 13 factories employing more than 15,000 
Chinese labourers.96  
Post-war canning in Singapore was still maintained as a Chinese business. In 
1949, there were three canneries operating in Singapore, producing 189,958 cases of 
canned pineapple, and represented 33 per cent of the total Malayan production.97 In 
1956, the sole Pine-Apple Preserving Company produced a total of 13,715 tons of 
canned pineapple in Singapore, representing an increase of 64.16 per cent over 1955. 
The company used 28,486 tons of small growers’ pineapples (3.75% were grown in 
Singapore, 11% from the Riau Islands, and 85% from the Federation). 
Such Chinese business was also extended to Johor in 1924. The best known was 
the Lee Pineapple Company. It was a landmark in Skudai and passers-by could hear 
the distinct pong of the canning waster as they approached the factory. The Lee 
Pineapple Company is also the only surviving cannery today.98 Post-war canning 
saw more participation of smallholders. In 1947, a committee was set up in Johor to 
discuss the re-organization of the industry.99 There were five estate canneries in 
Johor in the 1970s: the Lee Pineapple Cannery, the United Malayan Pineapple 
Cannery, the Lam Huat Cannery, the Pineapple Cannery of Malaya, Pekan Nenas, 
and the Pineapple Cannery of Malaya, Pulai Sebatang. 100  In a registration of 
smallholdings in Johor by Wee in 1971, 64% of the smallholdings were less than five 
acres, 26% in the five to10 acres groups, 6% in the 10 to 15 acres group, 2% in the 15 
to 20 group, and the remaining 2% over 20 acres.101 The harvested fruits were usually 
transported by bicycle from the collecting point to the roadside, a distance of about 
1.3 miles.102 All the fruits grown by the smallholders were sold to the canneries 
through organizations or individuals authorized by the Malayan Pineapple Industry 
board. There were pineapple marketing cooperatives, farmers associations and 
licensed pineapple dealers. The private dealers or vendors were more popular because 
of their long acquaintance, prompt payment and availability of lorry transports. The 
private dealers (as marketing agents) transported the fruits from the roadside to the 
canneries.  
 
                                                          
94 Song, One Hundred Years' History, 429. 
95 36 tins = 1 case. 
96 CO273/620/14: Labour Disputes in Malaya 
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Palm oil industry 
The first European palm oil industry in Johor, the Elaeis Estate Factory, was set up by 
Tungku Mahkota in August 1929 using hydraulic presses.103 In the following decades, 
the palm oil industry underwent rapid development. In 1933, another two estates lay 
down light railway systems, one of them allowing truck transport direct from factory 
to port. On Ulu Remis estates, the sultan opened a spacious factory fitted with a Stork 
Expression Plant capable of dealing with the output from 8,000 acres of palms.104 
However, the palm oil industry was completely neglected during the period of 
Japanese occupation. It did not recover until the implementation of the government’s 
diversification polices in the 1950s. Under the FELDA and KEJORA systems, many 
smallholders’ palm oil industries were set up in the plantations. One of the joint 
ventures owned by the FELDA in Johor, Johore Bulkers, was established in 1974 with 
12 palm oil producers providing storage and export facilities for palm oil. Other 
important companies included Johor Oil Palm Plantations105, Kamayan Oil Palm106, 
Kahang Palm Oil Mill (KPOM)107, and Kulim (Malaysia).108 In total, 10 palm oil 
mills and one large palm oil bulking installation were planned at a port near Johor 
Bahru by FELDA during the Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975). 109 Such local 
dominance showed that, compared to the colonial period, the capital connection with 
Singapore through Western agency firms had been cut off. 
Lacking oil palm plantations, this type of industry was absent in the Riau Islands. 
Only in the 1980s were some projects planned to introduce the palm oil industry. In 
1982, the Palm Oil Plantation and Processing Plant was expected to be established by 
PMDN (Penanaman Modal Dalam Negeri, domestic investment) in Keritang district 
in Indragiri Hilir.110 
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107 Ibid., 20 September 1984, Page 24. 
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Oil Palm estates in Segmat, Johor 
 
Mining 
Rich mineral deposits formed an asset which, next to commercial agriculture 
attracted much capital. Overseas Chinese had been engaged in small-scale tin mining 
in Malaya since the eighteenth century by using traditional washing methods. The 
arrival of Europeans and their method of dredging – a capital-intensive method – 
improved the productivity of mining. Up to the early twentieth century, European 
production accounted for about two-thirds of Malaya’s output.111 Many of these 
Western mining companies were registered in Singapore. In 1891, there were three 
engaged in mining on the Malay Peninsula: the Jelebu Mining and Trading Company, 
the Mahlembu Mining Company, and the Raub Australian Syndicate. In 1907, the 
total number of mining companies increased to 15, representing a rapid increase of 
European capital investment. The majority of tin ore was transported to Singapore 
for smelting. In 1891, there was one tin smelter located at Pulau Brani, off Singapore. 
The Straits Trading Company’s new smelter at Butterworth in the Federation of 
Malaya treated part of the ore formerly sent to Singapore.112 
Although tin ore was also found in Johor near the Kota Tinggi district on the 
alluvial plain of the Johor River, extending to the slopes of the mountains Panti and 
Mentahak, these mining sites did not attract much European capital. The tin deposit 
in Johor was not as rich as in Pahang, and Johor was a place that European methods 
could not possibly be introduced due to their demand for large capital.113 In the early 
twentieth century, there were only two European mining companies conducting 
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business there: the Royal Johore Tin Mining Company, registered in Singapore, and 
the Tengkil Tin Syndicate, registered in Johor. In 1932, another company, Pelepah 
Tin Dredging Company, was the only dredging technology applied in Johor.  
On the local side, although Malays had been mining tin for centuries, their 
activities were carried out on a smaller scale, and Malays played little part in the new 
mining industry. Some Chinese mining industries were set up here, yielding good 
return by using the labour-intensive hydraulic and gravel pump method.114 These 
Chinese capitalists, however, were completely Singapore-based. The first tin mining 
in Johor was set up by Mr Seah Cheng Joo, younger son of Seah Chiam Yeow. Since 
1915, he had been engaged in tin mining at Mersing with Seah Eng Kiat. Another 
Chinese, Tan Kim Wah, born in Singapore in 1875, went to Johor to try his fortune at 
the tin mines in the early twentieth century. Under prospecting licences, he worked 
both in Johor and Siamese States for a number of years. In 1914, his partner, J. C. 
Robertson, while tracing a footpath at Ulu Jemluang, Johor, came across some rich 
tin land in the Ulu Jemluang Valley. Eventually he secured a mining concession from 
the colonial government. Another Chinese tin mining business, the Hap Liong 
Company formed by Tan Wi Yan, Sim Cheng Mia, J. C. Robertson, and E. Fong Seng, 
Wong Siew Yuen, and the Ulu Jemluang Tin Mines, had both been worked since with 
great success.115 From 1910 onwards, deposits of alluvial tin were worked in the 
neighbourhood of both the Johor and Muar rivers and further deposits were believed 
to exist in the Endau Valley, but up to then no extensive fields had been located 
there.116 In 1920, some reports pointed out the existence of oil and coal, but no 
serious attempts were undertaken to explore these sites.117 The following decade saw 
a decline of the Chinese tin industry as a result of its inability to compete with 
modern technology and equipment.118 Other mining industries worked on a small 
scale. In addition, there were also other industries of clay, gold washing and wolfram 
productions that showed a strong Chinese influence.119 
More extensive mining exploration took place in Johor from the 1920s by the 
Japanese who showed a great interest in the production of iron and bauxite ore.120 
Iron ore mining was initiated by the Japanese Haematite (Iron-Ore) Mine at Bukit 
Medan. In 1932, a new company was set up by Chinese on the Sedili River in this year. 
The 1940s saw more Japanese business: the Sri Medan Mine, Batu Pahat; the Iizuka 
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Mine, Endau. However, the Sri Medan Mine was closed down during the Japanese 
occupation, partly owing to lack of ore resources and also because the machinery was 
required for mining bauxite. Compared to iron, bauxite revenues were much richer 
in Johor. It was also initiated by the Japanese in 1936 at Batu Pahat. In 1938, another 
unit was opened at Kim Kim by a Chinese miner. Another two new mines were 
opened during the Japanese occupation, one in Malacca, and one, the Nangan Mine, 
in southeast Johor. The Nangan near Pengarang was started to exploit several 
deposits covering a large area in this neighbourhood. In 1949, there were 14 bauxite 
ore mines in the state, the majority of which indicated the investment of Japanese 
capital. Development continued in the post-war period. In 1964, there were 53 mines 
in total, producing tin, iron and bauxite. The number increased to 71 in 1965 and 94 
in 1967.121 The largest three were the Ramunia Bauxite (Telok Ramunia)122, the 
Southeast Asia Bauxite (Telok Ramunia), and the Heah Joo Seang Rubber Estates. 
Most of these mines were located in Kota Tinggi, Mersing and Muar. In Kota Tinggi, 
especially production from this district accounted for more than 90 per cent of the 
ores produced in the state. Mining in the colonial period had shown European 
importance, whereas after the 1950s,123 most of these ores were exploited by Asians, 
especially Japanese who had a dominant position in this business in Johor.124 
 
Table 5. 9. Labour force in mining in Johor, 1931-1966. 
 Iron Tin Gold Bauxite China clay Total 
1931 1228 1707 - - - - 
1932 956 871 50 - 5 1882 
1936 2143 2072 32 55 2 4304 
1937 1875 2426 - 209 18 4538 
1938 1597 1847 22 742 - 4208 
1949 - - - 750 - - 
1961 - - - 320 - - 
1966 881 725 60 424 - 2090 
Source: JAR (1931- 1941), ARFM (1949, Department of Geological Survey, Department of 
Mining Industry), ASTSIJB (1963), ABSM (1964, 1968). 
 
The development of the mining industry in Johor is apparent from the labour 
force employed (Table 5.9): the 1930s can be regarded as a golden age of mining in 
Johor. In the Riau Islands, the Chinese population was also engaged in tin mining, 
but most of them were wage-earning labourers rather than capitalists. The large 
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investments in tin mining were from European capital.125 Here, the mining industry 
was operated by the Singkep Tin Maatschappij (Singkep Tin Company) which 
obtained the only concession from the sultan for the mining industry in Singkep 
(1899, eight pits in Dabo and seven pits in Raija). In the early twentieth century, the 
company also extended its business to Karimun and Pulau Kundur to exploit tin.126 
Even though, the volume of tin smelted was insignificant. From July 1904 to June 
1905, the Singkep Tin Company produced 6,007 piculs tin, 632 piculs coming from 
the company in Kedah (Malacca). In the 1920s, explorations were conducted in the 
Riau Islands for tin ore deposits. The spread of tin ores in Bintan and Batam was 
much wider than expected. Various other minerals were also found in the vicinity, 
and also in the Natuna Islands. Production of tin in 1920 amounted to 11,648 Straits 
piculs. Production of tin in 1920 amounted to 11648 Straits piculs and the average 
labour force was 646 men, all Chinese.127 In 1933, the Singkep Tin Company was 
bought up by the Billiton Company, which had engaged in tin exploitation on the 
like-named island since 1860 by virtue of a government concession.128 In the late 
1930s, the Nederlands-Indische Bauxiet Maatschappij (Dutch East India Bauxite 
Company) started exploiting bauxite from its concession in Bintan.129  
The tin ore was first delivered by company ships to Bangka, from where it was 
transhipped to Singapore. Compared with Johor, production from the Riau Islands 
was rather limited. Nevertheless, it did suggest a connection with Singapore and this 
area. Mining was continued in the post-war period. In 1968, the production of 
bauxite from Bintan, entirely mined by state enterprise P.N. Aneka Tambang, 
amounted to 879,323 tons, as compared to 275,000 tons in 1940. Ninety per cent of 
the production was taken over by Japan, who showed growing interest in developing 
bauxite industries in Bintan. In 1972, some Japanese companies, including Sumitomo, 
Nipon Light Metal, and Showa Denka designed an alumina project on Bintan. 
Singkep mine was still in operation, producing around seven per cent of Indonesia’s 
tin concentrate around 1970.130 
 
Forest production 
One regional agricultural production with a non-Western character, but with some 
economic importance, was forestry, locally referred to as panglong industry, a 
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timber-exploitation concern run by Chinese engaged in beam-cutting mills, sawmills, 
firewood mills, and charcoal-burning plants. Panglong enterprises had spread from 
the Riau Archipelago along the east coast of Sumatra and to the small islands off 
North Sumatra Residency and Sumatra’s East Coast Residency, especially on the 
Bintan group and Karimun Island around Singapore as far back as the 
mid-nineteenth century. In the 1890s, many of these islands were deforested after 
three decades of exploitation.131 Nevertheless, in the Riau Islands, both numbers and 
output were still on a significant scale (Table 5.10). 
 
Table 5. 10. Wood industry in Riau Residency in the early twentieth century. 
 Beams Firewood charcoal 
Indragiri  8  
Karimun 3  29 (75 ovens) 
Kateman 16 4  
Tanjung Pinang   95 (182 ovens) 
Lingga 3  64 (118 ovens) 
Bengkalis 65 33 72 (200 ovens) 
Sources: Cartor, The Economic Position, 217-20. 
 
 In Johor, a cursory inspection suggested that the Johor forests were 
exceptionally rich in valuable timber, if they were properly cared for.132 Most timber 
from Johor was exported, while some sawn softwood sawmills were imported from 
adjacent Sumatra (including the Riau Islands). All the timber enterprises were 
founded by Chinese, which shows their close relationship with the Riau Islands. 
These Chinese, like those in the Riau Islands, were also Singapore-based. One of 
them was Lee Keng Liat, who owned businesses both in the Straits Settlements and 
Johor, and who established the only sawmill factory in Muar, the Muar Steam Saw 
Mills. A Western factory also existed temporally, the Johor Steam Saw Mills 
Company, set up by European timber merchants.133 In the Riau-Lingga Archipelago, 
as well as in Ingragiri, Bangka, and Bengkalis, Chinese tauke from Singapore 
exploited the forest, paying export duties on the wood and taxes on charcoal-burning 
facilities and labour.134 
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Map 7. Panglong locations in Riau in 1932. 
 
Source: Erman, ‘Tauke,’ 21. 
 
The timber was not only for local production and consumption, but also for 
charcoal manufacturing and sawmills in Singapore ship-building yards, and 
furniture-factories in Singapore owned by Chinese capitalists.135 After being sawn 
into beams locally, the timber was sent to large sawmills in Singapore by vessels 
either owned or hired by panglong-holders. In Singapore, the timber was sawn into 
planks before being sent to Hong Kong, Mauritius, China, Thailand and the 
Netherlands Indies. In 1889, there were 103 charcoal factories and seven sawmills on 
the island, all owned by Chinese.136 But because of a slump in demand for sawn 
timber and the uneconomic methods of production, there were only 30 sawmills still 
in operation in Singapore in 1947, and several more were expected to close down in 
the same year. 137 Nevertheless, industries engaged in forest product processing 
maintained their important position in the local economy. In 1960, 45 sawmills were 
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in operation, all Chinese-owned, employing Chinese labour and importing timber 
from Indonesia and Malaysia.138 
There is no doubt that the timber was all sent to Singapore instead of being 
processed locally or exported to somewhere else. Most Chinese panglong-holders 
were based on Singapore. These Chinese capitalists with their working capital resided 
in Singapore where they received a licence from the authorities for establishing a 
panglong. Personnel was recruited by panglong-owners in Singapore and sent out to 
the panglongs. Money and provisions were sent out from Singapore, in proportion to 
the amount of timber received. Labour conflicts were not rare, since the tauke’s 
representative in Singapore often seemed far from friendly. It was this system that 
made many panglong-holders ignorant of the wretched conditions prevailing at the 
panglongs. Part of the timber output was sent to sawmills in Johor, creating the only 
significant connection between Johor and the Riau Islands. 
Post-war panglong business in Johor and the Riau Islands did not show much 
change. A survey in 1949 shows that there were 37 sawmills with a total output of 
60,000 cubic tons in Johor in the same year. Another Chinese plywood factory using 
rubber latex glue, the San Chee Seng Company, operated in Kluang. The output and 
labour force of the company were 180 cubic tons and 18 Chinese employees 
respectively.139  
In the Riau Islands, the number of wood enterprises was still at a high level 
(Table 5.11, Table 5.12). If there were some changes, the most important one was a 
certain disconnection between the three regions. Under national economic policies, 
many of the products were nationally oriented and consumed. Another change was 
seen in the organization of the timber industries. Different from small lumber camps 
and sawmills, the late 1960s and early 1970s also saw the beginning of large-scale 
extraction from the 10 large modern joint ventures.140 
 














processing of wood 
4 4 1 3 31 9 
Panglong, charcoal - - - - 58 65 
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Table 5. 12. Number of forest establishments in Riau, 1968-1971. 
 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Panglong -  felling 39 160 189 29 
Concession-request 9 20 38 8 
-recommendation - - 29 33 
-P.A. 3 3 10 10 
-F.A. 1 - 8 10 
-S.K.H.P.K. 3 2 7 9 
Source: RdA (1975). 
 
Supporting industries 
Investment of capital in the services sector reflected forward linkages facilitating the 
export trade.141 In the triangle, this category of industries arose in Singapore, and 
included docking facilities, shipping repair companies, telegraph and gas companies, 
and engineering factories. Together with the development of agriculture and mining, 
these industries were diversified and extended to Johor and the Riau Islands. If 
capital invested in these industries in the colonial period showed a certain 
dependence on Singapore, the post-war development was different and more focused 
on the specific region. 
 
Singapore 
Pioneer European ventures were few in number and type, but underwent rapid 
growth in the following decades as a result of the agricultural expansion. In 1889, 
there were 53 manufacturing plants in Singapore, covering many branches. They 
represented large-scale capital investments and formed the mainstream of industrial 
development. The Singapore Gas Company was founded with a capital of £100,000, 
in 20,000 shares of £25 each, and 13 official staff in 1891. 
The development of these European firms is revealed by the increasing number 
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Table 5. 13. Growth of European manufacturings in Singapore in 1891 and 1907. 
 1891 1907 
Tanjong Pagar Dock 
Company 
70 official staff. 
2 docks, 
1 machine shop,  
1 blacksmiths’ shop, 
3 wharves. 
126 official staff and clerks. 
Departments of wharf, traffic, 
water service, coal, dockyard 
and workshop, engineer, etc. 
The Eastern Extension 
Australasia and China 
Telegraph Company 
57 official staff, 
Offices in Penang, Singapore, 
and Malacca. 
113 official staff. Offices in 




16 official staff. 
19 official staff. Branches in 14 
places in Asia. Local Offices & 
Exchanges – ‘Telephone 
House’ in Johor. 
Source: STDS (1891, 1907). 
 
In general, the development of manufacturing in Singapore was rather limited 
in the colonial period. All factories were in the hands of Westerners. An increasing 
number of companies were registered immediately after the Pacific War, which hints 
at an embryonic industrialization (Appendix xli). Nevertheless, the significant 
development was still confined to processing and engineering industries, especially in 
tin, rubber and oil milling. 142 During the 1950s, there was encouragement to 
diversify from Singapore’s traditional role as an entrepôt. 143  Nevertheless, the 
industrial sector was small, and its productivity was low. Manufacturing in 1960 
accounted for only 11.4 per cent of the GDP; commerce was by far the largest sector, 
with a share of 32 per cent.  
Singapore’s serious attempt at industrialization began in 1961 when the 
Economic Development Board was established. Based on the Malaya market, a policy 
of import substitution was adopted from the start. A great effort was made by the 
government (1) to strengthen and widen the domestic market; (2) to strengthen and 
extend trading links with neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia and with 
countries outside the region; (3) to create conditions and basic facilities favourable 
for industrial growth; and (4) to offer inducements to private enterprises to establish 
and expand industries within the country.144 Yet, this policy was abandoned in late 
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1966145 due to the conflict of interests between Singapore and Malaya and the 
collapse of the common market scheme in 1965 which all made industrialization very 
difficult.146 During the brief period of import substitution, reliance was put on 
private enterprise whose basic decisions were determined on the expectation of a 
common market with the Malay Peninsula. A system of import quotas was 
introduced for a limited number of goods, along with controls on how many 
enterprises could enter a particular field.147 
After the separation from Malaysia in 1965, the Singapore government argued 
that emphasis on heavy industry was a more effective stimulus to increase 
productivity and achieve long-range economic development.148 The new approach 
became official policy in 1967 with the government proclamation of the Export 
Expansion Incentives (Relief from Income Tax) Act, and this was further enhanced 
by the 1968 Employment Act. The import substitution policy was succeeded by a 
strategy of promoting export-oriented, labour-intensive industrialization. At that 
time, the government began its central role in formulating and implementing the 
industrialization programme through the Economic Development Board. Foreign 
direct investment (FDI) was encouraged to help Singapore penetrate export markets 
and to bring in advanced technology (Appendix xl). Capital, especially from the USA, 
Britain, the Netherlands and Japan, contributed to the mushrooming of a large 
number of firms involved in the new ‘secondary industries’ producing manufactured 
goods for the markets of neighbouring countries.149 
These changes were reflected in the industrial structure (Appendix xxxviii, 
Appendix xxxix). High-growth industries in this period were textiles and electronics. 
The combination of spinning, weaving, knitting and finishing recorded a 63 per cent 
of the total growth in the period 1962-1972.150 The petroleum industry also held a 
leading position. Historically, Singapore was a major storage and distribution centre 
for oil products from the oilfields in Sumatra and Burma, accounting for between 10 
and 15 per cent of the trade of pre-war Malaya.151 Singapore's role as an oil-refining 
centre began in 1961, when Royal Dutch Shell opened the country's first refinery on 
the island of Pulau Bukom. Singapore's geographical location and the worldwide 
trend among international oil companies to locate refineries near rapidly growing 
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markets were major reasons to invest in oil refining during this period.152 Two 
installations were constructed on the islands of Pulau Bukom and Pulau Sebarok 
serving as bulk terminals for the refineries in Indonesia and Sarawak. These two 
‘ocean’ installations stored and blended refined oil products for transhipment 
elsewhere and ship bunkers. They also fed the bulk storage installations on the Pulau 
Bukom and a large proportion of Federation installations, owned by Shell and the 
Standard-Vacuum Oil Companies respectively. 153 From the late 1960s onwards, 
output in petroleum manufacturing accounted for the largest share of total output, 
although its growth rate was much less than that of textiles and electronics, and also 
slightly exceeded by shipbuilding and ship repairing.154 
In short, during the first two decades after the war, staying in the Federation 
and sharing a common Malayan market made it possible for Singapore to maintain 
already existing bilateral economic connections with Malaysia, but industrialization 
provided difficult to pursue. The manufacturing sector's success was largely a 
function of Singapore's ability to attract foreign investment through a favourable 
business climate providing investors with an educated, trained and disciplined labour 
force. This was realized by the adoption of an export-orientation policy in the late 
1960s. In this process, domestic enterprises played a lesser role than foreign capital, 
as evidenced by Singapore’s enlarged capital network and a deeper integration into 
the world market. Nevertheless, the small industries established by them still played 
an important role in providing employment for local labour.155 
 
Johor 
Limited industries were also set up in Johor, where the Chinese played a considerable 
part. The bulk of local manufacturing (soap, motor tyres, rubber footwear, pineapple 
canning) was in Chinese hands. Steadily through the years, the Chinese became the 
leading economic factor, at first as labourers, followed in more recent times by 
ownership and direction of industry and to an important extent also in financing 
trading operations.156 At the same time, the prosperity of plantation and mining 
industries generated large profits known as the ‘export surplus,’ which caused the 
Johor and colonial governments to attract capital back to the state. On the advice of 
D. G. Campbell, General Advisor to the Johor government in 1911, it was decided to 
greatly develop Johor’s road and rail system in order to render vast areas of fertile 
land accessible and convenient for Singapore. Favourable terms would ensure that 
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much Singapore capital which hitherto had been sent further afield, would come to 
Johor. The slight progress made in the codification and publication of the laws in 
English had done much to establish the confidence of foreign capitalists.157 Generally, 
before 1957, when Malaysia became independent, adherence by the British colonial 
government to the ‘vent for surplus’ export policy hindered the development of an 
industrial sector in the country. This was also the case in Johor.158 
After independence, industrialization came to be regarded as the means of 
generating productive employment and diversifying the economy. In 1957, the 
Malaysian government inaugurated a development policy to accelerate the process 
and pace of industrialization. Import substitution was the adopted strategy to achieve 
these objectives.159 The production of primary activities created backward linkages, 
resulting in the production of parts and machinery for mining and processing, as well 
as small-scale service industries, which were all strengthened by a rapid growth of 
manufacturing production in the 1960s.160 Nevertheless, the specialization of these 
manufacturers did not show much change compared to the situation in the colonial 
period. In spite of some battery, electronics, motorcycle, car and engineering 
manufacturers, the rest was dominated by food, beverages, textiles and biscuits. 
Although local firms had gained manufacturing experience during the colonial era, 
the government failed to nurture this entrepreneurial capacity and its policies 
undermined these enterprises.161 Non-Malay companies maintained a prominent 
presence in the economy and the owners of these enterprises were still not locally 
based, but came from Singapore and Britain.162  
Under the NEP from 1971, emphasis was placed on increasing economic 
opportunities for Malays. It sanctioned increased participation or interference by the 
state in the economy.163 In order to accommodate the large inflow of FDI and new 
firms, seven EPZs (Export Processing Zones) were set up between 1972 and 1974 in 
Penang, Selangor, and Malacca. Many of these industrial estates and firms produced 
electrical machinery (electrical and electronic components) and textiles. The surge in 
FDI was short-lived. Between 1974 and 1975, approved investment fell by nearly 62 
per cent. During 1974 and 1982, only two new EPZs were created, including Pasir 
Gudang/Johor Port Authority in Johor. It was hoped that the ‘anticipated industrial 
restructuring in Singapore would channel export-oriented, labour-intensive firms 
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into Johor’s industrial areas.’ 164  In this process, the Malaysian Industrial 
Development Finance (MIDF), established in 1960 played a key role. One of its 
subsidiaries, the Malaysian Industrial Estates (MIE), constructed many factories units 
in Johor.165 
Nevertheless, supporting industries in Johor in the post-war period were still 
undeveloped. Although manufacturing today accounts for only about eight per cent 
of the gross national product, and for approximately seven per cent of the total 
employment, key economic indicators point to an impressive upswing over the past 
years.166 According to Table 5.14, post-war industrial expansion still achieved some 
progress during the early period. The increasing number of established firms after 
1970 was another good sign of the future. 
 
Table 5. 14. Year of establishment of industrial firms registered in Johor, pre-1960 to 1982. 
 Number Percentage 
Before 1960 10 12.2 
1960-1964  7  8.5 
1965-1969 18  22 
After 1970 47 57.3 
Source: Othman et al., Johore Port, 226. 
 
The Riau Islands 
By the beginning of the twentieth century it could be said that the whole Indonesian 
archipelago had been put under effective Dutch control, offering a favourable 
environment for the operation of a full-fledged and lucrative colonial economy with 
an infrastructure required to facilitate production and exports of primary 
commodities.167 In addition, limited direct capital transfers took place, not to finance 
expansions, but to keep the export industries viable.168 It is likely that supporting 
industries were rather lacking in the Riau Islands. These limited industries, did not 
lay the basis for sustained economic growth and successful transformation into a 
more diversified economy. The expansion of primary exports during this period was 
generally initiated and undertaken by Dutch and other Western enterprises, in which 
the Indonesian population only participated as unskilled workers. It was therefore not 
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surprising that at independence in 1945, there was a widespread desire on the part of 
the Indonesian people to ‘convert the colonial economy into a national economy.’169 
Although Sukarno on 1 July 1947 announced that all nations would be allowed 
to invest in Indonesia, including Dutch firms,170 the unstable political environment 
and inconsistent government polices scared away foreign capital. Limited industries 
were set up in the post-war period by inexperienced local people and capital. Only 
from the 1970s onwards was there a sign of industrial development in the Riau 
Islands. This was done the through the Badan Otorita Batam (BOB, Industrial 
Development Authority Batam Island) with the support of the Indonesia’s favourable 
policy and Singapore’s capital in 1973. The island became a support base for the state 
oil company in 1969 and in 1974 it became Indonesia’s only Free Trade Zone (FTZ) 
under BOB.171 With the advantage of a favourable investment regime and cheap 
labour, it attracted investors from Singapore and gave encouragement to the 
multinational manufacturing of export goods. 172  Under these conditions, an 
increasing number of foreign workers were recruited, showing certain integration 
with the outside world (Appendix xlvii). 
Nevertheless, existing companies were still rather small in terms of capital and 
personnel. The slow development is indicated by the usage of machinery which was 
mostly applied in the processing industries and shipbuilding. For instance, in the 
early 1970s, of the total 61 wooden boat-building businesses in Riau, only eight of 
them used machinery. Only one of the eight was located in Tanjung Pinang, the Riau 
Islands, using just two machines: 60hp. and 10hp. respectively.173 Many of these 
industries were still small-scale as indicated by the number and capacity of power 
equipment they used, and workers they employed. It is clear that medium-sized 
factories had a dominant position (Appendix xliv, Appendix xlv). The higher 
percentage of small factories in Riau, when compared to Indonesia in general, shows 
a slower development of manufacturing in these islands. Generally, factories in the 
Riau Islands in the post-war period were faced with a shortage of capital. Some of 
them submitted an application of bank credit. However, very few of them were 
successful.174  
To sum up, it has been argued that there was a limited development of 
manufacturing sector during the colonial period due to the policy of economic drain. 
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However, there was still a significant development of manufacturing in Singapore, 
more than in Johor and the Riau Islands. In the colonial period, these industries were 
limited in type and scale. Many of them were a direct outcome of the establishment of 
backward and forward linkages. Processing industries were based on raw materials 
from the adjacent area, especially Johor and the Riau Islands, which, in turn, 
imported many of the products from food production factories in Singapore. This 
shows the close contacts within the triangle. These intensified industrial linkages 
were also indicated by the registration of companies in Singapore (Figure 5.3). 
 
Figure 5. 3. Cumulative number of local and foreign firms registered in Singapore, 1925-1949. 
 
Source: Appendix xlii. 
 
Post-war manufacturing saw some individual developments in the three regions 
but also continuity with the colonial period. Significant industrialization did not take 
place until the implementation of governments’ policies in the late 1960s to stimulate 
entry by foreign investment and establishment of capital-intensive manufacturing. 
Nevertheless, the manufacturing sectors in Singapore and Johor were more 
developed and diversified than in the Riau Islands. The rise of export-oriented 
industry in Singapore shows Singapore’s lesser dependence on the raw materials from 
adjacent areas, resulting in loosening connections between the three regions. 
In Indonesia, during Sukarno’s ‘Guided Democracy’ from 1957 onwards, the 
exploitation of Indonesia’s natural resources was largely left to state-owned 
enterprises. 175  Since government enterprises during Guided Democracy were 
concentrated in Java, manufacturing development in the Riau Islands did not achieve 
much progress. This feature only began to change from the 1970s, when under the 
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New Order government much greater reliance was placed on private enterprises and 
foreign companies to exploit natural resources. 
With regard to capitalists, Europeans held a leading position in manufacturing 
development in the colonial period in Singapore. Their dominance, however, met 
with great competition from the Chinese in Johor and the Riau Islands, whereas 
Malays, especially Malay smallholders, gradually gained more importance after the 
war. Another group, the Japanese, also played an important part, particularly in 
mining in Johor and machinery manufactures in the Riau Islands. The intensive 
business activities of Westerners and Chinese indicate strong connections both 
outward and internally, while the Malay dominance in the post-war period was more 
internally-oriented. 
 
3. Financial Services 
The service sector primarily consists of various departments including truck 
transportation, messenger services and warehousing; information sector services; 
financial investment services; rental and leasing services, scientific and technical 
services; administrative and support services; arts, entertainment and recreation 
services, etc. During the period under study, most of these services did not gain much 
significance. Only financial services obtained limited development but with a great 
impact on the entire region. This section hence focuses on the development of 
regional banking and insurance services. It begins with a survey of regional currency 
which serves as the foundation of regional financial service. 
 
Currency176 
As early as the 1840s, Singapore was already a prosperous financial centre and the 
European and Chinese merchants there were beginning to look to the peninsula as a 
field for investing their trading profits.177 Before going into the details of these 
investments, it is necessary to look at one important premise: currency. Currency 
policy was the exclusive domain of the government and not part of commercial 
services. Yet it was crucial in creatig an environment conducive to investment of 
capital. 
For much of the nineteenth century, Spanish and Mexican dollars were the 
major currencies used for business in the Straits Settlements. In addition, various 
dollar strikes including the USA and Hong Kong dollars, also serves as legal tender in 
the second half of the nineteenth century. This remained in force until 1904 when the 
Straits dollar became the sole legal tender in the Straits Settlements. It was divided 
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into 100 cents. In 1906, it was pegged at a fixed price at 2 shillings 4 pence sterling. 
The Straits dollar was also used in both the FMS and UMS (Unfederated Malay 
States).178 In 1939, it was officially replaced by the Malayan dollar which was issued 
by a Board of Commissioners of Currency established under an agreement signed in 
1938 by the governments of the Straits Settlements and the Malay States.179 During 
the Japanese occupation, the Japanese government-issue dollar replaced the Malayan 
dollar as legal tender. After war, the Malayan dollar was restored, but it was quickly 
replaced by the Malaya and British Borneo dollar in 1953, used until 1965 when 
Singapore achieved independence from Malaysia. The Singapore dollar and Malaysia 
dollar then became legal tender in Singapore and Malaysia respectively, both at a rate 
of S$60 = £7 until the early 1970s.  
In the Netherlands Indies, the monetary system was in a state of great chaos and 
confusion until the introduction in 1817 of the Netherlands Indies guilder (NIG) 
with the same intrinsic value as the Dutch guilder. In the following decade, the NIG 
experienced a serious depreciation. In 1877, the Netherlands Indies also introduced 
the gold standard, but the exchange rate of the NIG to other currencies still fluctuated 
dramatically.180 At the same time, other currencies and copper coins were also 
universally used throughout the colony. This was especially so in the Riau Islands, 
not only because of its peripheral position in the Netherlands Indies, but also because 
of its close connection to Singapore. The dependence of regional trade and shipping 
on Singapore brought no problem for the circulation and payment of dollars.181 
Moreover, these Singapore dollars with fixed value had more advantage than the 
unstable NIG. The regional Dutch colonial currency had been replaced by the Straits 
dollar when introduced in the early nineteenth century. The exchange rate was set up 
at S$100 = f.1425. The conversion rate was quite high, and rose fast in the following 
years. In the Riau Islands, for those who were paid by the government in NIGs, this 
was a disadvantage. As a result, the local currency gradually disappeared and the 
Straits dollar widely circulated.182 The prevalence of the Straits dollar thus became an 
obstruction for regional trade and resulted in the Riau Islands’ economic dependency 
on Singapore. The Dutch colonial government took some measures to restrict the 
circulation of Straits dollars in the early twentieth century. In the Riau Islands, the 
Straits dollar was officially replaced by the NIG in 1909.183 However, the continuous 
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depreciation of the NIG184 still encouraged the unofficial circulation of the Straits 
dollar. 
During the Japanese occupation, the military government brought a 
replacement currency, the gulden (Japanese dollar) to Indonesia. Nevertheless, under 
the Japanese administration and the economic influence of Malaya, the ‘Japanese 
dollar’ was used more widely. The same pattern also applied in the late 1940s when 
Indonesia’s own currency was not recognized by the international market. Therefore, 
the Malaysian currency was more used here. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Straits 
dollar of British Malaya was the principal currency. Even when the Indonesian rupiah 
became legal tender, the Riau rupiah was used as a distinct currency in the Riau 
Islands in 1963 and 1964 due to restrictions and instability of the rupiah in the first 
two decades after independence. 
Although the Riau Islands were geographically and politically separated from 
the Malay Peninsula, the regional cross-border monetary system showed many 
internal connections which facilitated the flow of capital invested by Europeans, 
Chinese, and Malay capitalists. The great influence of Singaporean Chinese, in these 
regions is shown by the fact that almost all the bookkeeping used Singapore dollars as 
its currency. The tax regulations often strike difficulties in preventing profits from 
flowing overseas because the administration is entirely or partly based in 
Singapore.185 
 
Banking and insurance companies 
The expansion of the regional export economy was accompanied by the emergence of 
European banks which were engaged in the financing and promoting of trade and 
shipping between Pan-Malaya and the metropolitan countries.186 The pioneer of the 
banking business was the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China (informally, 
the Chartered Bank), which opened its Singapore branch in 1859, only six years after 
its incorporation. However, the establishment of banks opened in Singapore in the 
nineteenth century was still quite limited and characterized by two facts: (1) a 
complete dominance by European capital and (2) difficult operations due to the 
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Table 5. 15. Early establishment of banks in Singapore in 1891 and 1907. 
1891 
Chartered Bank of India, Australia and 
China 
31 clerks, 18 agencies and branches, paid 
capital: £800,000, reserve fund: £250,000 
Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, 
London and China 
27 clerks, 15 agencies, 13 branches, paid-up 
capital: £750,000, with power to increase to 
£1,500,000, paid-up capital: £250,000 
HSBC (Hong Kong and Shanghai 
Banking Corporation) 
36 clerks, 8 agencies, 23 branches, paid-up 
capital: $10,000,000, reserve fund: $5,482,127 
New Oriental Bank Corporation, 
Limited 
19 clerks, 5 agencies 
1907 
Banque de L’Indo-Chine - 
Chartered Bank of India, Australia and 
China 
51 clerks, 27 agencies and branches, paid 
capital: £800,000, reserve fund: £975,000 
International Banking Corporation 16 branches, capital: gold $3,250,000 
Deutsch-Asiatische Bank - 
HSBC 
49 clerks, 4 agencies, 27 branches, paid-up 
capital: $10,000,000, reserve fund: $21,000,000 
Mercantile Bank of India, Ltd. 
32 clerks, 18 agencies and branches, authorized 
capital: £1,500,000, subscribed capital: 





40 clerks, 18 agencies, 19 branches, capital: 
f.45,000,000 (£3,750,000), reserve fund: 
f.5,000,000 (£417,000) 
Nederlandsch Indische Handels Bank 13 clerks, 8 branches 
Russo-Chinese Bank - 
Source: STDS (1891, 1907). 
 
In the early twentieth century, long-established banks kept expanding and new 
banks mushroomed in the tiny island of Singapore as a result of rapid Western 
capital penetration in this area (Table 5.15). The flourishing of rubber estates 
particularly stimulated the development of the banking system, which gradually 
replaced the private companies in providing support in the form of financial loans to 
the estates.187 As the Malayan estates kept growing, so branches of these banks were 
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established across the peninsula. The Chartered Bank was first European bank to 
establish agencies in the Malay states, in Taiping in Perak and Kuala Lumpur in 
Selangor in 1888. Yet, these banks did not give short-term loans to planters.188 Later 
on, banks opened up in Johor to fulfil demand from the rubber estates. Nevertheless, 
European banking activities were still limited. By 1949, there was only one Western 
bank in Johor – the HSBC, which had branches in Johor Bahru and Muar.189 
Mainly on the basis of the tin and rubber industries, many Chinese capitalists 
also showed an interest in banking. This originated from their pawnshops which 
provided money loans to smallholders, following in the step of the Europeans. The 
Kwong Yik Bank was established in 1903, being the first banking institution in 
Singapore run by the Chinese.190 In the 1910s, more Chinese banks were set up, 
including the Chinese Commercial Bank Ltd. (in 1912), the Ho Hong Bank (in 1917), 
and the Oversea-Chinese Bank (OCB, in 1919). Different from the European banks’ 
outward orientation, the Chinese banks focused more on regional business. They 
were reluctant to engage in the finance of estates, confining themselves to making 
short-term advances secured against stocks of rubber.191 One of the promoters of the 
Kwong Yik Bank, its founder Wong Ah Fook, left Hong Kong in 1851 at the age of 16. 
After a few years, he became one of the most successful contractors in Johor. Then he 
turned his attention to the state, and devoted all his energies to help open the country, 
and many of the buildings both in town and country were built by him.192 The Ho 
Hong Bank was also the main financial supporter of rubber and tapioca estates in 
Johor. When auctioned in 1922, it was the owner of several estates in Johor: Eng Tech 
San Rubber and Tapioca Estates (985 acres), Gowthia Rubber Estates, Pasir Gudang 
(978 acres). In 1932, the three above-mentioned Chinese banks merged to found the 
Oversea-Chinese Bank Corporation (OCBC) after the economic depression in the 
late 1930s. It became the largest Chinese bank in Singapore, with branches in Johor 
Bahru, Muar and Segamat. There were also some smaller Chinese banks set up in 
Johor. The Batu Pahat Bank was a small bank operating in Batu Pahat, on Johor’s 
west coast, in 1920. After subsequent reorganization, it became the Pacific Bank and 
was incorporated by the OCBC in 1963, becoming a subsidiary of the OCBC. 
Banks established by other ethnic groups also mushroomed from the 1920s. 
There were local Indian banks in response to the Indians who were active in textile 
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distribution, the import business and money lending.193 Two Japanese banks were 
active in the inter-war period, the Bank of Taiwan and the Yokohama Specie Bank.194 
There is some hesitation about mentioning banks in the Riau Islands, because there 
were no serious banking activities in the colonial period. Although both the NHM 
and De Javasche Bank (DJB) played an essential role in conducting financial activities 
in Indonesia, none of their branches were located in the Riau Islands.195 Because of 
limited money supply in the Netherlands Indies, there was little incentive for 
commercial banks and international banks to establish their branches there. 196 
Except for a small part of mainland Sumatra, mainly Medan,197 most of the money 
supply relied on Singapore, where both the NHM and DJB had opened branches.198 
Other funding was arranged by large private enterprises, for instance the BPM when 
constructing and operating the distribution centre of Pulau Sambu. There were also a 
few Chinese operating their pawnshops but with very little importance. Sometimes, 
chops and other types of firm also played a similar role as banks for providing credit, 
loans, remittances, etc. Probably this was the only bank connection between 
Singapore and the Riau Islands because small Chinese capitalists in the Riau Islands 
owned properties in Singapore. This capital link kept changing in the post-war 
period. 
Accompanying by the growth of the banking system was the rise of insurance 
companies. In 1891, around five insurance companies were operating in Singapore. It 
increased to 14 after 16 years. Similarly, Chinese capital was rather difficult to find 
(Appendix XXXVII). 
Several decades later, during the Japanese occupation, all these financial 
institutions suffered great losses. They were either closed or taken over by the 
Japanese. After the war, they were faced with the task of reestablishment, 
reconstruction and rehabilitation. In 1947, a total of 18 banks were conducting their 
business in Singapore: 10 foreign and eight Chinese. Among them, two local banks 
were newly opened in that year by the Chinese: the Overseas Union Bank and the 
Chung Kiahw Bank. There were also another two Chinese banks established later: the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank (in 1953), and the Bank of Singapore (in 1954). An 
increasing number of new foreign banks also came to the island, such as the 
Algemene Bank Nederland and Bank of America. Some Malaysian banks also 
appeared: the Malayan Banking and United Malayan Banking Corporation. 
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This was also the time for the establishment of Malay banks. Nevertheless, 
successful Malayan banking operations only began after the establishment of Bank 
Bumiputra in 1966 by the Malaysian government.199 Previous networks had been 
destroyed, especially during the period of conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia, 
when many branches were closed. Post-war financial connections within the triangle 
left no room for the Riau Islands. Independence gave a further impetus to the growth 
of local banking in both Singapore and Malaysia (Table 5.16). Among them, the 
United Malayan Banking Corporation had already set up its branches in various 
places in Johor: Johor Bahru, Muar, Segmat, Batu Pahat, Yong Peng in 1966. The 
difference is that, in Singapore, these banks were mainly incorporated by ethnic 
Chinese, whereas in Malaysia, the Malaysian government provided widespread 
banking services to the Malays and aroused their interest in banking business and 
management.200 
 




Local Foreign Total 
Singapore  94  78  55 133   - 
Johor  24  25   2  27  32 
Total Malaya and 
Singapore 
275 260 150 410 343 
Source: Lee Sheng-Yi, The Monetary and Banking Development, 157, table 7.7. 
 
Therefore, financial developments in the triangle were unbalanced with a strong 
financial centre at Singapore and financial development in the other two lagging 
behind, especially in the Riau Islands. Banks in Singapore were mainly operated by 
Europeans and Chinese both in the colonial period and the post-war era. 
Nevertheless, the distinction between them was clear. The large scale of European 
banks resulted in a focus on creating an international network which connected 
Singapore to the global economy, whereas the Chinese banks connected Singapore 
with Johor and the Riau Islands through their financing of smallholders. Chinese 
banks usually relied for credits on Europeans, which shows close connections 
between these two ethnic groups. This pattern was characteristic of the situation in 
the colonial period. After achieving independence, guided by individual government 
policies, a differentiation took place. Financial development in Singapore became 
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more outward-oriented than before. By contrast, in Johor and the Riau Islands, 
although there was encouragement for local Malays to participate in banking, 
financial services remained underdeveloped. Post-war financial connections within 
the triangle were different from those of the colonial period. 
 
4. Overall pattern of regional capital investment 
This chapter focuses on the development of three economic sectors represented by 
agriculture, manufacturing and financial services, which opened up an era of 
spectacular prosperity for this region. In the colonial period, the lack of a primary 
sector forced the development of manufacturing and finance in Singapore to a 
considerable degree based on the expansion of commercial agriculture in adjacent 
areas, such as Johor and the Riau Islands. After achieving independence, these two 
sectors in Singapore kept expanding, but the development was based on import 
substitution policies and incoming FDI. In Johor and the Riau Islands, commercial 
agriculture formed the mainstay of the regional economy, whereas the manufacturing 
and finance did not gain much significance until the 1970s.  
Generally, all ethnic groups participated in the formation of regional economies 
Western capitalists dominated international enterprises, whereas the Chinese capital 
concentrated on regional production and transportation. Judged by their economic 
significance, the Europeans, Chinese and Japanese played a more important role in 
the colonial period, whereas local people gained more importance in the post-war 
period. Determined by the character of these ethnic groups, the regional economic 
connections showed certain dynamics. The Europeans and Japanese were regarded as 
international factors connecting this region to the international market. Therefore, 
during their heyday in the first half of the twentieth century, the outward connections 
of this area were very strong, not only through Singapore, but also to some extent 
through Johor and the Riau Islands themselves. The Chinese, on the other hand, 
engaged more in the creation and maintaining of a regional network. Based on 
Singapore, many of them set up plantations, industries and small banks both in Johor 
and the Riau Islands. Thus, the colonial period was characterized by both strong 
international and strong regional connections.  
Sources about capital investment of Singapore in Johor after the Pacific War are 
scarce. Still, it is possible to show that capital linkages between Singapore and Johor 
were weaker than before. The difference is partially the result of a difference between 
domestic investment in the colonial period and foreign investment in the 
post-colonial period, which may be ascribed to the difference in political regime, and 
government policies towards industrialization in the post-war period. Singapore 
relied more on foreign inputs, while Johor and the Riau Islands gave preference to 
Malays. In Singapore, European and Chinese took economic initiatives that 
guaranteed growing international connections with the world market. By contrast, 
these outward connections were weaker in Johor and the Riau Islands, although 
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Japanese investment on a limited scale was observed. With regard to internal 
connections within the triangle, they were rather loose compared to the previous 
period. Priority was given to local Malays, both in Johor and the Riau Islands. The 
indigenous had considerable political influence, but lacked a solid capitalist 
foundation, business culture, and skills. It was a weak bourgeoisie.201 
Based on Porter’s Diamond Model, the factor of related and supporting 
industries is discussed in this chapter. Assignments after standardization are shown 
by Table 5.17. 
 
Table 5. 17. Standardized assignments of related industries in Singapore, Johor and Riau 














S J R S J R S J R S J R 
Agroproessing 1.2 0.8 0.4 2.4 1.6 1.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 3.2 4 2.4 
Forestry industry 0.4 0.8 0.8 1.2 2 1.6 0.4 0.8 0.8 2 4 3.2 
Supporting industry 0.8 0.4 0.4 2.4 1.2 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.4 4 2.4 1.6 
Banks 0.8 0.4 0.4 2.4 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 4 2 0.8 
Insurance 
companies 
0.8 0.4 0.4 2 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 3.2 1.2 0.8 
Mean value 0.8 0.6 0.5 2.1 1.3 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.5 3.3 2.7 1.8 
 
5. Overview of individual performance 
The development of trade, shipping and capital investment in this region displayed a 
dynamic process during the period under discussion. Based on political change, a 
periodization was devised to examine the economic performance of the three regions 
in the areas of political and ethnic relations, and the role of different ethnic groups in 
conducting regional economy.  
The socio-political aspect is to reveal the environment of economic 
development in the three regions. Regaring political relationships within the triangle, 
according to political transformation and mutual relationships between the 
governments, these relationships showed distinct patterns. During the colonial 
period from 1870 to 1942, the political relationship of the three regions was reflected 
by the relations between two colonial governments: the British and the Dutch. In 
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general, the Anglo-Dutch relationship in the east showed a competitive pattern. 
Although the kinship between two existing Malays kingdoms – Riau-Lingga 
Sultanate and Johor State – created another connection in the political sense, this 
relationship was rather unimportant due to the weakness of Malay authority. During 
the short period of Japanese occupation, the Japanese military administration 
indicated a ‘unified’ political relationship between Singapore, Johor and the Riau 
Islands, but such ‘unification’ was unstable and temporary. The post-war political 
relationship between the three regions was characterized as a rivalry attributed to 
rising nationalism, the separation of Singapore from the Federation of Malaysia in 
1965 and the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation between 1963 and 1966. The 
relationship later improved, especially after the establishment of ASEAN in 1967. 
Regarding socio-ethnic relationships in such a multi-ethnic region, social 
structure and ethnic relationship have a direct impact on regional economic 
development. In the period of early imperialism, both the Europeans and Malay 
nobles possessed political advantage, whereas the Chinese played a more important 
role in regional agricultural plantation, trade and shipping. Their complementary 
importance resulted in a cooperative relationship between them. In the early 
twentieth century, Malay rulers faded out due to aggressive European penetration, 
facilitating European expansion in the economy. Therefore, the Chinese-European 
relationship was both cooperative and competitive. At the same time, Chinese were 
also used by the Europeans to keep balance between the British and Dutch, another 
sign of ‘reciprocity’. There was also a growing importance of Japanese capital and 
capitalists engaged in rubber plantations and mining in Johor. The regional 
socio-ethnic relationship during the Japanese occupation was full of tension, 
especially between the Japanese and the Europeans. The Japanese needed the Chinese 
to maintain existing connections. A regional deviation took place in the post-war 
period. In Singapore, the Europeans, the Chinese and Japanese continued to be 
economically important, whereas in Johor and the Riau Islands, preference was given 
to the Malays. This resulted in full participation of all ethnic groups in Singapore but 
a rivalry between Chinese and Malays in Johor and the Riau Islands. In general, there 
was a clear dichotomy as indicated by Europeans and Japanese in external 
connections and the Chinese in internal connections. This dichotomy was not static. 
There was a European expansion into internal connections and the Japanese gained a 
growing importance in external connections. Although post-war policies were more 
in favour of Malays, the Chinese still played a key role in defiance of government 
policies, especially in the Riau Islands. 
In order to make good comparison of the individual growth of population, trade, 
shipping and capital investment, we have to standardize the quantitative numbers of 
growth rate per annum: <1.5% – VL (Very Low); 1.5-3% – L (Low); 3-5% – H 
(High); >5% – VH (Very High). 
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Both in Singapore and Johor, population growth rates per annum were higher 
in the colonial period (above 2.9%) than after achieving impendence (ca. 2.4%), 
whereas in the Riau Islands, an accelerated process was shown throughout the 
research period, increasing steadily from 1% to 3%. There was also regional 
differences in the sense that population growth rates were far higher in Singapore and 
Johor than in the Riau Islands. 
Different from population growth, trade expansion in the three regions followed 
separate paths. Both in Singapore and Johor, a high growth rate per annum was 
achieved (3.3% and 3.7% respectively) in the period of early imperialism. But a 
deviation took place during the period 1910-1940. The growth rate per annum was 
high (3.1%) in Singapore, but very high (7%) in Johor, suffering no negative influence 
from the world market. Recovery took place immediately in Singapore after the 
Pacific War with a record growth rate of 7.8% per annum, whereas in Johor, the 
growth rate was below pre-war levels, at only 5%. The Riau Islands told another story. 
Trade development started from a very low level with an average growth rate of 1.3% 
per annum during the period 1870-1910. In the following decades, the path of the 
Riau Islands’ trade expansion was similar to that of Johor, but at lower growth rates: 
very high (6%) during the late colonial period and low from the 1950s. 
Regarding shipping development, in general, the three regions followed a 
trajectory similar to that of trade expansion but at higher growth rates per annum. In 
Singapore, the average growth rates of number of vessels per annum in the three 
classified periods of early imperialism, high colonialism and independence are 
estimated at 4.9%, 0.4% and 4.6% respectively, but in terms of total tonnage, they are 
recorded at 6.2%, 2.4% and 6.8%. This differentiation is also applied to Johor and the 
Riau Islands. This is because shipping development is assessed by total tonnage 
rather than numbers of ships. The higher growth rate is consequently amplified by 
technological progress. In general, shipping development in Johor and the Riau 
Islands lagged behind Singapore with the only exception in the period of high 
colonialism, when a very high growth rate was achieved in both Johor and the Riau 
Islands. 
The growth rate of capital investment is difficult to standardize in the three 
regions, so we have to take into consideration all three sectors of the economy. 
Nevertheless, the spatio-temporal differences are suggested by the registration of 
companies. There is no doubt that capital- and technology-intensive and financial 
industries gained importance above labour-intensive and traditional agricultural 
production. From this point of view, capital investment started at a low level in 
Singapore but very low in Johor and the Riau Islands. In the following decades, the 
process was accelerated in all three regions, particularly in Singapore. The gap 
between them can be understood as differences in industrialization, transformation 
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of the industrial structure, and utilization of FDI, especially after independence. 
Therefore, we consider the capital investment in the three regions as follows: very 
high in Singapore, high in Johor, low in the Riau Islands. 
To sum up, during the war and revolutionary period both economic 
development and population growth suffered serious decline, whereas in the periods 
of high colonialism and immediately after independence the performance was far 
more successful. Nevertheless, economic progress in the two periods had different 
reasons. During the first half of twentieth century, it was characterized by 
participation by non-Malay ethnic groups, especially Europeans and Chinese. They 
maintained their importance in post-war Singapore, but lost their economic 
predominance in Johor and the Riau Islands, where, instead, Malays gained more 
economic authority. 
 
6. Overview of joint performance 
The joint performance of regional economy is analysed in Porter’s Diamond Model, 
which also explains their internal relations. Three of the factors in the model have 
been discussed above with the exception of factor conditions. The evaluation of factor 
conditions relies on empirical studies and current historiography. Generally, 
Singapore’s advantage was reflected in its geography, infrastructure, knowledge, 
whereas Johor and the Riau Islands were more advantageous in natural resources, 
available land and labour. Assignments after standardization are shown by Table 
5.18. 
The synthesis of the assignments and the calculation of individual competitive 
advantage are displayed by Table 5.19. Results are tentative, but they do reveal a large 
gap between Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands in terms of economic 
development in accordance with their individual competitive advantage.  
• In general, Singapore possessed the most competitive advantage among the 
three. 
• Except for the Pacific War, which brought a sudden interruption, there has 
been a gradually intensified and accumulated competitive advantage both in 
Singapore and Johor. This advantage was reinforced by political stability, liberal 
economic policies and the effectiveness of government administration (λ≥ 1).  
• By contrast, the Riau Islands with a lower value by the four variables was 
already lagging behind Singapore and Johor at the start. Gloomy conditions in the 
Riau Islands were further worsened by the poor performance of the government 
(λ< 1) much of the time. The highest value of competitive advantage of the Riau 




Table 5. 18. Standardized assignments of factor conditions in Singapore, Johor and Riau 
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S J R S J R S J R S J R 
Geographical 
location 
4 3 2 4 3 2 4 3 2 4 3 2 
Natural resources 1 4 3 1 4 3 1 4 3 1 4 3 
Available land 3 4 3 2 4 3 2 4 3 1 4 3 
Labour 2 1 1 2 3 2 - - - 2 2 2 
Infrastructure (× 
2) 
0.8 0.4 0.4 2.4 1.2 0.8 2.4 1.2 0.8 4 2.4 1.2 
Knowledge, 
technology (× 2) 
1.2 0.8 0.4 2 1.2 0.8 2 1.2 0.8 2.8 1.6 1.2 



















S J R S J R S J R S J R 
Factor conditions 
(× 1) 
1.8 1.8 1.3 2.2 2.4 1.7 2.3 2.3 1.6 2.7 2.6 1.9 
Demand conditions 
(× 2) 0.9 0.5 0.5 1.9 1.2 1 0.6 0.4 0.4 3.2 2.5 1.7 
Social structure 
(× 2) 
2.7 2.1 1.7 2.9 3.1 1.9 0.7 0.7 0.7 3.9 2.9 1.6 
Related industries 
(× 3) 
0.8 0.6 0.5 2.1 1.3 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.5 3.3 2.7 1.8 
Mean 
weighed-value of 
four variables (P ) 
1.6 1.3 1 2.3 2 1.4 1 1 0.8 3.3 2.7 1.8 
Government (λ) 1.7 1.0 0.6 2.0 2.0 1.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 2.0 1.7 0.7 
Competitive 
advantage (P ×λ) 
2.7 1.3 0.6 4.6 4 1.7 0.4 0.3 0.2 6.6 4.6 1.3 
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In terms of internal connections within the triangle, the strength was also in 
accordance with the factor of ‘government’. Theoretically, the formation of their 
internal connections are due to both individual competitiveness and regional 
complementarity, reflected by (1) world demand for regional raw materials 
transhipped through Singapore; (2) creation of backward linkages in Singapore as a 
result of exports from the hinterland of Johor and the Riau Islands; (3) development 
of finance in Singapore to provide capital for Johor and the Riau Islands; (4) the role 
of traders, shipowners and capitalists in materializing the connections. There was a 
spillover effect from Singapore in establishing such connections to Johor and the 
Riau Islands. This effect was subject to political determination and government 
policies. During the Japanese occupation, the internal connection was politically 
strong but economically weak. The strongest economic internal connections 
appeared in the first half of the twentieth century when the factor of ‘government’ 








Chapter 6  







Both individual and joint performance of Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands did 
not form an isolated process, but were deeply integrated with the world economy. 
This chapter focuses on the external aspect of the growth triangle, using the model of 
globalization introduced above. It starts with a general description of the external 
network formed by trade and shipping. The second part offers an analysis of the 
external integration by using four dimensions of globalization model. 
 
1. The formation of external connections  
External connections are defined as outward links of the triangle area with world 
market. They are directly materialized by the movement of commodities, capital, 
information, etc. Singapore as a traditional entrepôt had very limited production. On 
the export side, it depended on produce from Johor and the Riau Islands as discussed 
above. Throughout the period under study, the export structure of Singapore 
underwent several changes. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
traditional agricultural commodities, such as pepper and gambir from Johor and the 
Riau Islands created the first international connections with the world market. They 
were replaced by rubber and mining products from 1910s onwards. After achieving 
independence, there were also structural changes in exports. The development of 
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manufacturing and service sectors changed Singapore into a staple port, whereas 
exports from Johor and the Riau Islands still relied on agricultural and very few 
manufactured products, such as palm oil, rubber and minerals. The growing volume 
of exports from the triangle area indicated an intensified external connection with the 
global economy. 
Within this network, Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands played different 
roles. Since the nineteenth century, for Singapore, the world market has been its large 
destiny for export with the majority of products coming from its Malaya, and 
Indonesian hinterland. Especially after the 1870s, the international shipping 
connections of Singapore with the West were intensified by the arrival of the 
steamship rather than sail, and the use of cable telegraph, especially with Britain. As a 
result, the total tonnage of ships increased at an astonishing rate, which facilitated the 
international trade of Singapore, especially with western countries (Appendix xix). 
On the import side, imports of raw materials from British Malaya and the 
Netherlands Indies accounted for more than 40 per cent of the total in 1870, whereas 
imports from the West differed. Imports from Britain declined gradually from 
around 30 per cent in the 1870s to around only 10 per cent in the early 1900s, 
whereas the USA and Japan gained a larger share. Articles imported from Britain 
included cotton piece goods, apparel and ironware. From the USA came cigars, 
tinned provisions, paper, motor cars and oil products; from Japan, coal, cotton piece 
goods, wooden furniture, matches and cement. On the export side, among the 
Western countries, Britain had the largest share. In the 1870s, it only accounted for 
around 17 per cent of Singapore’s total exports. This proportion increased slightly to 
20 per cent in the first decade of the twentieth century. Exports to Britain were 
mainly preserved pineapples, oil cakes, tin, sago, gambir, pepper and rubber. These 
commodities were also exported to the USA, especially from the 1900s onwards when 
rubber was in a great demand. Exports to Japan included raw cotton, copra, rattan, 
rubber and tin. British Malaya and the Netherlands Indies had a share of around 20 
and 30 per cent respectively in Singapore’s re-export of Western manufactured goods 
around 1900.  
More changes took place when rubber and tin replaced traditional agricultural 
products from the 1910s onwards, while Singapore still served as the pivotal point in 
trade and commerce for Japan, China, India and other countries in the Pacific and 
Indian oceans.1 Among the trade partners of Singapore, the emergence of Japan as 
the third naval power in the world fundamentally altered the strategic situation of 
Singapore.2 Japan began to gain significance in the trade with Singapore in the 1920s, 
replacing Britain in exports of cotton piece goods to Singapore in exchange for large 
                                                          
1 Beale, A Review, 8. 
2 CSAR (1956), 318. 
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imports of mining products.3 It was also in this period that Britain was surpassed by 
the USA and the Netherlands Indies because of the expanding trade in rubber. In 
1932, the USA took 67 per cent of rubber exports and 42 per cent of tin exports from 
the Straits ports.4  
The external network was completely destroyed during the period of Japanese 
Occupation when Japanese military administration cut off also international 
connections of this region with the world market. These outward connections did not 
recover until achieving independence. By then, the pattern of economic development 
of Singapore began being transformed from entirely depending on trade to 
industrialization. Local production of industrial and manufactured products had a 
growing importance for Singapore’s trade, reducing the importance of its previous 
Malaya and Indonesia hinterlands. In 1965, the political separation of Singapore from 
peninsular Malaya made this trend irreversible. Although there are no official 
statistics of trade between Indonesia and Singapore published between 1963 and 1965, 
there was a significant decline in trade with Indonesia during the mid-1960s, 
although it was unofficially believed that Singapore-Indonesia trade had recovered its 
pre-Confrontation level by the end of 1968. 5  By contrast, Singapore’s trade 
connections with other countries were re-established, reflecting its enlarged and 
varied forelands and hinterlands. Among these countries, Japan and the USA 
gradually gained considerable importance (Table 6.1). 
The long-term development of Singapore’ external connections mirrored the 
extended and intensified network of Singapore. In this network, the easy access to the 
world market attracted capital, technology, information to this island.  
 
Table 6. 1. Geographical composition of Singapore’s trade, 1961-1969. 
(percentage share) 
 Import Export 
 1961 1963 1967 1969 1961 1963 1966 1969 
P. Malaya 23.1 23.2 19.1 17.5 28.4 31.5 23.6 16.4 
UK 13.0 11.7 8.0 6.7 7.9 6.3 6.1 5.8 
Japan 10.8 11.1 12.4 16.3 5.6 4.3 4.5 7.1 
USA 6.0 6.2 5.6 7.8 7.2 7.2 7.0 10.7 
Other 47.1 47.8 54.9 51.7 50.9 50.7 58.8 60.0 
Source: Courtenay, A Geography, 236. 
 
                                                          
3 Beale, A Review, 9. 
4 Courtenay, A Geography, 129. 
5 Ibid., 237-9. 
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Different from Singapore, the access of Johor and the Riau Islands to the 
international market was rather limited. Within the triangle, Johor played a role as an 
exclusive hinterland, mostly for Singapore. The only international connection was 
created in the late 1920s with the emergence of shipping directly to Japan without 
passing Singapore for mineral ores. In 1928, the total volume of ore cleared out was 
584,588 tons. In 1930 and 1932, there were 113 and 118 Japanese steamers 
respectively. 6 The rapid development of Japanese shipping resulted in a much 
extended Johor network. Different from other international trade, export of mineral 
ores from Johor to Japan continued during the Pacific War and this pattern remained 
unchanged during the post-war period. In the 1960s, more than 80 per cent of the 
exports of iron and bauxite ore from Johor were destined for Japan, a situation not 
different from pre-war years.7 
The Riau Islands showed much similarity with Singapore, On the one hand, the 
Riau Islands acted as the hinterland of Singapore for exports of regional produce. On 
the other hand, it also served as a centre in Indonesia for the re-export of 
commodities from elsewhere in Southeast Asia and as a middle point between Java 
and other parts of the Netherlands Indies. Nevertheless, the international shipping 
network was limited in Southeast Asia representing a pattern of entrepôt 
transhipment. The import of food and other daily necessities was directly 
transhipped to other places in the Netherlands Indies. The reason for the foreign 
transhipment taking place through the Riau Islands rather than Singapore was the 
aim of the Dutch colonial government to attract shipment from Singapore to ports in 
the Indonesian archipelago. It was partly realized by the opening up of the Riau 
Islands as a ‘duty-free region’. Yet the Riau Islands were marginalized in the shipping 
network of Singapore, exemplified by the limited shipping navigation between 
Singapore and ports in the Riau Islands. For instance, ‘in 1877 only one new vessel, a 
schooner was registered. This was due to the great dullness of the local trade between 
Singapore and the indigenous states in Sumatra.’8 ‘In 1891, several steamers had 
been laid up, and a line to Sumatra under Dutch flag had ceased running; the vessels 
were offered for sale in Deli.’9 Nevertheless, the role of Riau Islands did not entail 
any direct connection to the Western market. Even the commodities that met world 
market, such as rubber, tin and oil, still relied on the market channels of Singapore. 
This pattern kept unchanged after independence in Indonesia. 
Although both Johor and the Riau Islands expanded their international foreland 
to certain extent, such expansion was still limited. Their access to the world market 
                                                          
6 JAR (1919, 1920, 1928, 1930, 1932). 
7 1960-1964, Production: ABSM (1964), 43. 
8 ARSS (1877). 
9 Ibid. (1891). 
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still depended on Singapore as intermediary. Through Singapore, Johor and the Riau 
Islands were exposed indirectly to international influence. Within the triangle area, 
local crafts and sails navigated between Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands, while 
there was a growing expansion of ocean-going steamers transporting commodities 
from Singapore to the world market. These two types of shipping strengthened 
Singapore’s connections with the world shipping network, as well as with the regional 
markets. This pattern determined that both Johor and the Riau Islands’ economies 
were vulnerable, and they were deeply affected by the economic changes in the world 
market.10 From a global perspective, world trade has achieved rapid growth as 
indicated by its share in total GDP since 1870.11 But periodic and geographic 
differences remained (Table 6.2). Compared to Johor and the Riau Islands, Singapore 
followed a relatively similar trend with the global trade growth, suggesting a 
far-reaching integration of Singapore with the world economy. By contrast, the trade 
of Johor and the Riau Islands showed a different path due to their regional 
specialities.  
 
Table 6. 2. Average growth rates of trade of different regions, 1870-1970. 
(annual average percentage rate) 
 1870-1910s 1910s-1940s 1945-1970 
World 3.5 1.8 5.8 
Singapore 3.3 3.1 7.8 
Johor 3.7 7 5 
Riau 1.3 6 Slow recovery 
Source: World trade growth from Held et al., Global Transformations, 218-29. 
 
2. Analysis of external integration using the globalization model 
Generally, there was a gradually deepened external integration of the triangle area 
with the global economy, revealing increasing globalization, whereas the individual 
processes of Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands differed during the period under 
research. In this part, we consult four dimensions in the globalization model to reveal 
these spatio-temporal differences: extensity, intensity, velocity and impact. 
 
Extensity 
In the early period of imperialism, a worldwide trade and shipping network was just 
in embryo, as most of the commodities from this region were to large extent confined 
                                                          
10 Turnbull, A History, 7. 
11 Klasing et al., 'Trade Theory and Trade Growth Since 1870'. 
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to Asia and characterized as a flourishing entrepôt trade. Limited connections to the 
Western world were created from Singapore by exports of gambir and imports of 
manufactured goods from the West, particularly Britain, but the value was rather low. 
In exchange, manufactured goods were imported from Europe, particularly Britain. 
Although part of the raw materials came from Johor and the Riau Islands, 
transhipment through Singapore reflected an indirect outward connection, which 
was moderate in the Riau Islands and extremely limited in Johor. 
Such a network was extended and stimulated by exports and shipping of rubber 
and oil products which was in a strong demand in the world market during the 
period of high colonialism. The expansion took place in all three regions, although 
compared to Singapore, the extensity of Johor and the Riau Islands remained limited. 
Steamship routes radiated from Singapore to Europe and the USA, carrying 
commodities and people. At the same time, the traditional intra-Asian network was 
also maintained or strengthened as indicated by the increasing importance of trade 
with Japan. In Johor, the extensity of the network was also enlarged by the shipping 
of mining products to Japan, and in the Riau Islands, the extension involved 
transhipment of oil products from Pulau Sambu. The most important regional 
agricultural product, rubber, was still exported via Singapore. In this way, the indirect 
connection prevailed above direct integration. It hence limited the extensity of Johor 
and the Riau Islands, which, at any rate, was lower than in Singapore. 
The network was completely destroyed during the Pacific War and the only 
connection was with Japan. It thus resulted in an extremely low extensity. However, 
the smuggling trade and shipping still maintained the feeble existence of 
interregional connections. 
A recovery took place in the post-war period but in a different fashion. In 
Singapore, internationalization deepened with continued liberal economic policies 
and the encouragement of foreign capital. But in Johor and the Riau Islands, 
particularly the latter, in the context of rising nationalism, more attention was given 
to the domestic market, resulting in a shrinkage in the world market and a limited 
foreign investment, especially from Japan and the USA. In Johor, the extensity was 
enlarged by the direct connection to the Western world and the wider utilization of 
FDI, although Singapore and Britain were still the chief partners. Nevertheless, 
compared to the situation in the first half of the twentieth century, such an extension 




The direct indicator to assess the intensity is the absolute volume or value of trade, 
shipping and capital. With respect to the dynamic process, growing intensity is also 
signified by the relative increase. The discussion hitherto has shown that the absolute 
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value of these aspects kept increasing over one hundred years, but also that there 
were spatio-temporal differences. 
• Generally, the intensity is ranked by Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands 
according to the absolute value of trade and shipping capacity 
• The intensification as indicated by growth rates in trade and shipping was 
much stronger and faster in the post-war period than before in all the three regions as 
indicated by higher growth rates in trade and shipping. 
• In the high colonialism era, the growth of trade and shipping compared to 
the period of early imperialism was faster in Johor and the Riau Islands, but slower in 
Singapore. 
The formation of this pattern is attributed to (1) different levels of integration 
with the world market, which was deeper in Singapore than in Johor and the Riau 
Islands. It indicated the degree of globalization of the three regions from another way 
around; (2) the rising and falling importance and position of Europeans and Chinese 
in the three parts of the triangle as they directly pursued these connections. 
 
Velocity 
Velocity is described as the speed of the exchange of commodities, people and 
information between the origins and the destinations. To a large extent it can be 
indicated by the development of transport and communication which had a positive 
impact on the velocity. The development of transportation systems is shown by the 
construction of ports, the application of advanced technology in shipping, the 
improvement of shipping yards and shipping facilities and the improvement of 
inland traffic in this region. Communication is accelerated as a result of technological 
progress, including the use of telegram, steamers and later also aviation development. 
This point is also facilitated by the development of financial services, such as the 
establishment of banks, merchant firms, and the circulation and recognition of 
currencies. The discussion reveals that in general all these points showed 
improvement in the time series, yet more significantly in Singapore than in Johor and 
the Riau Islands. The change of velocity shows a similar trend with that of intensity. 
 
Impact 
The impact of globalization on a certain region is defined as how external influence 
and the interaction between these external factors changed regional social structure. 
These external factors included the immigration of Chinese and Europeans and their 
mobility and foreign capital.  
In the period of early imperialism, such an impact had already been 
considerable in Singapore, as shown by the growing political power of Europeans and 
the design of Western institutions. But in Johor and the Riau Islands, the political 
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regime of a traditional sultanate to a large extent still autonomously existed and 
Western influenced was limited. The influx of Chinese people was on a large scale, 
but many of them came from adjacent areas, suggesting their regional characteristics 
rather than external factors. They, from Sumatra, mainly crossed the Straits of 
Malacca to bases in Singapore and Penang, either as refugees or as smugglers, because 
they found Singapore most convenient for their operations. Therefore, it seems that 
social structures did not change much compared to the previous period. This is 
suggested by the continued existence of Chinese secret societies and their 
cross-regional networks. 
Structural changes were significant in the period of high colonialism. As the 
rubber plantations and the exploitation of petroleum expanded, so exogenous 
elements swarmed into Singapore. Politically, these changes were indicated by the 
further elaboration of administrative colonial institutions, the introduction of 
Western education, the suppression of Chinese secret societies and the building of 
Western houses and infrastructure. The political impact was also so far-reaching in 
Johor that the final coming of a British General Advisor changed the equilibrium at 
the Malay court. Such a change facilitated a growing importance of Europeans. The 
Malay sultanate came to depend strongly on British advisors and policies. Europeans’ 
high hierarchy in the colonial government encouraged both British and Singaporean 
Chinese investors who were anxious to contribute revenue to the British economy. 
Reflected in terms of geomorphology, the former Chinese kangkar areas developed 
into market towns servicing the agricultural populations of the area. In Mukim 
Pentong, there was a rapid capitalist expansion.12 In the Riau Islands, the 
abolishment of the sultanate brought an abrupt end to the political continuity. 
However, the continuation of the Chinese autonomous system maintained a certain 
stability in this area.  
Apart from the political impact, social forces and social order created another 
connection to the process of globalization.13 Socially, the expansion of regional 
economy necessitated the influx of large numbers of workers preferred by Chinese 
and British planters, because they were more suitable for work, living conditions, and 
the discipline of the plantations than local residents. A dynamic social structure was 
created due to the increasing number of Chinese of different language groups and 
Europeans. The impact was increased by more aggressive colonial policies, which did 
not only influence the Chinese community, many of whom accepted Western 
education, but also affected indigenous Malays.14 Nevertheless, the citizenship and 
                                                          
12 Guinness, On the Margin, 13. 
13 Chin, 'The State of the 'State' in Globalization: Social Order and Economic Restructuring in 
Malaysia'. 
14 Guinness, On the Margin. 
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identity of ethnic Chinese in the post-war period did have a certain effect on regional 
integration and connection.15 
The impact of regional integration was extremely low during the Japanese 
occupation. There was no external impact. During decolonization, pre-war overseas 
networks were disrupted, replaced by trade routes determined by wartime territorial 
division. In Singapore, the social structure remained stable, as can be seen from the 
unchanged demographic structure. The impact was even deeper because of the 
continuation and increase of foreign investment, not only from the British 
Commonwealth, but also from Japan and the USA. By contrast, the external impact 
was relatively insignificant as a result of nationalism. Structural change took place as 
a result of internal factors, such as government policies, domestic capital, national 
trade and shipping. Nevertheless, due to the effectiveness of government 
administration, the colonial pattern was maintained to a large extent in the Riau 
Islands, which was likely to have tightened links across the Straits of Malacca with 
Singapore, but informally or illegally. 
 
Table 6. 3. Globalization indicators of Singapore, Johor and Riau Islands by period, 
1870-1970. 
Region Political Extensity Intensity Impact Velocity 
Singapore 
Early Imperialism 1 0 1 0 
High Colonialism 2 1 2 1 
The Pacific War -2 0 0 0 
Decolonization 3 3 3 3 
Johor 
Early Imperialism -3 -1 -2 -1 
High Colonialism -1 0 1 0 
The Pacific War -2 -1 -1 -1 
Decolonization 1 1 2 1 
The Riau 
Islands 
Early Imperialism -1 -3 -3 -3 
High Colonialism 1 -1 -1 -1 
The Pacific War -3 -2 -2 -2 
Decolonization 0 0 0 0 
                                                          
15 Lyons and Ford, 'Citizenship'. 
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Based on the above information, the assignment of the value is displayed by 
Table 6.3. The individual processes of the integration with the world economy are 
visualized in Figure 6.1.  
1. The process of globalization is different from region to region. It thus 
confirms the argument of Held, McGrew and others that globalization does not 
reflect a simple linear development.  
2. In general, as globalization is achieved by the exchange of commodities, 
people and information, the case of Singapore is characterized as a direct pattern. By 
contrast, the process of indirect globalization in Johor and the Riau Islands is to a 
large extent through Singapore because of their limited access to the world market. In 
short, the globalization of Johor and the Riau Islands depended on Singapore.  
3. There was a gradually deepening integration with the world in Singapore. 
Full globalization was achieved in the post-war period. In Johor, the integration was 
also deepened chronically, but the limited extensity meant that an integration was 
realized on the regional rather than global level. This process was different in the 
Riau Islands, where the deepest integration took place in the period of high 
colonialism and the relatively lower extensity, intensity, velocity and impact resulted 
in a low level of regionalization. 
4. The continuation of colonial patterns into the post-war period in the Riau 
Islands showed a clear pattern of path dependence. The discontinuity during the war 
and post-war Johor can be attributed to political changes. The process was subject to 
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effective implementation of government policies which now still plays an important 
role in influencing regional economic development.  
5. The direct integration of Singapore and indirect integration of Johor and 
the Riau Islands into the world market suggests a global stratification whereby 
countries or regions with economies of scale and political gravity blend into 
globalization directly, whereas underdeveloped countries or regions achieve indirect 
globalization through regionalization by integrating with their closest developed 
neighbours. 
6. Within a core-periphery framework, it has been pointed out that a 
functional regional economy will typically consist of a central urban core and a 
surrounding, large rural, periphery.16 However, application of this argument varies 
by situation. From the point of view of Southeast Asia, Singapore together with its 
closest neighbour of Johor and the Riau Islands, played the role of core with the rest 
of the Southeast Asia area as the periphery, whereas from a national perspective, the 
Riau Islands occupied a peripheral position in Indonesia. The dual position of the 
Riau Islands is thus an uncertain factor of regional integration. 
These hypotheses help us to understand the relationship between globalization 
and regionalization, always a matter of dispute among scholars.17 Marchand and 
others argue that regionalization reflects state and non-state forces reacting in 
opposition to globalization.18 But this study accepts Dent’s view of regionalism as 
‘structures, processes and arrangements that work towards greater coherence within 
a specific international region in terms of economic, political, security, socio-cultural 
and other kinds of linkages.’19 If globalization can be conceived fundamentally as 
increasing levels of connectivity, integration and interdependence between different 
parts of the world economy and society occurring on a worldwide scale, then 
regionalism is a manifestation of very similar processes occurring on a lesser scale.20 
We suggest that globalization is a form of extremely extended and intensified 
regionalization, with the level of globalization declining from the economic and 
political core to the periphery. While regionalism may be viewed as a building block 
of globalization, it has also, conversely, been perceived at times as fragmenting the 
international system into separate competing regional blocs.21 Although Mittelman 
shows certain doubt about the effect of regional cooperation as a means to improve 
                                                          
16 Hughes and Holland, 'Core-Periphery Economic Linkage: A Measure of Spread and Possible 
Backwash Effects for the Washington Economy'. 
17 Mansfield and Solingen, 'Regionalism'. 
18 Marchand et al., 'The Political Economy of New Regionalisms'. 
19 Dent, East Asian Regionalism. 
20 Hettne, 'Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism'. 
21 Dent, 'Paths'. 
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international cooperation and a sound base for sharing in globalization,22 the SIJORI 
case gives a positive answer. 
This process is correlated to the factor of ‘government’ in the model of 
competitive advantage: (1) the ideology of laissez-faire with certain government 
intervention encourages both competition and cooperation of all ethnic groups and 
strengthened mutual connections; (2) an effective government administration 
indicated by ‘direct rule’, has a positive impact on the formation of mutual 
connections; (3) various ethnic groups, the Europeans, the Chinese, and to some 
extent the Japanese, actively performed a role as actors of internal connection. This 
can only be facilitated and encouraged by harmonious ethnic relationships; (4) 
extreme militarism and interventionism hamper economic development, resulting in 
a hostile ethnic relationships and weak internal connections. In short, stable and 
effective government administration, preservative and regulative liberal economic 
policies and fair ethnic policies are the direct impetus of regional economic 
connection and cooperation. 
 
3. Concluding remark 
The external integration of the growth triangle with the global economy was realized 
by the exchange of trade, shipping and capital through Singapore as a gateway, while 
these products largely originated from Johor and the Riau Islands where access to the 
world market was limited. By applying the globalization model, we found that there 
was direct integration with the world in Singapore, whereas this process in Johor and 
the Riau Islands was indirect and relied on Singapore as intermediary. Rather than 
globalization, Johor and the Riau Islands showed a strong characteristic of 
regionalization. 
 
                                                          
















After the signing of the Treaty of London in 1824, which resulted in the split of the 
old Johor-Riau Sultanate, the three involved regions, Singapore, Johor and the Riau 
Islands, were not part of the same political framework until nearly 150 years later, 
when the foundation of ASEAN offered a stimulus to regional cooperation and 
integration, as exemplified by the formation of the SIJORI Growth Triangle. For 
more appropriate understanding of the rationale for this regional cooperation, we 
must not neglect the mutual economic connections that have been there for centuries. 
As D. K. Bassett has argued, ports in the Riau Islands and along the southern Malay 
coasts had already played an important role in British and Dutch ‘country’ trade since 
the seventeenth century.1 They formed the basis of local connections and networks 
which were enlarged, intensified and diversified in the following centuries, not only 
economically, but also socially and culturally as a result of huge colonial expansion.2 
The present study fills in this gap by focusing on an economic history of the old 
Johor-Riau Sultanate and the internal connections between the three powers during 
the period prior to the establishment of the SIJORI, applying the following research 
                                                          
1 Bassett, 'British Country Trade and Local Trade Networks in the Thai and Malay States, 
c.1680-1770'. 
2 Frost, 'Asia's Maritime Networks'. 
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question: how did the regional economic system integrate into the world market in 
the context of globalization? The research question is addressed in a twofold 
analytical framework outlined in Chapter 1. Chapter 2-5 focus on the internal 
integration of the growth triangle by surveying the aspects of socio-political evolution, 
trade, shipping and capital as applied in Porter’s Diamond Model, and Chapter 6 
analyses the external integration within a wider process of globalization. 
 The regional political and social aspects reveal both differences and similarities 
between the three areas. Colonial powers, particularly the British and the Dutch, 
determined the regional political situation from 1870 to 1942, which can be divided 
into two sub-periods: early imperialism (1870-1910) and high colonialism 
(1910-1942). In all three regions, colonial administration transformed from indirect 
to direct rule. Therefore, the political evolution is considered as a process of growing 
colonial intensification and intervention. Meanwhile, regional differences between 
the two colonial governments became more pronounced. Singapore had established a 
well-designed colonial bureaucracy, which guaranteed its high political status and an 
efficient administration. In Johor, the geographical proximity to the British colonial 
political centre and the placidity in the Malay court created political stability, 
although colonial administration applied a form of indirect rule as indicated by the 
existence of Malay sultans as the nominal ruler and the appointment of a British 
advisor representing the real power. By contrast, political stability and harmony were 
lacking in the Riau Islands, which were initially the main part of the Riau-Lingga 
Sultanate, but later incorporated into the Riau Residency under direct Dutch control. 
During the Japanese occupation, the three areas were placed under a unified Japanese 
military administration, but the impact was rather limited and ended after Japan’s 
surrender. Although presently the three regions belong to three different nations, the 
first two or three decades after the Pacific War still showed a pattern of continuation 
of the colonial influence: Singapore was not separated from the Federation until 1965, 
and political insignificance was still the hallmark of the Riau Islands. Therefore, the 
one hundred years’ political development in the triangle region showed more 
continuity than discontinuity, a feature deeply embedded in the colonial period. The 
continuity resurfaced in their political relationships. There were interactive and 
influential contacts between Singapore and Johor within the same political regime, 
whereas political connectivity between the Riau Islands and the other was rather 
weak, a factor attributed to the antagonism between the Dutch and the British, and 
later between Indonesia and Malaya. 
 Different from individuality on the political level, regional social aspects showed 
more interconnectivity and mutual influence in terms of demographic structure, 
social organization of the Chinese community and ethnic relationships. It was not 
only Malay royal rulers from the same family who established interregional 
connections, large Chinese populations also established extensive interregional 
connections, such as self-organization systems – kapitan, konsi, and other 
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cross-boundary institutions – kongkek, opium farming syndicates, Chinese Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry, etc. The continuation and discontinuation of these social 
connections were to a large extent influenced by ethnic relationships between Malays, 
Europeans, Chinese, and other ethnic groups. European and Chinese economic 
significance in the colonial period was facilitated by a harmonious relationship 
between them during the colonial period. When the Malays gained political authority 
after the Pacific War, the good relationship between the Malays and the others turned 
to subtle rivalry. The European and Chinese economic position was restricted, but 
Malays’ business incapability and the shortage of indigenous entrepreneurship gave 
an opportunity for continued European and Chinese importance.3 
 Against this dynamic socio-political background, regional economic 
development showed a unique pattern as indicated by the increase in trade, shipping 
and capital. In general, regional economy which was export-oriented, developed 
rapidly in one hundred years, but both temporal and spatial differences were obvious. 
Based on our statistical analysis, in the period of early imperialism, economic growth 
was much faster in Singapore and Johor than in the Riau Islands. Moving into the 
period of high colonialism, and attributed to the unsatisfactory performance of the 
world economy, economic growth slowed down slightly in Singapore. But the global 
negative influence was rather limited on Johor and the Riau Islands, where economy 
expanded at high the growth rates per annum. After the disastrous Japanese 
occupation, Singapore soon recovered. The same trend was also observed in Johor 
but at a lower growth rate. In spite of insufficient relevant statistics, qualitative 
information indicats a rather slow recovery in the Riau Islands. Placed in a global 
context, Singapore followed a similar trend with the world trade expansion, 
suggesting a deep integration of Singapore’s economy with the world. By contrast, the 
different paths of economic development in Johor and the Riau Islands indicated 
their limited internationalization but regional inclination. 
 The dichotomy between Singapore and the other two was a direct result of 
different patterns of economic connection in the three regions. During the colonial 
period, in Singapore, international (external) connections were established for the 
exchange of raw materials, for instance rubber, minerals, oil products from local 
hinterlands and the manufactured goods from Western countries by ocean-going 
steamers. Therefore, an extensive network was created in Singapore, and it was 
intensified gradually during the period under research. By contrast, good external 
connections were lacking in both Johor and the Riau Islands, as both export of 
regional raw materials and import of daily necessities and manufactured goods by 
traditional sails or old second-hand steamers, relied on Singapore. Although there 
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was intention from both governments to direct the trade through domestic ports, 
geographical proximity and well-established market facilities still played an essential 
role in attracting trade, shipping and capital to Singapore. Therefore, for Johor and 
the Riau Islands, very limited outward connections beyond the triangle were 
established. After achieving independence, Singapore transformed gradually from a 
harbour relying on entrepôt trade to relying on the export of domestic industrial 
products supported by an import substitution strategy. This resulted in a reduced 
dependence on the Malay and Indonesian hinterlands, including Johor and the Riau 
Islands. Nevertheless, this reduction did not occur in any substantial way until the 
1970s. Thus during the period under study, the economies of Johor and the Riau 
Islands which was rather regionally oriented, showed a strong dependence on and 
orientation towards Singapore, which the economy integrated deeply with the world 
market. 
 The distinction between external and internal connections is also reflected in 
the agents of economy: Europeans and indigenous (especially the Chinese). During 
the colonial period and the immediate post-war period, European capitalists 
international enterprises, such agent houses, steamship companies dominated all 
international trade to the West, whereas the Chinese capital and capitalists 
concentrated on regional production and transportation. Moreover, there was a 
growing and important role for Japanese capital in the rubber plantations, mineral 
mining and other manufacturing sectors. Thus the emergence of the Japanese became 
the third power diversifying the regional economic structure. The transformation of 
these relationships from cooperation to competition indicated European penetration 
in Singapore and Chinese retreat to Johor and the Riau Islands, where, however, 
more preference was given to the Malays after the Pacific War. The rise and decline 
of Western and Chinese traders and business firms mirrored the evolution of 
regional networks. 
 In short, in spite of a growing economy in all three regions, significant regional 
difference was clearly marked by a much stronger economic performance of 
Singapore than the others under the joint influence of natural resource endowment, 
economic rules and political policies. But the emphasis differed during the process. 
The importance of these factors accounting for this pattern is revealed by consulting 
the theory of competitive advantage. By applying the modified Diamond Model, we 
attributed Singapore’s high economic performance to its possession of most 
competitive advantage, which was further signified by the political stability, liberal 
economic policies and effective government administration. By contrast, in the Riau 
Islands, the relatively lower competitive advantage was worsened by poor 
performance of the government much of the time. The highest value of competitive 
advantage of the Riau Islands was observed during the period of high colonialism 
attributed to a relatively effective Dutch administration. 
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 Therefore, we highlight the role of the variable of ‘government’, which, together 
with the variable of ‘social structure’, also explains the change of regional internal 
connections. We attribute the formation of connections within the triangle to four 
elements: world demand for regional raw materials transhipped through Singapore; 
the creation of backward linkages in Singapore based on products from Johor and the 
Riau Islands; the financial services from Singapore; and the role of multi-ethnic 
groups acting as traders, shippers, capitalists, etc. The interaction between the four 
elements resulted in a dynamic pattern of internal connections within the triangle. 
The external connections of the triangle area were gradually extended and 
intensified in one hundred years from 1870 to 1970. Chapter 6 places this regional 
network in the context of globalization by applying the model designed by Held, 
McGrew and others. Four indicators were used: extensity, intensity, velocity and 
impact. Results show the different processes and degrees of globalization in 
Singapore, Johor and the Riau Islands. There was a gradually deepening integration 
with the world in Singapore and full globalization was achieved in the post-war 
period, whereas the degree of globalization in Johor and the Riau Islands was lower. 
Instead, regionalization is more appropriate to describe the integration in these two 
regions. Thus the globalization in Johor and the Riau Islands depended on their 
connections with Singapore. 
 This picture can be viewed in a core-periphery model, which argues that the 
core region supplies the periphery with higher-order services while the periphery 
furnished the core with natural resource-based commodities. Economic growth in 
the periphery is hence felt more strongly in the core. This study affrims that it is 
easier for a region, like Singapore, to deepen its integration with the world if there is a 
correspondence between its political gravity and economic gravity. This argument 
further confirms that the process of globalization in Johor and the Riau Islands is 
easier by integrating with Singapore rather than with Malaysia or Indonesia. It also 
further underscores our argument about the relationship between globalization and 
regionalization. We suggest that globalization is a form of extremely extended and 
intensified regionalization, with the level of globalization declining from the 
economic and political core to the periphery, while regionalization is a building block 
of globalization. 
 To sum up, both in the colonial and independent periods, the economic status 
of the three regions in this triangle showed a certain discrepancy: Johor and the Riau 
Islands were economically peripheral, feeling the commercial pull of Singapore.4 But 
in a political sense, two poles can be identified: Johor under the political guidance of 
British Malaya and later Malaysia, and the Riau Islands under Indonesia. Therefore, 
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there was both diversity and unity within this triangle, either as three separated 
regimes or as a closely tied body. Mutual economic connections are indicated by 
quantitative indices of trade and markets. There was an increasing importance of the 
market in British Malayan for manufactured goods from the late nineteenth century, 
reflecting both rapid peninsular developments brought about by rubber and 
Singapore’s continued dominance in the supply of manufactured goods to the 
peninsula. But unlike the Singapore-Johor relationship, where Johor relied heavily on 
Singapore, the Riau Islands had wider trade hinterland and foreland. Singapore 
served as a particular segment outside the Indonesia market for the Riau Islands, 
which was influenced by the combined force of government intervention and 
economic rules. We therefore agree with Huff’s argument that Singapore’s trade 
composition mirrored not simply an urban-rural dualism, but rather a tripartite 
division, namely domestic, Malayan and extra-Malayan markets, reflecting different 
degrees of integration of Johor and the Riau Islands with Singapore.5 This pattern 
was mainly created by European and Chinese economic leaderships who were 
instrumental in initiating regional economic transformation and extraordinary 
growth.6 Attributed to individual ethnicity and ideology, these two ethnic groups 
performed differently in the formation of two connections, external and internal. 
There were mutually reinforcing links between internal and external integration. 
Singapore’s role as a hub in the triangle created links with world economy, resulting 
in immigration of Europeans and Chinese, who played an important part in 
reinforcing internal integration within the triangle. 
 These connections formed an early prototype of the SIJORI Growth Triangle, 
the discrepancy and unbalance within which was also the characteristics of this early 
network: poor connections between Johor and the Riau Islands, uneven distribution 
of competitive advantages, political differences, etc. Therefore, the success or failure 
of current cooperation depends on how to deal with and utilize these historical 
connections and how to learn lessons from the historical experience. 
After several years’ endeavour, much progress has been achieved by the SJORI 
Growth Triangle – which became the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth 
Triangle (IMS-GT), including a considerable transfer of technology and capital from 
Singapore to Johor and the Riau Islands. As a result, a number of industrial estates, 
free-trade zone, a wide range of industries were jointly set up in Johor and the Riau 
Islands with the investment from Singapore. 7  Such foundations resulted in a 
                                                          
5 Huff, The Economic Growth, 115. 
6 McDonald, 'Confucian Foundations to Leadership: A Study of Chinese Business Leaders 
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Being A SEZ'. Ho and So, 'Semi-periphery and Borderland Integration: Singapore and Hong 
Kong Experiences'. 
 Conclusion  197 
 
 
consistent economic growth in the first decade of the present century. 8  The 
individual economic performance of the three regions is illustrated by some basic 
indicators shown in Table 7.1. However, such progress was made in the shadow of 
dissatisfaction which can be summarized from the same table. 
 
Table 7. 1. Basic indicators for the IMS-GT, in 1994, 2005-2010. 
(US$ billi.) 
 
1994 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Singapore 
GDP,  in 2010 
Constant Prices 
70.2 169.9 185 201.8 205.4 204.2 235.3 
Growth rate 10.9% 7.5% 8.9% 9.1% 1.8% -0.6% 15.2% 
Johor 
GDP,  in 2005 
Constant Prices 
4.3 13 13.7 14.2 14.8 14.4 15.8 
Growth rate 9.6% - 5% 4.1% 4.2% -3% 9.8% 
% of total national GDP 6.3% 9.2% 9.2% 9.0% 8.9% 8.8% 9.0% 
The Riau Islands 
GDP,  in 2000 
Constant Prices 




- 6.78% 7.01% 6.63% 3.52% 7.19% 
% of total national GDP - 1.54% 1.48% 1.46% 1.37% 1.37% 2.05% 
Note: The Riau Province, 1993. 
Source: Department of Statistics Singapore (http://www.singstat.gov.sg/), Department of 
Statistics Malaysia (http://www.statistics.gov.my/), Statistics Indonesia 
(http://www.bps.go.id). 
 
According to Talbe 7.1, GDP growth was much slower in the first decade of the 
present century than in the 1990s and growth rates of the three regions kept on 
declining after the announcement of SIJORI. The declining percentage of regional 
GDP of Johor and the Riau Islands in the total of Malaysia and Indonesia further 
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affirmed the unsatisfactory economic performance from a perspective of relative 
importance. Although the triangle includes the territory of the Riau Province and 
Riau Islands Province, the main contribution to the economy of Riau in general 
comes from the exploitation of petroleum around Dumai on the mainland. By 
contrast, the core area of the triangle, the Riau Islands, still remains one of the 
poorest areas in Indonesia; In the Riau Islands, the intended capital and advanced 
technology from Singapore did not reach the Islands. Some achievement was made in 
the category of tourism rather than other processing industries.  
Even if the SIJORI Growth Triangle has had a significant impact on the region, 
some caution is required when assessing its achievements.9 In practice, the expected 
redistribution of regional comparative advantage was not always realized, or the 
initial progress failed to expand the scale and level of cooperation.10 Many regional 
projects were carried out independently rather than cooperatively. In the Riau Islands, 
the BIDA (Batam Industrial Development Authority) was operated 
independently by utilizing domestic private capital. So was the Iskandar Malaysia, a 
project some three times the size of Singapore, in southern Johor, developed by the 
Malaysian government in 2006. Instead of cooperation, Iskandar Malaysia was 
designed to both compete with and integrate with the Singaporean economy.11 Such 
independent endeavour rather than Singapore-dominated cooperation resulted in 
better economic growth as indicated by the indicators in 2010. In both Johor and the 
Riau Islands, Singaporean capital was not particularly favoured, while either domestic 
capital or capital from other countries, such as China, India, Vietnam or Japan was 
encouraged. In retrospect, it is hard to see the effect and benefit of mutual 
cooperation between the three regions, and scholarship has not widely admitted the 
unsatisfactory outcome of SIJORI.12 
 Reasons are various, but political in character. The most important rationale for 
SIJORI was the idea of redistributing regional comparative advantage. From the point 
of view of the pre-SIJORI conditions, this idea was not new. With regard to 
interregional economic relations in the colonial period, D. W. Hughes and D. W. 
Holland have suggested that the core region supplied the periphery with higher-order 
services, while the periphery furnished the core with natural resource-based 
                                                          
9 Koch, 'Economic Analysis of Asian Growth Triangles: The Johor-Singapore-Riau Growth 
Triangle'. 
10 Chen, Transnational Sub-regional Cooperation in Practice: Dynamics of Micro-regionalism 
and Micro-regionalisation in the East Asia Pacific, 387. 
11 Rizzo and Glasson, 'Iskandar Malaysia', 417-27. 
12 Grundy-Warr et al. have pointed out the limits of a development strategy that emphasizes 
fragmented enclaves of improvement and the limited progress and planning problems in the 
growth triangle. Grundy-Warr et al., 'Fragmented Integration in the Singapore-Indonesian 
Border zone: Southeast Asia's 'Growth Triangle' against the Global Economy'. 
 Conclusion  199 
 
 
commodities.13 Regarding agricultural development, Singapore had since the 1870s 
been faced with the problems of limited available land and large demand for a 
unskilled or semi-skilled labour force. On the other hand, the advantage of Singapore 
was the regional concentration of using advanced technology and the high potential 
of well-qualified skilled workers. 14  Unfortunately, the transfer of regional 
complementary advantage between the three states was rather limited. In other words, 
there was certain utilization of land and labour in Johor and the Riau Islands, but 
technology and capital were still concentrated in Singapore. Hence, there were very 
weak backward linkages from Singapore to the periphery of Johor and the Riau 
Islands, just as Huff and Angeles have argued, that in post-1870 Southeast Asia 
relatively few major flows of commodities were created.15 Therefore, the spread 
effect of redistribution of regional comparative advantage is rather limited and 
unbalanced, indicating a low redistribution of regional comparative advantage. As 
indicated by the model of competitive advantage, these ‘factor conditions’ are largely 
restricted by the factor of government, which has direct and considerable impact on 
‘created’ factors such as the understanding of policies, knowledge, social factors, 
industries, etc. The advanced and endogenous advantage is the origin of the modern 
economy.16 Therefore, we suggest that the precondition of (sub)regional cooperation 
depends on the improvement of regional individual competitiveness which is 
guaranteed by effective administration, favourable policies, effective administration 
and existing legacies from the perspective of dependency theory.  
1. The role of government administration: relationship and effectiveness. The 
current borders and interstate relations between Singapore, Johor and the Riau 
Islands were created and maintained by colonization. Thus the role of political 
administration plays an essential role as illustrated by the analysis of competitive 
advantage. A high degree of collaboration is associated with a unified government (in 
colonial Malaya), harmonious diplomatic relationships (Anglo-Dutch relationship in 
the period of high colonialism) and effective administration (Singapore, Johor after 
1911, and the Riau Islands during high colonialism). The integration of labour, 
commerce, finance and investment is an outcome of the easing of political tensions 
and the formation of a unified institutional framework.17 These points explain the 
better cooperation between Singapore and Johor than elsewhere. Politically, Johor 
                                                          
13 Hughes and Holland, 'Core-Periphery'. 
14 Stejskal and Hajek, 'Competitive Advantage Analysis'. 
15 Huff and Angeles, 'Globalization, Industrialization and Urbanization in Pre-World War II 
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17 Ho and So, 'Semi-periphery'. 
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has a strong political elite represented by the chief minister, who is very much at the 
forefront of promoting Johor’s industrial development. And throughout his long 
reign from 1895 to 1959, Sultan Ibrahim regarded himself as the political equal and 
social superior of the Governor of Singapore.18 The Johor government had a direct 
role in determining its own development with more administrative efficiency.19 The 
Riau Islands, on the other hand, was guided directly from Jakarta, so much so that 
one concern was that the regional government would be left out of the overall 
planning and development.20 As to the Riau Islands, for a long period its peripheral 
position in the political picture of Indonesia resulted in a low political hierarchy, 
government neglect and considerable ineffectiveness. Therefore, there was a demand 
for better governance.21 Things have improved recently. According to Law No. 22 
(1999), all regencies in the Riau Province were to receive autonomous status.22 Local 
government was freer to engage in economic affairs and natural resources were 
enabled for local communities.23 Such a decentralized trend was further facilitated by 
the formation of Riau Island province in 2002 and the Decentralization Law of 2004. 
This trend was continued. The Indonesian Parliament on 24 June 2008 approved 
approved a draft law on the formation of 12 new regencies in the country, including 
Anambas in the Riau Islands Province. By then, the province consisted of five 
regencies – Bintan, Lingga, Karimun, Natuna and Amambas – and Batam and 
Tanjung Pinang municipalities. 
2. Liberal policies. A liberal policy does not only concern economic fields but 
also political affairs. The effect of this concept in promoting regional connection was 
testified in the period before the Great Depression, when no customs tariff was 
involved, protectionism and interventionism was light and foreign investment was 
encouraged to a large extent. These measures and attitudes facilitated the free flow of 
capital and people both locally and from outside. Therefore, in order to recover or 
re-promote such historical cooperation, it is better for the government to remove 
barriers between the regions which were placed in the 1950s and 1960s. Currently, 
the new regionalism is a direct result of the success of multilateral liberalisation 
whereby countries or regions trying to enter the multilateral system compete among 
themselves for the direct investment necessary for their successful participation in 
that system. By internalising an important externality, regionalism plays a key role in 
                                                          
18 Turnbull, 'British Colonialism'. 
19 Ho and So, 'Semi-periphery'.  
20 Pangestu et al., Intra-ASEAN Economic Cooperation: A New Perspective. 
21 Sparke et al., 'Triangulating the Borderless World: Geographies of Power in the 
Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle'. 
22 Undang-undang Republik Indonesia nomor 22 tahun 1999 tentang pemerintahan daerah 
(http://prokum.esdm.go.id/uu/1999/uu-22-1999.pdf) 
23 Vidyattama, 'Decentralization and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: Implementation and 
Challenges'. 
 Conclusion  201 
 
 
expanding and preserving the liberal trade order.24 A good sign was the negotiation 
of bilateral or multilateral free trade agreements and the creation of domestic 
institutions since the 1990s at both national and regional levels. Nevertheless, more 
liberal preference is still needed at the sub-regional level, such as in the Riau Islands, 
where concerns remain about the historically rooted smuggling, piracy and 
trafficking. Historical experience shows that harsh policies did not manage to 
eliminate these problems. Thus the implication of non-state involvement in the 
regulation should be promoted and favoured to enhance interdependence rather than 
individual independence.25 It is thus essential to bring the region more ‘foreign 
factors’ which were historically lacking.26 
3. Economic and political gravities. According to the gravity model, bilateral 
trade between two countries is proportional to their respective sizes, measured by 
their GDP, and inversely proportional to the geographic distance between them. This 
theory is applicable to evaluate the economic connections between two regions. Thus 
it is easy for the two economic gravities – Singapore and Johor – to generate strong 
connections, whereas the connection between Johor and the Riau Islands is rather 
weak. However, economic gravity is not the only factor. Although Jordan and 
Khanna have argued that, in some cases, sub-regions of nation states are developing 
economic links with neighbours that may be more vital than links with the political 
centres of power that govern them,27 the political pull effect is still essential in the 
regional triangle. Here we also take into consideration political gravity, which, as 
discussed above, has a strong impact in influencing mutual connections. Thus we 
suggest that strong connections can only be realized when the eco-political gravities 
of two regions are close to each other. Therefore, in order to strengthen economic 
connections with Singapore and Johor, it is necessary for the Riau Islands to enhance 
their political status within Indonesia. The prospect of the growth triangle still, to a 
large extent, lies in the political cooperation between the three involved countries. 
4. The utilization of historical connections. Phelps has argued that closely 
intertwined regional colonial histories have ensured the importance of traditional 
concerns.28 Strong internal connections had already been there since the foundation 
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of Singapore in 1819. The development of port facilities and the establishment of 
both Chinese and Western business firms and shipping companies endowed 
Singapore with initial advantage to attract trade, people and capital from adjacent 
regions. The economics of proximity, complementarity and a shared history drove 
participation between neighbours. 29  The advantage brought by them was 
consolidated by the arrival of steamers and the establishment of industry, banks and 
insurance companies during high colonialism. Progress was mainly achieved with the 
help of the Europeans and Chinese. However, their role was restricted in the post-war 
Johor and Riau Islands, where Malays gained more preference. Although we cannot 
deny the economic importance of Malays, compared to the Europeans and Chinese, 
their mobility and economic abilities were limited. Thus when the Europeans and 
Chinese were not supported or even restricted to the post-colonial Johor and Riau 
Islands, the regional connections were also undermined. Olzak has suggested that 
both political and economic integration into the world system is influentially related 
with ethnic politics both in the periphery and core.30 From the perspective of path 
dependence, we suggest that the re-establishment of regional connections lies in the 
recovery of European and Chinese economic and social initiatives as a continuation 
of the colonial pattern. Some effort in this direction has been made, but not enough. 
Although since 1995 the Riau Islands has been characterized by an increasing 
population mobility, the influx of population was as a result of domestic rather than 
foreign migrants.31 Thus it would be regrettable if these non-Malay ethnic groups 
could not receive support from the government, since the economy today is focusing 
on the communication of social capital.32 Moreover, evidence shows that there has 
been a growing Japanese importance in the triangle area since the nineteenth century. 
Regional economic cooperation should not only rely on Singapore; instead, the 
Japanese seems to offer a third alternative. A pattern of harmonious multi-ethnic 
diversity can thus contribute not only to political balance, but also to social stability 
and mobility, and economic diversity.33 
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Appendix 1: Tables 
 
 
Appendix i. Population in Singapore in selected years, 1871-1970. 
(thous.) 
Year Chinese Malays Indians Europeans 
Eurasians 
Total 
1871 55 26 12 5 97 
1881 - - - - 139 
1891 - - - - 185 
1911 220 42 28 14 303 
1921 315 54 32 17 418 
1931 419 65 51 23 558 
1937 455 70 52 26 603 
1947 729 114 69 26 938 
1950 789 124 72 30 1,015 
1956 965 154 98 44 1,262 
1966 1,427 276 157 54 1,914 
1970 - - - - 2,075 
Note: 1881, 1891, 1931: census; the rest are estimates. 
Source: 1871: Abshire, The History, 66; 1881-1937: ARSS (1881, 1891, 1911, 1921, 1931, 
1937); 1947-1956: CSAR (1950, 1956); 1966: SYB (1966); 1970: YSS (1971/1972). 
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Appendix ii. Population in Johor in selected years, 1911-1971. 
(thous.) 
Year Chinese Malays Indians Europeans Others Total 
1911 63 102 6 - 9 180 
1921 - - - - - 199 
1926 97 158 24 - - 280 
1931 - - - - - 505 
1932 253 232 55 1 4 545 
1938 308 312 84 1 5 710 
1941 309 302 58 1 5 675 
1947 - - - - - 738 
1949 341 368 58 - - 772 
1957 - - - - - 927 
1964 580 485 89 - - 1179 
1967 654 532 98 - - 1317 
1971 709 524 89 - - 1328 
Notes: 1967: census. The rest are estimates. Johor in 1926 estimates the population in 1926 
at some 250,000 (an increase of some 100,000 since on the figures of 1911 census) which is 
contradicted by the total sum of the population of different ethnic groups. Thus here we 
revise it to 280,000. 
Source: 1911, 1921, 1932, 1938: JAR (1911, 1921, 1932, 1938); 1926: Kirby, ‘Johore’, 253; 
1931, 1941, 1947: Kratoska, The Japanese Occupation, 18-9; 1949: RRBDFM (1949); 1957: 
VSWM (1967); 1964-1971: RRBDFM (1964), ABSM (1964-1971). 
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Appendix iii. Estimated non-indigenous population in Riau, 1870-1971. 
 1870 1880 1890 1900 1905 1910 1920 1930 1940 1966a 1966b 1971a 1971b 
Malays 
(× 1000) 
13 - - - 93 240 200/248 257 267 - - - - 
Chinese 
(× 1000) 
18 23 - 14 18 - 23 39 - - - - - 
Europeans 115 181 151 238 201 - 409 516 - - - - - 
Other Asians 211 167 352 247 209 - 556 1186 - - - - - 
Total 
(× 1000) 
- - - - - - - - - 134 317 164 330 
Territory R, S, I R, I R, I R R, I R 
Note: Territory: R: the Riau Islands; I: Indragiri; S: Siak.  
Source: 1870: RAN (1870); 1880-1930: CEI, vol. 11, table 16; 1910, 1940: Lindblad, New Challenges, 245, 251-2; 1966a, 1966b, 1971a: Lampiran 
(1971-1973); 1971b: Sensus Penduduk 1971.   
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Appendix iv. Trade of Singapore, 1870-1969. 
(£ mill. in current prices) 
Year Import Export Year Import Export Year Import Export 
1870 8.7 5.8 1901 22.9 19.2 1932 39.2 31.4 
1871 7.5 6.2 1902 21.6 18.3 1933 36.8 33.8 
1872 9.0 7.7 1903 22.7 18.9 1934 44.6 38.7 
1873 9.2 7.5 1904 23.7 19.3 1935 44.5 40.4 
1874 9.0 7.2 1905 24.5 20.3 1936 48.5 42.7 
1875 8.3 7.1 1906 27.4 23.6 1937 64.5 57.4 
1876 8.2 6.8 1907 28.0 23.6 1938 46.9 39.6 
1877 8.9 7.1 1908 24.7 21.1 1939 56.1 50.9 
1878 8.3 6.4 1909 25.6 21.7 1946 73.2 54.5 
1879 9.2 7.7 1910 30.0 25.7 1947 151.7 116.7 
1880 10.3 8.7 1911 31.6 26.5 1949 211.2 169.8 
1881 12.3 10.2 1912 35.2 28.2 1950 381.9 353.1 
1882 12.7 10.0 1913 38.3 29.9 1951 586.6 553.7 
1883 13.1 11.3 1914 32.3 26.6 1952 437.6 373.4 
1884 13.7 10.7 1915 39.4 35.5 1953 352.5 309.7 
1885 12.2 9.2 1916 50.3 44.1 1954 353.0 313.4 
1886 11.4 8.7 1917 61.6 57.4 1955 450.8 393.1 
1887 12.7 10.6 1918 67.2 58.0 1956 458.5 400.1 
1888 14.8 13.8 1919 84.8 84.0 1957 477.5 405.8 
1889 15.9 14.7 1920 103.9 84.5 1958 436.4 366.4 
1890 16.9 13.5 1921 56.6 48.5 1959 456.0 401.4 
1891 15.0 12.7 1922 53.3 48.4 1960 475.8 405.7 
1892 14.0 12.1 1923 67.7 59.9 1961 462.4 386.1 
1893 13.9 12.0 1924 74.3 64.3 1962 470.9 398.7 
1894 14.3 12.2 1925 116.9 105.0 1963 499.3 405.5 
1895 14.6 12.2 1926 116.3 102.1 1964 406.0 323.5 
1896 14.9 12.5 1927 108.6 92.4 1965 444.2 350.5 
1897 15.2 12.7 1928 90.5 76.2 1966 474.4 393.7 
1898 16.6 13.7 1929 94.5 76.9 1967 514.2 407.4 
1899 19.4 16.5 1930 73.0 61.4 1968 694.5 531.6 
1900 23.1 19.0 1931 45.9 38.0 1969 853.0 647.7 
Source: 1870-1939: ARSS (1870-1940); 1946-1966: SYB (1946-1966), CSAR (1950-1960); 
1967-1969: YSS (1967-1972).
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Appendix v. Structure of import and export of Singapore, 1870-1910. 
(£ thous. in current prices) 
 Pepper Gambir Rattan Fish Tin 
 
Import Export Import Export Import Export Import Export Import Export 
1870 191 313 224 397 101 112 14 8 - - 
1875 400 588 440 803 119 114 126 86 - - 
1880 261 409 438 638 158 305 196 215 - - 
1885 722 699 670 641 223 302 399 269 - - 
1890 816 1,005 904 1,028 384 431 596 409 319 1,848 
1895 332 376 753 874 309 363 525 496 973 2,065 
1900 633 621 604 682 556 680 622 645 2,914 3,526 
1905 880 860 592 627 386 463 840 787 2,709 3,988 
1910 591 760 614 665 367 454 1,011 896 3,179 4,041 
 Copra Gutta-percha Rice and opium Cotton goods 
 
Import Export Import Export Import Export Import Export 
1870 - - 354 436 1,084 733 1,690 1,101 
1875 - - 95 78 1,676 1,286 1,212 892 
1880 47 94 313 299 1,996 1,633 1,393 1,056 
1885 235 212 246 388 1,808 1,383 1,318 821 
1890 160 227 708 834 2,684 1,896 1,499 896 
1895 300 335 236 330 2,292 1,853 762 581 
1900 425 374 1,013 1,465 3,395 2,612 1,182 872 
1905 708 625 207 283 3,585 3,030 1,348 882 
1910 1,496 1,586 260 576 5,118 4,074 1,340 788 
Source: ARSS (1870-1910); Chiang Hai Ding, A History, 196-7.
208  Genesis of a Growth Triangle 
Appendix vi. Export of major commodities from Singapore, 1911-1970. 
(£ thous. in current prices) 
 
Tin Rubber Copra Canned Pineapple Palm oil Petroleum Rice Manufactured goods 
1911 4,828 1,451 - 289 - 55 3,456 - 
1915 6,415 6,376 - 366 - 141 4,939 - 
1920 8,225 27,131 - 838 - 228 3,406 - 
1925 8,466 47,356 - 865 - 8,300 5,276 - 
1929 8,933 21,423 - 1,019 - 5,775 - - 
1934 5,290 14,474 - 697 121 5,210 692 - 
1939 8,113 20,859 - 1,035 - 6,133 992 - 
1946 64 30,838 44 - 343 821 26 - 
1950 24,176 163,976 8,016 1,289 2,595 18,749 925 - 
1953 20,104 87,604 - 2,077 2,067 39,858 3,292 - 
1956 16,179 141,955 1,937 3,389 2,420 52,070 3,433 - 
1960 6,022 166,454 3,547 2,946 2,778 32,580 7,260 104,158 
1964 701 75,242 - 4,332 2,908 42,196 2,908 128,763 
1967 617 88,105 - 5,281 4,545 78,818 4,545 153,630 
1970 269 95 158,800 - 6,936 11,842 111,756 11,842 
Source: 1911-1939: ARSS (1911-1940); 1946: SYB (1946), ARFM (1949); 1950-1960: CSAR (1950-1960); 1960-1970: ABSM (1964-1968), CSAR 
(1965-1966), SYB (1966) , TDAR (1969), YSS (1967-1972). 
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Appendix vii. Imports and exports of Johor, 1870-1938. 
(£ thous. in current prices) 
 
Import Export Less re-export 
1870 - 225 - 
1875 - 394 - 
1880 - 317 - 
1886 501 726 - 
1891 478 765 - 
1896 382 688 - 
1897 352 604 - 
1898 353 599 - 
1899 332 718 - 
1901 546 1,093 - 
1906 446 1,031 - 
1911 615 1,025 - 
1912 - 1,461 - 
1913 1,086 1,658 - 
1914 1,014 1,929 - 
1915 1,069 3,374 - 
1916 1,487 4,881 - 
1917 2,030 5,757 - 
1918 2,272 5,084 17 
1919 3,445 8,317 26 
1920 5,003 8,015 22 
1924 3,931 5,656 41 
1925 5,820 13,794 58 
1927 4,600 10,305 106 
1928 4,376 7,623 153 
1929 5,294 11,576 242 
1930 5,499 6,968 156 
1931 3,436 4,083 153 
1932 2,545 3,457 111 
1933 2,633 4,199 198 
1937 5,518 12,383 334 
1938 5,062 7,323 179 
Source: 1870-1911: Courtenay, Trade, 228; 1911-1938: JAR (1911-1939). 
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Appendix viii. Major exports of Johor, 1870-1938. 





Copra Tapioca Rubber 
1870 139 86 - - - - 
1875 250 144 - - - - 
1880 225 92 - - - - 
1885 324 237 - - - - 
1890 472 376 - - - - 
1903 340 244 - - - - 
1910 210 117 140 111 63 175 
1912 222 - 187 169 42 525 
1913 177 163 170 241 39 758 
1918 177 29 208 273 176 3,533 
1920 83 24 433 854 238 5,523 
1927 27 2 146 642 62 8,061 
1930 22 0 155 605 94 4,581 




Tin ore Iron ore Bauxite Timber Fish 
1912 - 42 - - 35 18 
1913 - 62 - - 22 14 
1918 - 491 - - 78 - 
1920 - 466 - - 69 24 
1927 523 275 239 - 151 - 
1930 590 74 425 - 100 12 
1938 385 199 321 33 - - 
Source: JAR (1911-1939). 
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Appendix ix. Malaya external trade, 1947-1968. 
(£ mill. in current prices) 
 
Exports Imports M export to S M import from S 
1947 97 73 - - 
1948 130 101 57 43 
1949 137 109 65 47 
1950 304 154 - - 
1951 394 218 - - 
1952 249 194 - - 
1953 186 169 79 65 
1954 190 154 - - 
1955 277 180 - - 
1956 264 204 97 81 
1957 254 212 - - 
1958 220 193 - - 
1959 289 203 - - 
1960 341 251 99 98 
1961 306 260 - - 
1962 306 286 - - 
1963 312 294 - - 
1964 324 294 89 38 
1965 361 304 105 43 
1966 363 307 111 46 
1967 339 300 99 37 
1968 446 444 116 40 
Source: ARMD (1947-1970), ARFM (1949), ASTSIJB (1963-1966), ABSM (1964-1973), 
VSWM (1967). 
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Appendix x. Major exports of Johor, 1949-1970, volume or value (in current prices). 
 
















1949 - - 736 19 - - - 
1954 - - - - - 166 - 
1958 - - - - - 262 - 
1961 - - - - - 410 63 
1963 - - - 30 506 444 51 
1966 - - - 57 675 940 123 
1968 833 103 - - - 786 132 
1970 978 168 6,000 - - - - 
Source: ARMD (1947-1970), ARFM (1949), ASTSIJB (1963-1966), ABSM (1964-1973), 
VSWM (1967), RSH (1968-1972), OCTS (1968-1972).
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Appendix xi. Imports and exports of Riau Archipelago, 1868-1938. 
(£ thous. in current prices) 
Year Imports Exports Year Imports Exports Year Imports Exports Year Imports Exports 
1868 162 233 1901 73 113 1917 643 4,167 1925 674 825 
1871 174 242 1902 88 143 1918 933 3,475 1926 924 743 
1879 262 446 1903 107 254 1919 1,326 7,508 1927 609 583 
1883 168 341 1904 130 249 1920 1,159 6,590 1928 804 678 
1885 147 420 1905 98 243 1913 460 2,155 1929 787 1,003 
1890 309 482 1906 101 194 1914 506 3,007 1930 602 813 
1891 246 344 1907 93 246 1915 343 2,861 1931 322 407 
1892 155 286 1908 150 182 1916 413 4,238 1932 193 311 
1893 127 227 1909 123 250 1917 643 4,167 1933 126 281 
1894 111 213 1910 187 354 1918 933 3,475 1934 113 376 
1895 102 232 1911 226 578 1919 1,326 7,508 1935 152 422 
1896 79 224 1912 340 891 1920 1,159 6,590 1936 223 712 
1897 202 200 1913 460 2,155 1921 1,972 5,428 1937 398 1,325 
1898 104 187 1914 506 3,007 1922 1,617 6,565 1938 599 868 
1899 107 190 1915 343 2,861 1923 526 282 - - - 
1900 80 113 1916 413 4,238 1924 587 764 - - - 
Note: 1911-1922: imports and exports both include oil products. 
Source: SHS (1868-1925), JN (1925-1942), MCKS (1925-1940).
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Appendix xii. Imports and exports of Indonesia, 1951-1971. 





1951 3,383 4,918 - 
1952 10,855 10,664 - 
1954 8,739 9,609 - 
1954 7,216 9,928 - 
1955 7,264 10,830 - 
1956 9,813 10,606 12,046 
1957 9,217 11,016 15,341 
1958 6,244 9,154 20,501 
1959 5,500 10,732 25,608 
1960 26,001 37,835 38,013 
1961 35,732 35,468 48,555 
1962 29,120 30,675 80,439 
1963 23,488 31,337 - 
1964 28,086 32,589 - 
1965 32,321 31,795 - 
1966 - 30,732 - 
1967 - 30,129 - 
1968 - 33,086 - 
1969 - 38,656 - 
1970 - 52,552 - 
1971 - 55,405 - 
Source: SI (1951-1971). 
 
Appendix xiii. Registered oil products export from Pulau Sambu, 1911-1916. 
(£ thous. in current prices) 
Year Value Year Value 
1911  174 1917 3,828 
1912  393 1918 3,015 
1913 1,787 1919 6,840 
1914 2,468 1920 4,440 
1915 2,446 1921 4,880 
1916 3,991 1922 6,028 
Source: MCKS (1911-1916). 
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Appendix xiv. Major imports into Riau Archipelago, 1866-1938. 












1866 91 12 - - 10 
1883 94 3 - 43 29 
1895 40 4 - 37 20 
1900 28 2 - 27 24 
1905 39 1 - 28 30 
1911 72 3 1 - 149 
1918 387 3 1 6 535 
1925 140 5 1 43 485 
1928 - - - - - 
1930 278 32 23 47 223 
1934 74 10 9 15 6 
1938 75 8 197 42 279 
Source: SHS (1868-1925), JN (1925-1942), MCKS (1925-1940).  
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Appendix xv. Major exports from Riau Archipelago (excluding oil products), 1866-1909. 





Copra Rottan Fish Sago Wood 
1866 133 78 - - 0 1 - - 
1879 271 150 0 - 0 - 5 - 
1885 180 209 0 - 3 6 28 - 
1890 213 188 - - 12 1 39 - 
1895 164 51 2 0 10 1 3 0 
1900 83 23 
 
0 10 1 4 - 
1905 175 27 1 1 - 2 16 - 
1909 99 19 26 62 - - 34 2 
 
 
Tin Bauxite Rottan Fish Penang-nuts Sago 
1911 - - - 3 - 27 
1915 - - - 28 - 31 
1920 122 - - 15 - 77 
1924 - - - 6 13 149 
1927 - - - 55 1 57 
1929 205 - - 120 1 46 
1933 57 - 4 29 3 - 
1938 188 - - 36 5 20 
1973* 562 2650 19 95 - - 
 Wood Gambir Getah Percha Pepper Copra Rubber 
1911 - 154 1 25 182 - 
1915 2 91 - 6 251 1 
1920 - 116 - 1 345 1,448 
1924 - 145 - - 325 117 
1927 3 27 - - 164 231 
1929 24 35 - - 191 288 
1933 - - - - 333 104 
1938 32 41 - - 103 183 
1973* 10,979** - - - 319 7,719 
Note: * The Riau Province ** Wood, charcoal. 
Source: SHS (1868-1925), JN (1925-1942), MCKS (1925-1940), Lampiran (1973).  
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Appendix xvi. Interinsular trade of Riau Islands, 1957-1962. 
(Rp. mill. in current prices) 
 Export from the Riau Islands to other places 
 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 
West Java 5.2 11.2 19.2 9.1 12.2 20.9 
Central Java 3.8 20.4 20.6 12.6 1.5 1. 
East Java 1.6 0.3 - 4.1 14.8 14.1 
North Sumatra 0.1 - - 0.1 - - 
Central Sumatra 0.4 6.2 7.1 3.2 2.9 3.3 
South Sumatra 44.1 2.4 20.3 3.1 2.7 14.7 
West Kalimantan 1.1 2.3 4.7 2.9 1.9 3.2 
Central 
Kalimantan 
- - 0.1 - - - 
South Sulawesi - - - - 0.1 0.5 
Nusa Tenggara - - - - - - 
Total 56.3 42.8 72 35.1 36.3 57.7 
 
Import from other places to the Riau Islands 
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 
West Java 5.4 18 8.2 13.4 16.1 30.1 
Central Java 2.8 2.2 0.3 - 1.2 - 
East Java 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.7 - 
North Sumatra - 0.1 - - 0.1 - 
Central Sumatra 2.1 4.3 1.2 9.1 4.9 13 
South Sumatra 3.8 0.8 0.5 0.3 1.1 1.1 
West Kalimantan 1.6 3.2 5 7.1 2 2.9 
Central 
Kalimantan 
- - - 0.6 0.2 0.7 
South Sulawesi - - - - - 0.1 
Nusa Tenggara 15.8 28.7 15.8 30.6 26.3 47.9 
Total 31.6 57.4 31.6 61.2 52.6 95.8 
Source: SI (1957-1962).  
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Appendix xvii. Exports by principal ports in Indonesia, 1963-1971. 
(£ mill. in current prices) 
 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
Java and Madura 33.3 39.6 31.4 41.6 31.4 
Sumatra 183.1 186.0 192.7 166.9 179.2 
Tanjung Pinang 1.5 1.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 
Indonesia 249.3 258.6 252.8 242.4 237.6 
 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Java and Madura 35.5 30.3 48.0 63.8 
Sumatra 226.2 277.9 359.5 351.5 
Tanjung Pinang 1.6 2.2 2.9 0.8 
Indonesia 304.5 355.7 483.6 509.8 
Source: SI (1963-1971), RdA (1975). 
 
Appendix xviii. Vessels entering into and departing from Singapore, 1870-1907. 
Year 
Entrance Clearance 








No. 1000 n.r.t. No. 
1000 
n.r.t. 
No. 1000 n.r.t. No. 
1000 
n.r.t. 
1870 1,604 668 2455 78 1,557 626 2,763 78 
1871 1,678 819 2376 83 1,689 680 3,348 81 
1875 2,261 1,284 3171 84 2,348 1,003 3,462 83 
1876 2,149 1,454 3716 94 2,182 1,428 3,718 103 
1877 2,168 1,457 - - - - - - 
1880 2,120 1,893 a B 2,309 1,802 a B 
1881 2,443 1,821 a-185 b-12 2,418 1,790 a-86 b-7 
1884 8,272 2,451 - - 8,222 2,402 - - 
1885 8,539 2,703 - - 8,532 2,652 - - 
1886 8,796 2,739 - - 8,802 2,687 - - 
1889 3,867 3,066 6,619 255 3,848 3,048 6,619 255 
1890 3,646 2,990 5,546 209 3,621 2,956 5,515 213 
1891 4,184 3,325 7,293 261 4,155 3,289 7,188 259 
1904 - 12,332/2 - -  12,332/2 - - 
1905 - 12,764/2 - -  12,764/2 - - 
1906 - 13,334/2 - -  13,334/2 - - 
1907 - 13,580/2 - -  13,580/2 - - 
Note: 1884-1886: all vessels; After 1891, ‘indigenous craft’ also includes ‘steamer under 50 
n.r.t.’. 
Source: ARSS (1870-1907). 
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Appendix xix. Total tonnage of vessels entering into and clearing out from Singapore, 1875-1918. 
(thous. n.r.t.) 
Year Country British German Dutch Other European countries* Asian countries** Other countries*** 
1875 
Tons 1,510 - - - - - 
Percentage 64 - - - - - 
1898 
Tons 5,193 - - - - - 
Percentage 63 - - - - - 
1905 
Tons 7,746 1,829 1,235 1,825 116 271 
Percentage 61 14 10 12 1 2 
1910 
Tons 7,809 2,001 1,671 1,763 1,274**** 191 
Percentage 53 14 11 12 9 1 
1918 
Tons 3,349 - 1,702 807 3,404***** 145 
Percentage 36 - 18 9 36 2 
Note: * including Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Russia, Portugal and Spain; ** including China, Japan, Sarawak and Siam; *** 
including the USA and Australia； **** only Japan: 1,041; ***** only Japan, 2,769. 
Source: 1898: Great Britain, Trade. Others: ARSS (1875, 1905, 1910, 1918).
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Appendix xx. Merchant vessels clearing out from Singapore, 1900-1975. 
Source: 1910-1939: ARSS (1910-1940); 1947-1951: SYB (1966); 1952-1971: Huff, The 













No. 1000 n.r.t. 
1000 
n.r.t. 
No. 1000 n.r.t. 
1900 5,392 4,649 4,834 1931 15,291 7,020 14,599 
1901 6,008 4,924 5,454 1932 15,013 6,725 14,375 
1902 6,264 5,086 5,693 1933 14,800 6,428 14,214 
1903 6,607 5,290 5,994 1934 15,522 6,814 14,897 
1904 6,743 5,429 6,156 1935 15,754 6,796 15,116 
1905 6,984 5,268 6,402 1936 15,849 6,534 15,187 
1906 7,215 5,281 6,662 1937 17,096 6,761 16,397 
1907 7,324 5,161 6,784 1938 16,330 6,474 15,631 
1908 7,461 5,161 6,948 1939 16,494 6,455 15,809 
1909 7,503 5,320 7,069 1949 29,925/2 - - 
1910 7,897 5,341 7,419 1950 30,905/2 - - 
1911 8,258 5,761 7,718 1951 35,406/2 - - 
1912 8,738 5,957 8,221 1952 21,150 7,995 20,312 
1913 9,205 6,084 8,618 1953 23,020 8,708 22,267 
1914 8,690 5,962 7,994 1954 24,566 9,444 24,012 
1915 7,768 5,821 6,964 1955 26,541 9,979 26,025 
1916 7,401 5,774 6,612 1956 30,035 10,702 29,556 
1917 6,173 5,326 5,362 1958 32,505 10,755 32,065 
1918 5,509 4,752 4,696 1959 33,291 10,712 32,879 
1919 7,922 5,615 7,024 1960 34,923 10,842 34,449 
1920 9,443 5,772 8,562 1961 38,395 10,883 37,919 
1921 9,793 5,699 8,972 1962 41,912 11,104 41,405 
1922 9,875 5,868 9,142 1963 41,485 11,597 41,085 
1923 11,040 6,243 10,258 1964 40,854 10,296 40,670 
1924 11,798 6,488 10,946 1965 44,523 10,934 44,325 
1925 12,828 7,136 11,990 1966 50,892 12,188 50,676 
1926 13,671 7,996 12,852 1967 57,823 13,718 57,535 
1927 14,483 8,982 13,634 1968 63,338 15,524 63,037 
1928 15,563 9,705 14,697 1969 64,884 16,978 64,535 
1929 16,460 9,768 15,579 1970 74,690 19,019 74,277 
1930 16,606 9,112 15,920 1971 78,317 19,681 77,648 
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Appendix xxi. Entrance and clearance of ships in Singapore, 1961-1971. 
Year 
Vessels > 75 n.r.t Vessels < 75 n.r.t and native crafts 













1961 11,553 38,104 11,526 37,977 8,662 473 8,740 476 
1962 11,812 41,577 11,775 41,466 8,617 452 9,051 507 
1963 11,653 41,125 11,597 41,085 7,668 377 7,768 399 
1964 10,326 40,820 10,296 40,670 7,701 192 7,682 185 
1965 10,928 44,454 10,934 44,324 1,612 198 1,600 198 
1966 12,230 50,817 12,188 50,676 15,399 220 15,330 216 
1967 13,811 57,758 13,718 57,535 24,390 288 24,401 288 
1968 15,614 63,437 15,524 63,037 17,578 305 17,556 301 
1969 16,634 63,901 16,568 63,711 15,900 341 15,973 349 
1970 18,422 73,847 18,269 73,037 15,646 427 15,659 462 
1971 19,073 77,362 18,723 76,449 15,936 630 15,694 670 
Source: YSS (1971/1972). 
 










+ or – on last year totals 
1959 
Indonesian 1161 +150 351,252 +62,257 
Total 21,436  65,851,240  
1965 
Indonesian     
Malaysian 559  441,057  
Singapore 1,021  486,202  
Total 21,682  88,778,811  
1966 
Indonesia 42 + 42 32,939 + 32,939 
Malaysia 702 + 143 382,832 - 58,225 
Total 24,418 + 2,556 101,493,470 + 12,714,659 
1970 
Indonesian 4,731 +406 2,049,716 +11,234 
Malaysian 902 -51 423,574 + 37,003 
Singapore 3,171 +764 3,491,991 +868,866 
Total 38,066 +4,017 148,724,539 +19,425,904 
Note: Before 1965, figures for Malaysia and Singapore were included in the total of British 
ships. 
Source: ARMD (1959, 1966, 1970), SYB (1966).
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Appendix xxiii. Cargo discharged and loaded at Singapore, vessels of all tonnages at ‘roads’ and wharves, 1954-1955. 
(thous. freight tons) 
Year Region 
Direct Transhipment 








Mineral oil in 
bulk 
General 




The Riau Islands 17.79 40.5 5.74 7.72 0.06 - 0.98 - 
The Riau Islands, 
vessels > 75 n.r.t. 
5.11 40.5 0.28 7.72 0.06 - 0.97 - 
Sumatra 35.74 195.48 3.66 12.59 10.32 - 
 
- 
Indonesia 76.49 333.09 15.04 22.79 23.78 - 9.54 - 
Oct, 
1954 
The Riau Islands 19.1 - 5.87 - 0.04 - 0.83 - 
The Riau Islands, 
vessels > 75 n.r.t. 
6.43 - 0.26 - 0.04 - 0.83 - 
Sumatra 35.41 154.57 5.37 12.46 
 
- 6.19 - 
Indonesia 78.5 211.37 17.02 12.46 17.27 - 10.3 - 
Aug, 
1955 
The Riau Islands 16.59 18.48 9.78 9 0.81 - 1.25 - 
The Riau Islands, 
vessels > 75 n.r.t. 
3.69 18.48 2.99 9 0.74 - 1.25 - 
Sumatra 17.42 190.6 6.8 69.48 11.4 - 7.53 - 
Indonesia 59.54 284.89 22.83 98.45 24.03 - 13.25 - 
Oct, 
1959 
The Riau Islands 11.65 
 
4.69 
     
The Riau Islands, 2.47 - 0.26 - - - - - 













Mineral oil in 
bulk 
General 
Mineral oil in 
bulk 
vessels > 75 n.r.t. 
Sumatra 32.54 211.48 4.28 8.34 10.28 - 7.41 - 
Indonesia 71.41 235.99 15.28 19.82 18.65 - 13.24 - 
Jun, 
1960 
The Riau Islands 8.82 - 4.07 - - - - - 
The Riau Islands, 
vessels > 75 n.r.t. 
1.38 - 0.1 - - - - - 
Sumatra 20.85 111.31 5.98 1.53 6.85 - 4.64 - 
Indonesia 53.69 176.15 16.54 19.84 14.25 - 11.36 - 
Sep, 
1960 
The Riau Islands 11.54 1.39 5.51 0.27 - - - - 
The Riau Islands, 
vessels > 75 n.r.t. 
3.52 1.39 0.03 0.27 - - - - 
Sumatra 23.91 119.48 6.31 40.64 8.17 - 5.84 - 
Indonesia 57.95 181.52 17.07 56.23 10.62 - 12.07 - 
Note: Sumatra refers to mainland Sumatra Island, not including the Riau Islands, and Banka and Billiton. 
Source: MSMDESS (1955-1960).
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Appendix xxiv. Vessels > 75 n.r.t. arriving and departing in Malaya, Singapore and Peninsular Malaysia, 1938-1969. 
(thous. n.r.t.) 
 
Malaya – entered Malaya – cleared Singapore - entered Singapore - cleared 
West Malaysia - 
entered 
West Malaysia - 
cleared 
1938 16,313 16,346 15,336 15,348 - - 
1947 9,612 9,888 9,204 9,372 - - 
1948 11,592 11,952 10,836 10,896 - - 
1949 15,480 15,228 14,208 14,052 - - 
1950 15,852 15,384 14,616 14,520 - - 
1951 18,876 18,516 16,884 16,716 - - 
1952 22,020 21,612 20,280 20,196 - - 
1953 23,088 22,764 22,332 22,140 - - 
1954 24,400 24,092 - - - - 
1955 26,320 26,044 - - - - 
1956 29,376 28,862 - - - - 
1957 33,184 32,854 - - - - 
1958 32,051 31,548 - - - - 
1959 32,872 32,006 - 32,879 - - 
1960 - - 34,458 34,449 - - 




Malaya – entered Malaya – cleared Singapore - entered Singapore - cleared 
West Malaysia - 
entered 
West Malaysia - 
cleared 
1961 - - 38,104 37,977 - - 
1962 - - 41,577 41,466 - - 
1963 - - 41,125 41,085 18,043 17,919 
1964 - - 40,820 40,670 19,439 19,311 
1965 - - 44,454 44,324 20,959 20,745 
1966 - - 50,817 50,676 21,508 21,383 
1967 - - 57,758 57,535 22,075 22,043 
1968 - - 63,437 63,037 21,674 22,698 
1969 - - 63,901 63,711 - - 
1970 - - 73,847 73,037 - - 
1971 - - 77,362 76,449 - - 
 Source: ARSS (1938), CSAR (1946-1947, 1950-1960), MSMDESS (1955-1960), ABSM (1964-1968), YSS (1967-1972).  
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Appendix xxv. Total number and tonnage of vessels at all ports of Johor, 1919-1932. 
(ton) 
Year Pattern of vessel 
Entered Cleared 
Number Tonnage Number Tonnage 
1919* 
Ocean-going steamers 89,205 
Coasting steamers 13,932 
1920** 
Ocean-going steamers 106,675 
Coasting steamers 17,532 
1924 - - 401,878 - 403,245 
1925 - - 510,835 - 511,928 
1926 - - 544,670 - 539,487 
1927 - - 576,112 - 574,713 
1928 
Ocean-going steamers 108 349,880 108 349,880 
Coasting steamers 5,296 196,431 5,302 196,748 
Sailing vessels 12,406 190,816 12,306 185,657 
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Year Pattern of vessel 
Entered Cleared 
Number Tonnage Number Tonnage 
Japanese steamers***    584,588 
1929 
- - 776,772 - 776,995 
Japanese steamers 113 - 113 - 
1930 
Ocean-going steamers 118 384,039 118 384,039 
Coasting steamers 5,252 201,366 5,252 201,366 
Sailing vessels 839 163,601 8,747 166,872 
Japanese steamers 118  118  
1931 - - 619,715 - 625,958 
1932 
Ocean-going steamers 90 302,348 90 302,348 
Coasting steamers 1,911 109,054 1,911 109,054 
Sailing vessels 7,157 139,512 7,152 139,752 
Note: * total tonnage of Muar; ** total tonnage of Muar and Endau; *** Japanese ocean-going steamer calling at Batu Pahat to load iron-ore 
Source: JAR (1919-1932).  
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Appendix xxvi. Vessels clearing in and out from Riau, 1866-1905. 
Year 
Total clearing in Total clearing out From Singapore To Singapore 
No. thous. n.r.t. No. thous. n.r.t. No. thous. n.r.t. No. 
thous. 
n.r.t. 
1866 527 17 545 17 461 13 429 9 
1870 735 35 721 35 668 26 596 20 
1879 1,432 48 1,410 37 1,220 25 1,217 23 
1885 1,620 130 1,672 132 1,324 61 1,388 54 
1890 1,207 118 1,254 142 1,051 59 1,036 60 
1895 1,445 107 1,490 92 1,262 53 1,270 53 
1900 1,455 133 1,612 140 1,342 109 1,515 117 
1905 916 95 982 120 870 47 918 43 
Note: Data concerning shipping with Singapore are collected from the vessels arriving and leaving for areas outside The Netherlands Indies. We 
assume that Singapore dominated these international shipping activities, thus it is possible to regard that this information could represent the 
situation. 
Source: SHS (1866-1905). 
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Appendix xxvii. Shipping of Riau Islands, 1909-1938. 
Year 
Ships to/from outside NEI Ships to/from NEI 
All vessels Steamers Sails and others Steamers 
Number Weight (m3) Number Number 1,422,785 Number Weight(m3) 
1909 5,565 1,392,552 4,724 29 64,948 400 1,422,785 
1916 13,733 3,365,502 8,925 1,218 587,893 2,847 2,161,326 
1920 20,949 5,634,087 10,957 4,772 1,268,783 4,554 3,037,384 
1923 20,930 6,010,597 9,456 3,169 903,942 4,942 4,059,682 
1930* 12,337 3,473,448 5,605 862 597,717 1,513 1,416,410 
1938* 7,122 3,079,740 2,125 1,768 2,988,225 1,521 3,057,087 
Note: * only arriving ships. 
Source: SHS (1910-1940), SSN (1910-1940). 
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Appendix xxviii. International and domestic shipping arriving at various ports in Riau Islands, 1909-1938. 
  Sambu Tdj.Pinang Tdj.Balai Penuba Terempa Tdj.Uban 
  Inter. Dom. Inter. Dom. Inter. Dom. Inter. Dom. Inter. Dom. Inter. Dom. 
1909 
Number 1,792 83 403 462 195 84 - - 
Tonnage (thous. m3) 629 255 63 33 31 36 - - 
1916 
Number. 6,795 571 185 754 352 52 54 200 26 69 - - 
Tonnage (thous. m3) 1,766 759 76 317 21 5 8 33 17 39 - - 
1920 
Number 12,583 372 105 779 61 439 - 163 28 73 - - 
Tonnage (thous. m3) 3,864 577 48 350 6 31 - 28 7 63 - - 
1923 
Number 12,003 412 170 1,012 157 393 4 199 2 133 - - 
Tonnage (thous. m3) 3,814 951 78 433 15 37 - 25 - 164 - - 
1930 
Number 11,179 23,921 813 539 344 940 1 351 - 152 - - 
Tonnage (thous. m3) 3,199 1,421 236 242 58 103 - 53 - 171 - - 
1938 
Number 5,425 1,129 896 721 624 752 - 295 - 115 177 379 
Tonnage(thous. m3) 1,911 1,414 853 2,135 66 58 - 63 - 124 249 2,290 
Source: SHS (1910-1940), SSN (1910-1940). 
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1908 1,116 915 - - 1925 15,330 5,646 1,012 554 
1909 1,994 1,220 - - 1926 15,608 6,228 892 517 
1910 2,727 1,565 - - 1927 15,545 5,546 1,016 482 
1911 3,294 1,773 - - 1928 13,798 5,271 1,119 502 
1912 3,781 1,811 955 438 1929 11,868 4,616 1,271 484 
1913 3,325 1,430 934 420 1930 11,464 4,633 1,194 458 
1914 4,894 1,607 833 422 1931 9,526 3,187 1,259 415 
1915 6,562 2,229 842 470 1932 7,684 2,864 1,085 389 
1916 7,147 2,470 878 371 1933 7,611 3,922 1,074 608 
1917 10,309 3,301 892 536 1934 6,516 3,704 1,130 698 
1918 11,416 3,566 748 398 1935 6,180 3,377 1,120 835 
1919 10,800 3,665 838 397 1936 6,539 3,567 1,303 1,726 
1920 12,775 4,385 823 408 1937 6,714 3,965 1,557 2,753 
1921 13,004 4,291 660 433 1938 6,423 3,907 1,541 2,988 
1922 13,579 4,251 647 415 1939 5,838 3,760 1,557 2,051 
1923 13,035 4,832 909 450 1940 5,553 3,846 1,483 2,273 
1924 12,561 4,626 905 359 - - - - - 
Source: CEI, vol. 12a. 
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Appendix xxx. Capacity of international shipping in Indonesia, 1948-1971. 
Year Number 
Total capacity, 
b.r.t./g.r.t., 1000 tons 
Remark 
1948 65 125 KPM 













KPM, freighters and passenger ships 
National shipping companies 
1957 100 195 
KPM, freighters and passenger ships 
ceased its interinsular operations 
1957 73 55 
Pelni and other national shipping 
companies 
1958 ? 188 Pelni  and national merchant fleet 
End of 
1958 
217 272 All fleet 
1959 178 134 Indonesian owned, > 100 g.r.t. by size 
1960 228 147 Indonesian owned, > 100 g.r.t. by size 
1962 304 301 
Indonesian owned, > 100 g.r.t. by size. 
Among these, 290 coastal and 
inter-islands, 14 international 
1965 278 537 All fleet 
1971 327 558 All fleet 
Source: RBI (1948-1971), SI (1968-1969). 
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Appendix xxxi. Freight destined for foreign ports from Indonesia, 1939-1965. 
(thous. tons) 
Year Total Loaded Unloaded 
1939 7,568 5,677 1,891 
1952 5,407 2,870 2,537 
1958 4,454 2,142 2,311 
1962 4,577 2,081 2,496 
1965 4,511 2,346 2,165 
Source: SSN (1939), RBI (1952-1965), SI (1968-1969). 
 
 
Appendix xxxii. Arrival of vessels from foreign ports to Indonesia, 1939-1961. 
Year Number Tonnage in 1000 n.r.t. 
1939 10,872 12,469 
1952 12,993 12,925 
1958 8,483 10,341 
1959 9,015 11,361 
1960 9,230 11,512 
1961 4,154 10,771 
Source: SI (1963).  
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Appendix xxxiii. Cargo loaded and discharged in Malaya, Singapore and Indonesia, 
1948-1971. 
(thous. freight tons) 














Indonesia -  
discharged 
1948 - - 1,428 1920 2,700 
1949 - - 1,776 3120 3,500 
1950 3,600 6,024 2,532 4308 - - 
1951 3,876 7,536 2,856 5292 - 
1952 4,623 7,438 2,640 5208 6,237 5,954 
1953 7,354 10,888 5,172 8640 3,640 
1954 7,485 11,366 - - 3,312 
1955 8,700 13,160 - - - - 
1956 9,877 13,727 - - - - 
1957 10,208 14,094 - - - - 
1958 8,727 12,713 - - 7,024 7,192 
1959 - - - - 7,487 7,780 
1960 - - 5,287 9,602   
1961 - - 6,507 11,750 8,220 9,162 
1962 - - 7,663 13,403 7,577 7,992 
1963 - - 7,853 13,740 - - 
1964 - - 6,169 11,882 - - 
1965 - - 7,980 13,366 - - 
1966 - - 10,094 16,543 - - 
1967 - - 11,943 18,397 - - 
1968 - - 13,959 21,678 - - 
1969 - - 15,334 22,569 - - 
1970 - - 15,720 26,439 1,913 
1971 - - 19,269 28,817 2,001 
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Appendix xxxiv. Exchange rates: 100 pound sterling in various currencies. 
Currency Exchange rate (year average) 
Spanish, Mexican dollars 1870-1905: 450-1,126 (see extra table) 
Straits, Malayan, Japanese, Malaya and 
British Borneo 
1906-1967: 857 
(60 dollar = 7 pound sterling) 
Singapore dollar, Malaysia dollar 1968-1970: 732 
Netherlands Indian guilder 1870-1940s: 1,210* 
Japanese money 1942-1945: 1,210 
Indonesian rupiah 
1946-1950s: no international recognition 
1959-1965: devaluation, spiralling inflation 
1967: 41,084; 1968: 70,925; 1969: 77,926; 
1970: 86,933; 1971: 95,800; 1972: 103,851; 
1973: 101,815 
Note: * NIG approximately equals NG in value 
Source: Denzel, Handbook, 540-53. 
 
 
Appendix xxxv. Exchange rates: 100 pound sterling in dollar. 
Year E. Rate Year E. Rate Year E. Rate Year E. Rate 
1870 448 1879 532 1888 644 1897 1,006 
1871 454 1880 526 1889 640 1898 1,031 
1872 442 1881 528 1890 585 1899 1,003 
1873 456 1882 528 1891 613 1900 978 
1874 469 1883 542 1892 695 1901 1,013 
1875 481 1884 540 1893 775 1902 1,141 
1876 500 1885 564 1894 932 1903 1,124 
1877 492 1886 606 1895 940 1904 1,035 
1878 516 1887 620 1896 918 1905 973 
Source: Denzel, Handbook, 540-53. 
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Dyers 40 - 
Tannery establishments 20 - 
Food production 
Bread and Biscuit factories 13 - 
Oil factories 8 9 
Ice factories 2 - 
Mills-flour 1 - 
Mills-rice cleaning 22 - 
Mills-sago 11 - 
Soda water factories 5 - 
Engineering and foundries 8 - 
Brick-making Establishments 4 13 
Potteries 6 - 
Printing establishments 8 - 
Soap factories 21 4+ 
Dock and shipping repair companies 2 - 
Telegraphy companies 2 - 
Telephone companies 1 - 
Gas companies 1 - 
Source: STDS (1889), CSAR (1947). 
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Appendix xxxvii. Establishment of insurance companies in Singapore in 1891 and 1907. 
1891 1907 
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the 
United States 
North China Insurance Company, 
Limited 
The Straits Insurance Co., Limited, The 
Straits Fire Insurance Company, Limited 
(16 clerks, 3 agencies) 
Singapore Insurance Company, Limited 
(11 clerks, subscribed capital: £ 350,000, 
paid-up capital: £ 70,000) 
Fire Insurance Association of Singapore 
Singapore Marine Insurance Agents 
Association 
New Zealand Insurance Company, Limited, 
China Fire Insurance Company Ltd., Yangtsze 
Insurance Association, Ltd. 
China Mutual Life Insurance Co., Ltd. 
Commercial Union Assurance Co., Ltd. 
The Manufacturers Life Insurance Company 
The Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. 
The Marine and General Mutual Life Assurance 
Society 
North China Insurance Company, Limited 
Shanghai Life Insurance Co., Ltd. 
South British Fire and Marne Co. 
The Straits Insurance Co., Limited 
Sun Life Assurance Co., of Canada 
Union Insurance Society of Canton, Limited 
Source: STDS (1891, 1907). 
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Appendix xxxviii. Principal statistics of manufacturing production by industry in 1970. 
(£ mill. in current prices) 
Category Input Output 
Value 
added 
Food manufacturing 64.6 75.3 10.4 
Beverage industries 4.3 9.1 4.8 
Manufacture of cigarette and tobacco 9.9 13.3 3.4 
Manufacture of textiles 8.3 11.5 3.2 
Manufacture of wearing apparel, excluding footwear 8.4 11.7 3.3 
Manufacture of leather products, except footwear and 
wearing 
1.6 2.0 0.4 
Manufacture of foot wear 1.5 2.4 0.9 
Sawmills and Manufacture of wood and cork, except 
furniture 
17.2 25.5 8.3 
Manufacture of furniture and fixture, except primary metal 1.7 3.3 1.5 
Manufacture of paper 3.4 5.2 1.7 
Printing, publishing and allied industries 6.2 13.4 7.0 
Manufacture of industrial chemicals 2.6 4.8 2.2 
Manufacture of other chemical products 5.9 10.6 4.6 
Petroleum refineries and Manufacture of petroleum and coal 138.1 166.9 28.7 
Processing of natural gums, excluding rubber processing 1.8 2.0 0.2 
Manufacture of rubber products, except rubber footwear 2.8 5.4 2.6 
Manufacture of plastic products 3.2 4.8 1.6 
Manufacture of pottery, china and earthenware 0.2 0.5 0.3 
Manufacture of glass and glass products 0.9 2.0 1.0 
Manufacture of bricks, tiles, and clay products 0.3 1.1 0.8 
Manufacture of cement 3.9 4.9 1.0 
Manufacture of structural cements and concrete products 1.0 1.5 0.5 
Manufacture of non-metallic mineral 1.4 2.3 0.9 
Iron and steel basis industries 4.5 6.9 2.3 
Non-ferrous metal basic industries 2.7 3.4 0.7 
Manufacture of fabricated metal, except machinery and 
equip. 
19.3 29.8 9.8 
Manufacture of machinery, except electrical 5.7 10.2 3.9 
Manufacture of electrical machinery, apparatus 21.2 38.7 17.4 
Manufacture of transport equipment 19.3 45.1 21.8 
Manufacture of professional and scientific measuring … 1.2 1.7 0.5 
Other Manufacturing industries 12.1 16.2 3.9 
Rubber processing 93.9 98.7 4.8 
Granite quarrying 0.2 1.9 1.7 
Total 473.4 632.1 155.9 
Source: YSS (1970). 
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Appendix xxxix. Output of manufacturing in Singapore in 1972. 





Garments and Related goods 4.4 
Wood and cork 4.2 
Furniture and fixtures 0.4 
Paper and paper products 1 
printing and publishing 1.9 
Leather products 0 
Rubber products 0.7 
Chemicals 3.3 
Petroleum products 31.5 
Non-metallic mineral products 1.9 
Basic metals 1.2 
Metal products 3.6 
Machinery 2.3 
Electrical machinery 17.9 
Transport equipment 10.9 
Miscellaneous products 3.1 
Source: Yoshihara, Foreign Investment, 177, table 2.5. 
 
Appendix xl. Industrial distribution of private companies in Singapore in 1973. 
Category Foreign Singapore  Total 
Food, beverage, tobacco 42 6 48 
Textiles 56 7 63 
Chemicals 83 10 93 
Petroleum and oil products 14 0 14 
Metals 60 3 63 
Machinery and equipment 25 1 26 
Electrical products and electronic products 56 2 58 
Scientific and photographic equipment 6 1 7 
Others 93 21 114 
Total 435 51 486 
Source: Yoshihara, Foreign Investment, 226, table S. 
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Appendix xli. Companies registered in Singapore at the end of the year, 1948-1950. 
 1950 1949 1948 
Local companies 924 821 781 
Foreign companies 284 258 239 
Source: Report of the Registrar of Companies, Singapore, 1950. 
 
 
Appendix xlii. Local and foreign companies registered in Singapore from 1925 to 1950. 
Year Local foreign 
1925 32 26 
1926 49 34 
1927 53 32 
1928 42 24 
1929 41 29 
1930 33 24 
1931 28 15 
1932 41 18 
1933 33 15 
1934 39 13 
1935 42 19 
1936 43 15 
1937 50 8 
1938 57 26 
1939 52 22 
1940 45 19 
1941 49 19 
1942 1 - 
1943 - - 
1944 - - 
1945 - - 
1946 114 16 
1947 183 57 
1948 126 38 
1949 111 25 
1950 125 25 
Source: Report of the Registrar of Companies, Singapore, 1950. 
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Rice millings - 2 - 93 - - 
Flour meal - - - 22 46 36 
Ice lollipop 9 3 1 12 12 - 
Coffee polishing  - - - - 2 1 
Mie - - - - 11 1 
Soya source - - - - 2 1 
Salted fish - - - 10 23 11 
Fish preserves - - - - 14 - 
Bakery products 2 1 5 - 6 7 
Lemonade 4 1 1 - 1 3 
Cooking oil  3 3 13 4 3 
Ice-cubes 2 - - 5 5 5 
Source: RdA (1975). 
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Appendix xliv. Number of establishments, power equipment, capacity and number of persons 
employed in Riau Province and Indonesia in 1970.  
 
Number of establishment Number of power equipment 
L M T L M T 
Riau 9 334 343 22 321 343 
Indonesia 1,975 15,925 17,900 38,890 23,459 62,349 
 
Capacity of power equipment Number of persons employed 
L M T L M T 
Riau 2,088 8,321 10,409 691 3,964 4,655 
Indonesia 1,089,548 267,773 1,357,321 595,555 252,386 838,941 
Notes: L: Large; M: Medium; S: Small; T: Total. 
Source: SI (1970-1971). 
 
Appendix xlv. Number of manufacturing establishment and labour force by industry in Riau 
Province in 1975. 
 Type Number of worker 
 L M S T L M S T 
Pakanbaru 4 7 49 60 419 239 418 1,076 
Kampar 3 2 24 29 228 82 198 508 
Indragiri 
Hulu 
2 5 16 23 500 179 164 843 
Indragiri 
Hilir 
- 4 157 161 - 166 1,042 1,208 
Bengkalis 2 17 276 295 249 625 2,193 3,067 
The Riau 
Islands 
1 5 176 182 123 219 1,401 1,743 
Total 12 40 698 750 1,519 1,510 5,416 8,445 
Notes: L: Large; M: Medium; S: Small; T: Total. 
Source: RdA (1975).  
 Appendix 1: Tables  243 
 
 














Printing 4 - 1 - 3 - 
Plastic products 1 - - - 1 - 
Other Chemicals - - - - 1 13 
Soap - - - - 2 1 
Floor-tile 2 - - - - - 
brick 17 1 4 - 7 6 
Nonmetallic mineral - - - - - 2 
Machinery-weld/repa
ir 
- - - - 18 - 
Dock/ship building 2 - - - 19 8 
Wood apparel 
household 
6 - - - 12 - 
Made clothing - - - - - 2 
Metal product for 
construction 
equipment 
- - - 2 - 3 
Nail, but, bolt, knife 2 11 - - 3 - 
Total 60 29 23 161 295 182 
Source: RdA (1975). 
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Appendix xlvii. Number of industries by type of activity in Riau Province in 1975. 
Establishment 
Number of foreign worker 
Domestic Abroad 
Pertisa Trading Coy Ltd Pekanbaru - 2 
P. T. Duta Rimba Jaya - 40 
P. T. Kulim Company 4 4 
P. T. Pertambangan Balung Pekanbaru - 4 
Fa. Inewood 3 - 
P. T. Bangkinang Pekanbaru 8 - 
P. T. Nastiti 17 - 
CV. Samin 2 - 
P. T. IFA Samalinang Peranap Indragiri Hulu - 17 
P. T. Bumi Tani - 7 
Perabot Asia Jaya 5 - 
P. T. Riau Crumb Rubber Fty Pekanbaru 3 - 
Indonesia Survey AS Pekanbaru - 19 
P. T. Petro Sea Int Indonesia Pekanbaru - 63 
P. T. Sindotim Pekanbaru - 4 
P. T. Altrak - 1 
Siak Jaya - 11 
Shore Mer Timber - 63 
P. T. Riau Plywood 5 3 
CV. Uka Pekanbaru - 1 
Total 47 219 
Note: P. T. stands for perusahaan terbatas (limited company). 
Source: RdA (1975).  
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Appendix xlviii. Shipbuilding companies in the Riau Islands in 1974. 
Name 




WILIYATI Toluk Sekudai 
(Tembelan, 1969) 
Saws, axe, drill, etc. 9  
Lim Kan Lim alins Budiman 
Kesuna (Tanjung Pinang, 
1956) 
1 diesel engine, 3 drilling 
machines, 1 scouring machines, 2 
others 
9 3,090 
Lim You Rock (Tanjung 
Pinang, 1969) 
10 iron hammers, 24 wood drills, 
10 pressers, 3 cranes, 20 axes, ; 3 
hoes, 24 chisels, 2 excavations, 2 
sawing machines, 2 chainsaws, 
etc. 
37 3,605 
Sabtu d.h Chan Hong Ngie 
(Tanjung Balai (Karimun), 
1970) 
6 axes, 6 saws, 6 jacks, 6 
hammers, 6 drills, etc. 
11 93 
P.K.(F).I. (Tanjung Pinang, 
1972) 
1 chainsaw, 1 planer machine, 3 
drilling machines, 9 axes, 10 
handsaws, 10 hand drills, etc. 
17 4,304 
P.K.(F).I. Tanjung Pinang 
1 diesel engine generator, 2 
chainsaws, 2 planer machines, 5 
drilling machines, 6 axes, 4 hand 
saws, 4 hand drills, etc. 
10 4,304 
Source: Lampiran (1974). 
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Appendix xlix. Industrial machines used in private companies in Riau Islands in 1974. 
Name Type Information 
CV. RIMBA JAYA 
(Tanjung Pinang) 
Timer 
Diesel engines, saw machines, automatic saws (from 




Diesel engines, band saws, automatic saws (from 





Diesel engines, band saws, automatic saws, saw 
blade sharpeners (from the UK, Japan, Malaysia, 
Singapore, 1950-1971) 
FA. P. Bintan 
(Tanjung Pinang) 
Lemonade 
Diesel engines, automatic fillers, mixers, blenders of 
CO2, equipment of bottle and cover (from the UK, 
Singapore, Germany, Singapore, 1950-1962) 




Diesel engines, automatic mixers of CO2, equipment 
of bottle and cover (from UK, Singapore, 1970) 
SEGAR (Kundur) Lemonade 
Diesel engines, automatic mixers of CO2, equipment 










Diesel engines, blenders, grinders (from the UK, 
1965) 
PT. FAJAR TIMUR 
(Tanjung Pinang) 
Clothing 
Diesel generator, automatic pressers, button 
installations, sewing machines, etc. (from Japan, the 
UK, 1971) 





Diesel engines, conveyors, cutting machines, 
granulator, air pomp, hydro-cyclone, vibrating 





Diesel generator, equipment of conservation and 
vacuum, cooling machine, etc. (from Germany, the 






Diesel potter, electric motor, etc. (from the UK, 
1940) 
Source: Lampiran (1974).  
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Appendix l. Export unit value indices for Singapore (1900-1939, 1950-1970) and export price 
index for Indonesia (1870-1938). 
 
Export unit value indices 
(Singapore, 1900=100) 
Export Price Index 
(Indonesia, 1900-100) 
1900 100 1870 130.2 
1901 103 1871 157.8 
1902 109.6 1872 165.2 
1903 107.8 1873 169.6 
1904 101.5 1874 176 
1905 104.3 1875 169.7 
1906 111.2 1876 160.4 
1907 104.2 1877 167.7 
1908 98.3 1878 168.1 
1909 103 1879 156.6 
1910 114 1880 159 
1911 122.3 1881 130.4 
1912 127.2 1882 131.5 
1913 124.3 1883 142.2 
1914 114.6 1884 123.4 
1915 126.4 1885 124.5 
1916 139 1886 131.5 
1917 150.2 1887 135.7 
1918 166.2 1888 127.2 
1919 176.9 1889 147.9 
1920 203.6 1890 152.1 
1921 133.1 1891 119.9 
1922 114.3 1892 124.9 
1923 126.5 1893 143.4 
1924 130.1 1894 126.7 
1925 166.3 1895 114.1 
1926 152.3 1896 124.9 
1927 142.3 1897 110.8 
1928 117.1 1898 106.4 
1929 110.8 1899 103.7 
1930 88.1 1900 100 
1931 73 1901 104.2 
1932 62.9 1902 93 
1933 63.6 1903 94.9 
1934 77.3 1904 99.3 
1935 78.5 1905 110.4 
1936 81.8 1906 101.9 
1937 90.5 1907 98.9 
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1938 77.7 1908 104.3 
1939 86.7 1909 104.3 
1950 264.9 1910 114.9 
1951 374.3 1911 137.1 
1952 302.3 1912 129.2 
1953 261.9 1913 135.3 
1954 254.6 1914 147.9 
1955 299.8 1915 167.3 
1956 291.2 1916 159.1 
1957 284.7 1917 181.9 
1958 274.7 1918 226 
1959 301 1919 263.6 
1960 307.8 1920 362.1 
1961 307.8 1921 207.7 
1962 307.8 1922 198 
1963 307.2 1923 210.6 
1964 312.5 1924 203.4 
1965 310.7 1925 205.4 
1966 297.2 1926 188.5 
1967 299 1927 179 
1968 282.6 1928 150.1 
1969 294.3 1929 132.3 

















Source: Sugimoto, Economic Growth, 129, 136; Van Ark, 'The Volume'.  





Appendix 2: Chronology 
 
 
Residents of Singapore (1819-1826), Governors of Straits Settlements (1826-1946), Governors 
of Singapore (1946-1959). 
William Farquhar 1819-1823 
John Crawfurd 1823-1826 
Robert Fullerton 1826-1830 
Robert Ibbetson 1830-1833 
Kenneth Murchison 1833-1836 
Samuel George Bonham 1836-1843 
William John Butterworth 1843-1855 
Edmund Augustus Blundell 1855-1859 
William Orfeur Cavenagh 1859-1867 
Harry St. George Ord 1867-1873 
Andrew Clarke 1873-1875 
William Jervois 1875-1877 
Edward Archibald Harbord Anson* 1877 
William Cleaver Francis Robinson 1877-1879 
Edward Archibald Harbord Anson* 1879-1880 
Frederick Weld 1880-1887 
Cecil Clementi Smith 1887-1893 
William Edward Maxwell 1893-1894 
Charles Mitchell 1894-1899 
James Alexander Swettenham* 1899-1901 
Frank Swettenham 1901-1904 
John Anderson 1904-1911 
Arthur Young 1911-1920 
Laurence Guillemard 1920-1927 
Hugh Clifford 1927-1930 
Cecil Clementi 1930-1934 
Shenton Thomas 1934-1942 
Lord Louis Mountbatten** 1945-1946 
Shenton Thomas 1945-1946 
Franklin Charles Gimson 1946-1952 
Wilfred Lawson Blythe*** 1952 
John Fearns Nicoll 1952-1955 
William Goode*** 1955 
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Robert Brown Black 1955-1957 
William Goode 1957-1959 
Note: * Acting Governor of the Straits Settlements; ** British High Command; *** Acting 
Governor of Singapore. 
Source: ARSS, CSAR, SYB. 
 
 
Temenggong/Sultan of Johor, 1806-1981. 
Abdul Rahman 1806-1825 
Daing Ibrahim 1825-1862* 
Abu Bakar 1862-1895 
Ibrahim 1895-1959 
Ismail 1959-1981 
Note: * He was officially installed as temenggong in 1841. In 1855, he claimed himself as 
maharaja of Johor. 
Source: Trocki, Prince. 
 
 
Sultan of the Riau-Lingga Sultanate, 1811-1911. 
Abdul Rahman I 1811-1832 
Muhammad II 1832-1841* 
Mahmud Muzaffar 1834-1857** 
Sulaiman 1857-1883*** 
Abdul Rahman II 1883-1911**** 
Note:  * After about 1834, Sultan Muhammad II acted as a Regent. 
 ** Sultan Mahmud Muzaffar was crowned sultan by his father in about 1834. Sultan 
Muhammad died in 1841 and Mahmud took over the kingdom without a regent. In 1856, 
Sultan Mahmud ignored the Dutch prohibition and insisted on going to Singapore. Having 
made a threat, the Dutch then deposed him and he died in Pahang in July, 1864.  
 *** On October 10, 1857, the Dutch installed Mahmud’s uncle, Sulaiman, as sultan of 
Lingga. 
 **** He was the son of Yang di-Pertuan Muda Muhammad Yusuf. His mother was 
Fatimah, daughter of ex-Sultan Mahmud. 
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Residents of the Riau Residency, 1870-1942. 
D. W. Schift 1870-1880 
A. H. G. Blokzeijl 1886 
E. A. Halewijn 1886-1888 
F. S. A. de Clercq 1888-1890 
E. W. E. Burger 1890-1893 
A. L.van Hasselt 1893-1896 
A. M. Joekes 1896-1898 
W. C. Hoogkamer 1898-1901 
V. L. de Lannoy 1901-1903 
W. A. de Kanter 1903-1908 
W. J. Rahder 1908-1910 
G.F. de Bruin Kops 1910-1914 
A. C. Veenhuyzen 1914-1916 
L. R. Wentholt 1916-1921 
L. M. F. Plate 1921-1924 
V. A. Doeve 1924-1928 
J. Roest 1928-1933 
Jhr. J. M. von Schmidt auf Altenstadt 1933-1936 
P. J. Goedhart 1936-1939 




Chinese Kapiteins in the Riau Islands, 1867-1942. 
Kapitein in Tandjong 
Pinang  Kapitein in Lingga  
Poeij Gossi 1867-1875 Gho Soei Lim 1870-1877 
Oei Soei Kiat 1875-1892 Oeij Soei In 1877-1891 
Oei Tiang Tjai 1892-1917 Liem Pak Djiem 1891-1904 
Oei Tiou Tjing 1917-1930   
Oei Pit Ship 1930-1942   
Source: RAN. 
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Appendix 3: Selected Chinese Translations 
 
 
Cheong Chin Heng       章芳琳 
Chew Boon Lay        周文礼 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry   中华总商会 
Chinese Commerce Bank      华商银行 
Chop         号 
Chop Ban Ann        万安号 
Chop Chin Choon       振兴号 
Chop Chin Giap        振春号 
Chop Chin Joo        振裕号 
Chop Kwang Hong       广丰号 
Chop Tek Watt        德发号 
Chung-hua tsung-hui (Chinese General Association) 
          中华总会 
Cunxin Kongsi        存心公司 
Danbangke        担帮客 
Dangerous Societies Suppression Ordinance   危险社团镇压法令 
De Ambtenaar voor Chineesche zaken    华民政务司 
E. Fong Seng        余凤城 
Fujian         福建 
Fuxing Kongsi        福兴公司 
Gho          吴 
Goh Chok Tong        吴作栋 
Gho Siew Swee & Co.       吴秀水公司 
Guangdong        广东 
Guangzhao Kongsi       广肇公司 
Haishan Kongsi        海山公司 
Hap Liong Company       合隆号 
Heap Eng Moh        协荣茂轮船公司 
Ho Hong Bank        和丰银行 
Ho Hong Steamship Company     和丰轮船公司 
Hokkien         福建人 
Hsiao-po/Fu-po        小坡/福坡 
Hui          会 
Kangchu         港主 
Kangchu system        港主制度 
Kangkar         港脚 
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Kapitan         甲必丹 
Kongkek         公局 
Kongsi         公司 
Kwong Yik Bank       广益银行 
Lee Cheng Yan        李清渊 
Lee Keng Liat        李庆烈 
Lee Kong Chian        李光前 
Lee Pek Hoon        李百云 
Lieutenant         雷珍兰 
Lim Peng Siang        林秉祥 
Major         玛腰 
Nanyang         南洋 
NV Lian Hua        联华轮船公司 
Oei/Oey         黄 
Oversea-Chinese Banking      华侨银行 
Panglong         枋廊 
Red diploma        洪单 
Sampan poekat        大船 
Sampans         舢板 
Seah Cheng Joo        佘振裕 
Seah Chiam Yeow       佘瞻耀 
Seah Eng Kiat        佘应吉 
Seah Eu Chin        佘有进 
Seah Liang Seah        佘连城 
Secretary         朱葛礁 
Sim Cheng Mia        沈清名 
S.M.J.         忠诚勋章 
Songbai Kongsi        松柏公司 
Syonan-to         昭南岛 
Ta-po/Chao-po        大坡/潮坡 
Tan/Chen         陈 
Tan A Tiao        陈亚朝 
Tan Chay Yan        陈齐贤 
Tan Joor Tiam        陈裕添 
Tan Hengjing        陈亨敬 
Tan Hoo         陈和 
Tan Jiak Kim        陈若锦 
Tan Jincheng        陈进成 
Tan Joor Tiam        陈裕添 
Tan Kah Kee        陈嘉庚 
Tan Keong Saik        陈恭锡 
Tan Kim Wah        陈金华 
Tan Seng Poh        陈成宝 
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Tan Taw Hee        陈大喜 
Tan Tock Seng        陈笃生 
Tan Wi Yan        陈惟贤 
Tan Yeok Nee        陈旭年 
Tan Yuanjiao        陈源教 
Tauke         头家 
Temenggong        天猛公 
Teochew         潮州人 
The Chinese General Association     中华总会 
The Chinese Protectorate      华民护卫司署 
The Heaven and Earth Society (Triad)    天地会 
Tio Hoe Lay        张扶来 
Tiong Hua Loen Chun Kongsi     中华轮船公司 
Totok         新客 
Wee Bin & Company       黄敏公司 
Wee Boon Teck        黄文德 
Western ships        番仔船 
Wong Ah Fook        黄亚福 
Wong Siew Yuen       黄兆源 
Yicheng Kongsi        义成公司 
Yifu Kongsi        义福公司 














Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI, National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia), 
Jakarta AS: Algemene Secretarie 
 RAR: Residentie Archief Riouw 
 
National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew 
 BT 31: Board of Trade: Companies Registration Office: Files of Dissolved Companies  
 (1855-1930) 
 CO 273: Colonial Office: Straits Settlements Original Correspondence (1838-1939) 
 CO 882: War and Colonial Department and Colonial Office: Confidential Print Eastern 
  (1843-1952) 
 
Special Collection, Leiden University Library 
 BPL 2105: M. Schaalje, De geheime genootschappen 




Government reports and statistics 
ABSM   Annual Bulletin of Statistics, Malaysia (1964-1968) 
ARFM   Annual Report of the Federation of Malaya (1949) 
ARMD   Annual Report of the Marine Department (1949) 
ARSS   Annual Reports of the Straits Settlements (1870-1942) 
ASTSIJB Annual Statistical Tables, State/Inspectorate of Johor Bahru 
(1963-1966) 
CEI Changing Economy in Indonesia: A Selection of Statistical Source 
Material from the early Nineteenth Century up to 1940 
CSAR   Colony of Singapore Annual Report (1950-1960) 
DMAR   Department of Mines, Annual Report (1966) 
HCHON Handboek voor cultuur- en handels-ondernemingen in 
Nederlandsch-Indië (1888-1940) 
JAR    Johor Annual Report (1910-1942) 
JN Jaaroverzicht van den in-en uitvoer van Nederlandsch-Indië gedurende 
het jaar 1925-1942  
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KV    Koloniaal Verslag (1870-1930) 
MCKS Mededeelingen van het Centraal Kantoor voor de Statistiek gedurende 
het jaar 1925-1940   
MvO    Memories van Overgave 
MSMDESS  Malayan Statistics Monthly Digest of Economic and Social Statistics  
    (1955-1960) 
Lampiran Lampiran laporan: laporan survey: industri maritim/kapal kayu, 
industri dasar bidang permesinan dan peralatan industri, industri 
kerajinan tenun gedogan di daerah Propinsi Riau (1973, 1974) 
OCTS   Oil Palm, Coconut and Tea Statistics (Department of Statistics) 
RRBDFM Report on the Registration of Births and Deaths, the Federation of 
Malaya (1950-1965) 
RAN    Regeerings-Almanak voor Nederlandsch-Indië (1870-1942) 
RBI    Report of Bank Indonesia (previously the Java Bank) 
RdA    Riau dalam Angka (1975) 
RSH    Rubber Statistics Handbook (Department of Statistics)  
SHS Statistiek van den handel, de scheepvaart en de in- en uitvoerregten op de 
bezittingen buiten Java en Madoera, over het jaar 1866-1875, Statistiek 
van den handel, de scheepvaart en de in- en uitvoerrechten in 
Nederlandsch-Indië over het jaar 1877-1925 
SI    Statistik Indonesia: statistical pocketbook of Indonesia 
SMD    Singapore and Malaysia Directory (1966) 
SSN Statistiek van de scheepvaart in Nederlandsch-Indië over het jaar 
1910-1939 
STDS   The Straits Times Directory of Singapore (1889, 1891, 1907, 1908) 
SYB    Singapore Year Book (1949-1966) 
TDAR   Trade Division Annual Report (1960-1969) 
VSWM   Vital Statistics West Malaysia (1967) 






Browns Malayan Economic Review 
Soerabaijasch Handelsblad 
Singapore Free Press 
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Dit proefschrift bestudeert de geschiedenis van een regionaal samenwerkingsverband, 
de SIJORI-groeidriehoek, en met name de onderlinge economische verbindingen 
tussen Singapore, Johor en de Riau-archipel. Deze reeds lang bestaande verbindingen 
vormden de basis voor lokale netwerken die met name na de jaren 1870 werden 
uitgebreid, geïntensiveerd en gediversifieerd op niet alleen economisch, maar ook op 
sociaal en politiek gebied. Aan de hand van vier aspecten, te weten sociopolitieke 
veranderingen, handel, scheepvaart en kapitaalbewegingen analyseert deze studie 
twee vormen van integratie van de groeidriehoek tussen 1870 en 1970: 1. Interne 
integratie binnen de groeidriehoek; 2. Externe integratie in de wereldeconomie 
binnen een groter proces van globalisering. 
Vanuit een sociopolitiek oogpunt vertoonden de regionale politieke en sociale 
aspecten zowel verschillen als overeenkomsten tussen de drie gebieden. Op politiek 
gebied was er in de honderd jaar van ontwikkeling binnen de driehoek meer 
continuïteit dan discontinuïteit zichtbaar, welk kenmerk nauw samenhing met 
koloniale politiek. De continuïteit was ook zichtbaar in de politieke relaties. Tussen 
Singapore en Johor, die onder hetzelfde politieke regime vielen, bestonden 
interactieve en invloedrijke contacten, terwijl de politieke verbindingen tussen de 
Riau-archipel en de andere regio’s vrij zwak waren. Dit verschil wordt toegeschreven 
aan het antagonisme tussen de Nederlanders en de Britten en later tussen Indonesië 
en Maleisië.  
In tegenstelling tot  het politieke niveau waarop de regio’s vrij zelfstandig 
opereerden,  was er op sociaal niveau  regionaal  juist meer onderlinge 
verbondenheid en wederzijdse beïnvloeding ten aanzien van demografische structuur, 
sociale organisatie van de Chinese gemeenschap en etnische relaties. 
De voortzetting en beëindiging van deze sociale verbanden werd in grote mate 
beïnvloed door de relaties tussen Maleiers, Europeanen, Chinezen en andere etnische 
groepen. De Europese en Chinese economische invloed in de koloniale periode was 
bevorderd door een goede verstandhouding tussen beide groepen, omdat de 
Europeanen de Chinezen nodig hadden om als tussenpersonen op te treden. Toen de 
Maleiers na de Pacifische Oorlog politieke macht verkregen sloeg de goede relatie 
tussen de Maleiers en de andere bevolkingsgroepen om in lichte rivaliteit. De 
Europese en Chinese economische positie werd ingeperkt, maar door Maleise 
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onbekwaamheid in zakendoen en beperkt inheems ondernemerschap konden de 
Europeanen en Chinezen een rol van belang blijven spelen.  
Tegen deze dynamische sociopolitieke achtergrond tekende zich in de regionale 
economische ontwikkeling een uniek patroon af dat zichtbaar werd in de toename in 
handel, scheepvaart en kapitaal. In grote lijnen ontwikkelde de regionale economie, 
die export-georiënteerd was, zich snel in honderd jaar, maar met duidelijke 
verschillen in plaats en tijd. Singapore vertoonde een ontwikkeling die gelijk was aan 
de uitbreiding van de wereldhandel in de periode die deze studie omvat. Daarentegen 
duidden de afwijkende wijzen van economische ontwikkeling in Johor en de 
Riau-archipel op hun beperkte internationalisering en juist regionale focus. 
De tegenstelling tussen Singapore en de twee andere regio’s was een direct 
resultaat van verschillende patronen in economische verbindingen in de drie regio’s. 
In de koloniale periode waren in Singapore internationale contacten gelegd voor de 
uitwisseling van grondstoffen zoals rubber, mineralen, olieproducten van het 
achterland en geproduceerde goederen uit westerse landen door stoomschepen die de 
oceanen bevoeren. Zodoende was een uitgebreid netwerk gecreëerd in Singapore dat 
toenam in de periode die deze  studie beslaat. In zowel Johor als de Riau-archipel 
daarentegen ontbraken goede externe verbindingen, omdat zij met hun traditionele 
zeilschepen en oude tweedehands stoomschepen zowel voor export van regionale 
grondstoffen als voor de import van dagelijkse benodigdheden afhankelijk waren van 
Singapore. 
Hoewel beide regeringen de intentie hadden om handel te drijven in 
binnenlandse havens speelden de geografische nabijheid en de goede 
handelsfaciliteiten in Singapore een essentiële rol in het aantrekken van handel, 
scheepvaart en kapitaal. Voor Johor en de Riau-archipel werden daarom, afgezien 
van de driehoek, slechts beperkte externe verbindingen opgezet. Na de 
onafhankelijkheid transformeerde Singapore langzaam van een haven die afhankelijk 
was van doorvoerhandel naar een haven die afhankelijk was van export van 
binnenlandse industriële producten door middel van importsubstitutie. Dit 
resulteerde in een verminderde afhankelijkheid van de Maleise en Indonesische 
achterlanden, inclusief Johor en de Riau-archipel. Desalniettemin was er zeker tot de 
jaren zeventig nog geen sprake van een substantiële afname. In de periode die deze 
studie beslaat vertoonden de economieën  van Johor en de Riau-archipel, die vooral 
regionaal georiënteerd waren, dus een sterke afhankelijkheid van en focus op 
Singapore, waar de economie sterk geïntegreerd was in de wereldmarkt. 
Kortom, in plaats van een groeiende economie in alle drie regio’s was er sprake 
van een aanmerkelijk regionaal verschil dat zichtbaar was in veel sterkere 
economische prestaties van Singapore dan van de andere gebieden, onder invloed 
van een combinatie van natuurlijke grondstoffen, economische regelgeving en 
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politiek beleid in de drie gebieden. Deze studie verklaart het ontstaan van 
verbindingen binnen de driehoek aan de hand van vier elementen: de wereldwijde 
vraag naar regionale grondstoffen die overgeladen en verscheept worden in 
Singapore; de vorming van backward linkages in Singapore gebaseerd op producten 
van Johor en de Riau-archipel; de financiële diensten in Singapore; en de rol van 
multi-etnische groepen die optraden als handelaren, transporteurs, investeerders, 
enzovoorts.  
De externe verbindingen van de driehoeksregio werden langzaam uitgebreid en 
geïntensiveerd in de honderd jaar tussen 1870 en 1970.  Deze studie plaatst het 
regionale netwerk in de context van globalisering aan de hand van een model 
ontwikkeld door Held, McGrew en anderen. Vier indicatoren worden daarbij 
gehanteerd: extensiteit, intensiviteit, omloopsnelheid, en invloed. De uitkomsten 
tonen aan dat de processen en mate van globalisering in Singapore, Johor en de 
Riau-archipel verschillen. Er was een geleidelijk toenemende integratie in de 
wereldeconomie in Singapore  waarbij volledige globalisering werd bereikt in the 
naoorlogse periode, terwijl de mate van globalisering in Johor en de Riau-archipel 
lager was in diezelfde periode. 
Regionalisering is daarom een passendere term om de integratie van deze twee 
regio’s te beschrijven. De globalisering in Johor en de Riau-archipel was dus 
afhankelijk van hun verbindingen met Singapore. Het ontstaan van dit beeld kan het 
beste geïllustreerd worden aan de hand van de wereld-systeemtheorie, waarbij de 
discrepantie tussen kern en periferie wordt uitgelicht. Deze studie bevestigt dat het 
gemakkelijker is voor een regio als Singapore om zijn integratie met de wereld te 
versterken als de politieke en economische zwaarte overeenkomen. Dit argument 
bevestigt dat het proces van globalisering in Johor en de Riau-archipel makkelijker te 
integreren valt met Singapore dan met Maleisië of Indonesië. 
Deze studie onderschrijft de visie van Huff dat de samenstelling van de handel 
van Singapore niet slechts een stedelijk-ruraal dualisme weerspiegelde, maar dat er 
eigenlijk sprake was van een driedeling, namelijk binnenlandse, Maleise en 
extra-Maleise markten, die een verschillende mate van integratie van Johor en de 
Riau-archipel met Singapore weergeven. Dit patroon is vooral ontstaan door 
Europese en Chinese economische voortrekkers die een grote rol speelden in het in 
gang zetten van regionale economische veranderingen en buitengewone groei. Deze 
twee etnische groepen zouden door de aan hen toegeschreven individuele etniciteit 
en ideologie op verschillende wijzen hebben bijgedragen aan de totstandkoming van 
de twee verbindingen, zowel de externe als de interne. Deze verbindingen vormden 
een vroeg prototype van de SIJORI-groeidriehoek. 
